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El Salvador: Root Causes and Just Asylum 
Policy Responses 
 




Abstract: Throughout the course of United States history, there has often 
been a chasm between our ideals as a country, and our actions.  Our foreign 
policy and immigration policy have been no exception – frequently betraying 
our stated commitment to democracy, respect for human rights, and 
protection of the persecuted.   This article takes a close look at El Salvador, 
whose nationals make up a significant number of asylum seekers at our 
border. Our foreign and immigration policies towards El Salvador are 
illustrative of that gap between ideals and reality.  We supported a brutal 
military during that country’s civil war, and adopted an unjust and biased 
policy towards Salvadoran asylum seekers.  In recent years, as conditions 
worsened in El Salvador, the U.S. did too little to address root causes, and 
instead doubled-down on policies of deterrence and exclusion.  In this article 
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I argue that we, as a nation, can do better.  We can welcome those fleeing 
persecution, while implementing policies that address the root causes of their 
flight. The article begins with a discussion of the conditions in El Salvador 
which lead to forced migration – from violence and corruption to climate 
change and natural disasters.  The article next describes and critiques U.S. 
asylum policy from the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act to the beginning of 
the Biden administration; it details the substantive and procedural measures 
that have resulted in the denial of protection, and provides modest reform 
proposals. The article ends with an overview of recommendations for 
addressing the root causes of migration, with an appeal for the U.S. to live 
up to its ideals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2018 I published an article, El Salvador – A Peace Worse than War: 
Violence, Gender and a Failed Legal Response.1  Since the end of its twelve 
year civil war in 1992, El Salvador has experienced some of the highest levels 
of violence, including violence against women, of any country in the world.2  
A Peace Worse than War examined the complex interplay of historical and 
contemporary factors that have contributed to these persistently high levels 
of violence, and have caused many Salvadorans to flee their homeland.  
 Since the publication of A Peace Worse than War, conditions in El 
Salvador have worsened in many respects.  At the same time, throughout its 
four years, the Trump administration did everything within its power to end 
the possibility of refugee protection for Salvadorans (as well as those from 
other countries), fleeing violence and persecution.  The Trump 
administration’s most draconian measure was to indefinitely close the border 
to all asylum seekers – using public health concerns around COVID-19 as a 
justification.3  A restrictive immigration policy towards Salvadorans is 
nothing new.4  Since the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, restrictive policies 
have greatly limited protection for asylum seekers – of which a large 
 
 1 Karen Musalo, El Salvador - A Peace Worse than War: Violence, Gender and a Failed 
Legal Response, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (2018). 
 2  E.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43616, EL SALVADOR: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 
5 (Jul. 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43616.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQD9-LMFV] 
[hereinafter CONG. RSCH. SERV.]; U.K. HOME OFFICE, COUNTRY POLICY AND INFORMATION 
NOTE, EL SALVADOR: GANGS 47-48 (Feb. 2020), 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2026251/El_Salvador_-_CPIN_-_Gangs_-
_v1.EXT.cleared.pdf [https://perma.cc/A896-GBZP] [hereinafter U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 
2020]. 
 3 An order issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on March 
20, 2020 allowed for the closure of the border, and the expulsion without process of all 
individuals without valid documents, arriving by land. Lucas Guttentag, Coronavirus Border 
Expulsions: CDC’s Assault on Asylum Seekers and Unaccompanied Minors, JUST SECURITY 
(Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69640/coronavirus-border-expulsions-cdcs-
assault-on-asylum-seekers-and-unaccompanied-minors/ [https://perma.cc/YNB4-DQ3L].  
There was no exception for asylum seekers or those fleeing torture.  The CDC order was issued 
pursuant to an interim final rule promulgated by the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS).  Id.  It was based on the purported authority of section 362 of the 1944 Public 
Health Service Act which permits the suspension of the “introduction of persons or goods” 
into the U.S. on public health grounds.  Id.  This statutory provision had never before been 
used to expel people at the border, but only to quarantine people and goods.  Id.  Although the 
closure was justified as being a necessary public health measure, it was later revealed that it 
was adopted as a result of pressure from the White House, over the objections of top health 
officials.  Associated Press, Pence Ordered Borders Closed in March over Objection of CDC 
Experts, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-10-
05/mike-pence-close-borders-cdc-experts-refused [https://perma.cc/83A7-T74U]. 
 4 See infra Section II.  
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percentage have been Salvadoran.  However, with the Trump administration, 
these restrictive policies reached new heights.  President Biden has signaled 
a very different approach, ending some of the Trump era policies within his 
first two weeks in office, and promising to review others to determine 
whether they should be terminated.5 
 The economic cost of deterrence is high; the amount expended for 
immigration enforcement in the U.S. has increased over the years.  Between 
2003, when the Department of Homeland Security was created, and July 
2020, it is estimated that the federal government spent $333 billion on 
immigration enforcement.6  But it is not economic cost alone that should 
concern us; there is the incalculable human cost of suffering and death which 
is the consequence of turning away asylum seekers.  Beyond the individual 
loss of life and potential is the damage done to a global system, when the 
nations of the world – especially those with greater resources – shrink back 
from their international commitments.  The entire protection system is 
weakened, leaving it to a smaller number of countries to step up and fill the 
gap.   
 The exclusion and deterrence of asylum seekers is a violation of 
protection obligations,7 and is troubling on the moral and ethical realm.8  In 
situations where the numbers of asylum seekers far exceed U.S. capacity – a 
situation which has not existed in recent history – the U.S. could engage in 
“burden-sharing” with other countries.9  But ultimately, the solution to large-
 
 5 See infra, text accompanying notes 391-399. 
 6 The Cost of Immigration Enforcement and Border Security, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1 
(Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/the-cost-of-
immigration-enforcement-and-border-security [https://perma.cc/PMA3-9X5C]. 
 7 The U.S. is a party to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for 
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].  
Congress enacted the 1980 Refugee Act to bring U.S. refugee law “into conformance” with 
the Protocol.   INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). 
 8 Philosophers have examined the moral or ethical dimensions of refugee protection.  For 
example, Peter Singer has written, “[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it.” Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 
231 (1972).  
 9 The concept and importance of burden-sharing is set forth in many Executive 
Committee Conclusions of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
See, e.g., Rebecca Dowd & Jane McAdam, International Cooperation and Responsibility-




FHDM]; G.A. Res. 71/1, ¶ 7 (Sept. 19, 2016) (recognizing the need for international 
cooperation and burden-sharing when there are mass influxes of refugees). 
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scale refugee flows lies in addressing root causes for forced migration, a 
commitment which President Joe Biden has made.10  
 The argument to address root causes becomes even more compelling 
when a receiving country has played a role in creating the conditions of 
violence and inequality that force people to flee their homes.11  The U.S. 
funded the brutal military regime over the course of El Salvador’s twelve 
year civil war; the conflict resulted in 75,000 killed, 7,000 disappeared, and 
500,000 displaced.12  Despite “ever-growing evidence” of the commission of 
atrocities, the Carter administration, followed at a higher level by the Reagan 
administration, continued financial assistance to the Salvadoran military.13  It 
only ended its support due to intense pressure to do so given the high level of 
human rights abuses.14  And in its post-war period, when El Salvador was 
struggling to develop strong democratic institutions and a functioning legal 
system, the U.S. deported thousands of Salvadoran gang members – 
something with which the country was not equipped to deal.15 
 In this article, I focus on two distinct but related themes – the conditions 
in El Salvador that cause people to flee, and the evolution of U.S. asylum 
standards that increasingly resulted in the exclusion from protection of 
Salvadorans (and other Central Americas).  Part I looks at the push factors of 
violence, deeply entrenched economic inequality, and climate change and 
environmental degradation.  It also provides an overview of developments 
since the 2019 election of Nayib Bukele, a leader with alarmingly 
authoritarian tendencies.  Part II examines the United States’ policy towards 
Salvadoran migrants from the civil war era to the present, critiquing select 
developments in asylum law that have excluded those worthy of protection 
from receiving it.  It makes the case that it is not only the restrictive policies 
 
 10 “We cannot solve the humanitarian crisis at our border without addressing the violence, 
instability, and lack of opportunity that compel so many people to flee their homes.”  Exec. 
Order No. 14,010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8267 (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-02-05/pdf/2021-02561.pdf  
[hereinafter E.O., Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework].  This Executive Order 
commits to working “closely with civil society, international organizations, and the 
governments in the region to: establish a comprehensive strategy for addressing the causes of 
migration[.]”  Id. at § 1. 
 11 Musalo, supra note 1, at 11-12.  
 12 Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional Refugee 
Crisis: Lessons from the. Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central American Women and Children 
at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 137, 154 (2017). 
 13 Musalo, supra note 1, at 11. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See José Miguel Cruz, Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of 
Violence, presented at Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding, 2009 Global 
Gangs Workshop (May 14-15, 2009), 
http://www.academia.edu/1451010/Global_Gangs_in_El_Salvador_Maras_and_the_Politics
_of_Violence [https://perma.cc/T3L7-X4BY]. 
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implemented by the Trump administration that need to be rolled back, but 
other substantive and procedural developments that diverge from 
international norms.  Part III provides a brief overview of measures to 
constructively address the root cause of forced migration in El Salvador.  
 
I. ROOT CAUSES OF FORCED MIGRATION  
 
A. Historical Context 
 
 Current conditions in El Salvador can be best understood in historical 
context.  Starting in the colonial period, powerful, monied interests 
dispossessed indigenous communities of their land and forced them to 
become a low-wage source of labor.  These deep inequalities and 
exploitations were maintained by brutal repression over decades.  Attempts 
to bring about societal change – specifically greater economic equality 
through popular organizing were met with state violence.  Ultimately, this 
led to the taking up of arms, and the ensuing twelve-year year civil war 
between the Frente Farabundo Martí para La Liberación Nacional (FMLN) 
[Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front] and the Salvadoran state.16  The 
conflict was characterized by massive human rights violations committed by 
Salvadoran security forces, which received substantial support from the 
United States government.17  
 The civil war came to an end in 1992 with a negotiated agreement and 
the signing of Peace Accords.  Although the conflict had been fought with 
the objective of obtaining greater economic justice, the Peace Accords did 
not result in measures which addressed the profound economic inequalities 
which had led to the conflict.18  The U.S. was not a constructive force; it used 
its influence to pressure El Salvador to adopt neoliberal economic policies,19  
 
 16 See Musalo, supra note 1, at 8-14 (discussing the history leading up to the twelve-year 
civil war).  
 17 During the conflict the U.S. provided $4.5 billion in economic and military aid.  PAT 
PATERSON, TRAINING SURROGATE FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: LESSONS 
FROM PERU, COLOMBIA, EL SALVADOR, AND IRAQ 75 (2016).  
 18 Musalo, supra note 1, at 14. 
 19 Id. at 24-25.  For example, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) funded a Salvadoran think tank that developed an economic liberalization plan 
which included “eliminating price controls, deregulating interest rates, and cutting public 
spending, especially to public services such as education and health care.”  ELLEN MOODIE, 
EL SALVADOR IN THE AFTERMATH OF PEACE: CRIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY 42 (2010).   The Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) [Nacionalist 
Republican Alliance], which held power from 1994-2009, is firmly associated with neoliberal 
policies:   
[T]he rise of neoliberal policies under ARENA still haunts Salvadorans 
today. The dollarization and privatization of telecommunications, electric 
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whose impact were adverse to the interests of the poor.  There was also little 
appetite to address the human rights violations committed during the conflict, 
which largely remained in impunity.20 
 The first post-war elections were held in March 1994.21  The candidate 
of the right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) [Nationalist 
Republican Alliance], the party representing the interests of the monied elite, 
was elected president.22  ARENA held the power of the presidency in 
successive elections until 2009 when defeated by the FMLN candidate.23  
Disillusionment with both parties, resulting from corruption and the inability 
to address violence committed with impunity, economic inequality, and other 
pressing societal problems,24 led to the 2019 election of Nayib Bukele, the 
 
energy, public banks, the pension system, sugar mills, and coffee exports, 
along with the passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), a free market strategy that largely benefits U.S. corporate 
interests, heightened poverty levels and widened inequality.  
Karla Cativo, Abstention Wins in El Salvador: Though Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele 
claimed a narrow first-round victory, low voter turnout reveals deep problems in the country’s 
political landscape, 51 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, 127, 128 (2019). 
 20 The Salvadoran Legislative Assembly passed a broad amnesty law after the end of the 
civil war.  Musalo, supra note 1, at 21.  On July 13, 2016, the Constitutional Chamber of El 
Salvador’s Supreme Court ruled the Amnesty Law unconstitutional allowing prosecutions for 
crimes committed during the armed conflict.  Id. at 23-24.  For an extensive discussion of the 
repeal of the Amnesty Law, see Nadia Hajji, After Repeal of El Salvador’s Amnesty Law: Next 
Steps in Justice and Accountability, 53 TEX. INT’L L. J. 77 (2018).  One of the most significant 
cases underway is the trial for the El Mozote massacre, during which the military killed more 
than 1,000 civilians.  CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 16.  There have been attempts by 
the Legislative Assembly to enact a law which would essentially restore a broad amnesty, but 
to date they have been unsuccessful. In El Salvador, Justice Delayed—Again?, AMERICA, Mar. 
16, 2020, at 8, 
https://www.americamagazine.org/sites/default/files/issue_pdf/ARI_03.16.20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZDX-CGY6]. 
 21 See Dinorah Azpuru, The Salience of Ideology: Fifteen Years of Presidential Elections 
in El Salvador, 52 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 103, 109 (2010); Howard W. French, Rightist 
Party Retains Power in Salvadoran Election, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/22/world/rightist-party-retains-power-in-salvadoran-
election.html [https://perma.cc/ZKU3-T3VE]. 
 22 Azpuru, supra note 21, at 109; MOODIE, supra note 19, at 39; Chris van Der Borgh, 
The Politics of Neoliberalism in Postwar El Salvador, 30 INT’L J. OF POL. ECON. 36, 47 (2000). 
 23 Azpuru, supra note 21, at 109; Blake Schmidt & Elisabeth Malkin, Leftist Party Wins 
Salvadoran Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/world/americas/17salvador.html 
[https://perma.cc/93NJ-LHPZ]. 
 24 “After continuous disappointments with previous governments, including former 
presidents who face serious corruption charges, voters are counting on Bukele to deliver on 
his promises to tackle the countries’ [sic] three crushing problems: corruption, violence and 
poverty.” Frida Ghitis, Is El Salvador’s New Social-Media Savvy President Promising Too 
Much?, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Sept. 12, 2019), 
EL SALVADOR ROOT CAUSES-04.05.2021.DOCX2- MUSALO HRPLJ V18-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2021  9:30 PM 
Summer 2021  EL SALVADOR: ROOT CAUSES & JUST ASYLUM POL’Y RESPONSES 187 
first president who did not belong to either ARENA or the FMLN.25  Bukele 
ran as a candidate of the Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (GANA) 
[Grand Alliance for National Unity], which is considered a right of center 
party.26  It is worth noting that Buekele prevailed in an election with a high 
level of abstention – more than half of the registered voters (53%) failed to 
vote.27     
 Since elected, Bukele has raised alarms internationally as a result of his 
anti-democratic, authoritarian tendencies which have included using the 
military in an attempt to coerce members of the Legislative Assembly to 
approve funding for his public security  plan,28 and publicly disparaging 
Supreme Court rulings regarding the legality of his COVID-19 quarantine 




 25 For more background on Nayib Bukele, see generally, Noelia Ruiz-Alba & Rosalba 
Mancinas-Chávez, The Communications Strategy via Twitter of Nayib Bukele: The Millennial 
President of El Salvador, 33 COMM. & SOC’Y 259 (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://revistas.unav.edu/index.php/communication-and-society/article/view/39038 
[https://perma.cc/Q5N3-8STE].  Bukele’s father was a successful entrepreneur, and he was 
involved in the family business, as well as starting his own business, Obermet, before running 
for political office. Id. at 260-61. In 2012 he successfully ran as a FMLN candidate for mayor 
of Nuevo Cuscatlán; in 2015 he was elected mayor of San Salvador. Id. at 261. In October 
2017 he was expelled from the FMLN after being accused of violence against a city 
councilwoman. Cativo, supra note 19. After his expulsion, Bukele founded a new party, 
Nuevas Ideas (New Ideas), planning to run for president as its candidate, but was unable to do 
so due to electoral requirements. Ruiz-Alba et al., supra note 25, at 261.  He then joined and 
ran as candidate of the Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (GANA) [Grand Alliance for 
National Unity]. Id.   
 26 Ruiz-Alba et al., supra note 25, at 261. 
 27 Cativo, supra note 19, at 127. 
 28 Maria Luz Nóchez, Bukele Bypasses Legislative Assembly and Extends the State of 
Emergency by Decree, EL FARO (May 18, 2020), 
https://elfaro.net/en/202005/el_salvador/24434/Bukele-Bypasses-Legislative-Assembly-and-
Extends-the-State-of-Emergency-by-Decree.htm [https://perma.cc/KW3R-HBHT];  Valeria 
Guzmán, Nelson Rauda & Jimmy Alvarado, Bukele Mete al Ejército en la Asamblea y 
Amenaza con Disolverla dentro de una Semana [Bukele Brings the Army into the Assembly 
and Threatens to Dissolve the Assembly within a Week], EL FARO (Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://elfaro.net/es/202002/el_salvador/24008/Bukele-mete-al-Ejército-en-la-Asamblea-y-
amenaza-con-disolverla-dentro-de-una-semana.htm [https://perma.cc/5F72-CE7H]; Frida 
Ghitis, El Salvador Knew Bukele Was Brash. But His Military Show of Force Was Ominous, 
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28535/in-el-salvador-bukele-sends-an-
ominous-signal-with-his-military-show-of-force [https://perma.cc/Y3BV-6FSM] [hereinafter 
Ghitis, El Salvador Knew Bukele Was Brash]. 
 29 El Salvador: President Defies Supreme Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Apr. 17, 
2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/17/el-salvador-president-defies-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/XY4T-6G6R].  
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widespread corruption in his government30 and his crackdown on the media,31 
while reports of secret negotiations with the leaders of the Mara Salvatrucha 
13 gang (MS-13) have demonstrated his willingness to use them to further 
his political aspirations.32     
 
B. Violence and its Broad Societal Impact  
 
 For the past two decades, El Salvador has been one of the most violent 
countries in the world, with the highest rates of homicides and femicides.33  
Much of the killing has been blamed on the two dominant gangs,34 MS-13 
and Barrio 18, which has two factions, the Revolutionaries and the 
Southerners.35  MS-13 and Barrio 18 have their origin in the deportation of 
 
 30 See text accompanying notes 165-183. 
 31 See text accompanying notes 194-197 
 32 Steven Dudley, The El Salvador President’s Informal Pact with Gangs, INSIGHT CRIME 
(Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/el-salvador-nayib-bukele-gangs/ 
[https://perma.cc/E6EH-ADXH].  Under certain circumstances, negotiations with gangs can 
have positive societal consequences, especially in bringing down levels of violence.  See José 
Miguel Cruz, The Politics of Negotiating with Gangs. The Case of El Salvador, 38 BULL. OF 
LATIN AM. RES. 547 (2019).  See also Eric Rahman & Siniša Vuković, Sympathy for the Devil: 
When and How to Negotiate With Criminal Gangs-Case of El Salvador, 42 STUD. IN CONFLICT 
& TERRORISM 935 (2019).  However, in Bukele’s case, it was reported that his objective in 
negotiating with MS-13 was focused on bringing him political advantage, including the 
support of MS-13 for his party in legislative elections scheduled for Feb. 2021.  See Carlos 
Martínez et al., Bukele Has Been Negotiating with MS-13 for a Reduction in Homicides and 




 33 The term “femicide” is generally understood to denote the gender-motivated killing of 
a woman. The term “feminicide” adds an additional element of state complicity, demonstrated 
by the fact that the killings are carried out in a context of virtually total impunity. See Karen 
Musalo et al., Crimes Without Punishment: Violence Against Women in Guatemala, 21 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 161, 172-73 (2010). 
 34 Some sources attribute two thirds of the country’s homicides to the gangs, while others 
place the number even higher. U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 37.  Attributing 
high levels of violence to gang activity paints an incomplete picture; it does not take into 
account the historic and social factors which made El Salvador “such fertile ground for [gang] 
emergence.”  Musalo, supra note 1, at 15-16.  Structural violence dating back to 1800s, the 
brutality of the civil war, and economic inequalities and social exclusion created the conditions 
under which gang and organized crime activity could thrive.  Id. at 16.  Added to these factors, 
and especially pertinent to gender violence, and violence against the LGBTQ community, are 
the patriarchal norms which first took root during the Spanish Conquest.  Id. at 32-36.    
 35 Mirage or Miracle? Gangs and Plunging Violence in El Salvador, No. 81 INT’L CRISIS 
GROUP 1, 2 (July 8, 2020), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-
america/el-salvador/81-miracle-or-mirage-gangs-and-plunging-violence-el-salvador 
[https://perma.cc/FJH6-U2UT] [hereinafter INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Mirage or Miracle?].  
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thousands of Salvadoran youth from the U.S. in the 1990s.36  There are 
currently an estimated 60,000 gang members,37 which makes El Salvador the 
country with the highest per capital gang concentration in Central America.38  
Gangs are present in more than ninety percent of the country’s municipalities, 
and in many of them, they “exercise full control of the daily life of its 
inhabitants.”39  They determine who can enter or leave the territory, using 
murder as “‘an integral part of their exercise of control and power.’”40  The 
level of their sophistication and organization has continued to increase, with 
one source observing that they “are better organized than the State [of El 
Salvador] is.”41  In addition to homicides, MS-13 and Barrio 18 engage in a 
wide range of criminal activity, including extortion, which is believed to 
constitute eighty percent of gang income.42 
 
 36 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 6. “A country in a post-
conflict transition, with weak state institutions, deep social divides and high poverty levels 
provided perfect conditions for gangs to take root among marginalized young people.” Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 6.  
 39 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 11 & 22. See also Ivan Briscoe & David 
Keseberg, Only Connect: The Survival and Spread of Organized Crime in Latin America, 
8 PRISM 114 (2019), www.jstor.org/stable/26597314 [https://perma.cc/7GUQ-NVEP] (on 
growing sophistication and control of the gangs).  One in-country source noted that the gangs 
are an “organized power,” they have “their own rules, their own weapons, and they have 
money.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Carmen Elena Molina, Juez [Judge], Juzgado Tercero 
de Familia [Third Family Court] at 9, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 15, 2019) (on file with author).  
Judge Molina ended by saying:  “In El Salvador, we have three military branches: the national 
army, the gangs, and the private security companies.”  Id. 
 40 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 29 (quoting UNHCR, S.R. Extrajudicial 
Execution Report 2018, ¶ 65e-f (Dec. 7, 2018), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/359/05/PDF/G1835905.pdf?OpenElement).  Our in-
country sources told us of many incidents regarding the strict control the gang exert over the 
communities they command.  Roberto Rodriguez Meléndez, Child Protection Specialist at 
UNICEF addressed the ability to practice one’s religion:  “If you are a boy, you have to have 
the consent of the gang to go to church.  If a youth goes to church without the gang’s 
permission, the gang will kill him.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview, with Roberto Rodriguez 
Meléndez, Especialista en Protección Infantil [Child Protection Specialist], UNICEF, in San 
Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with author). 
 41 “Gangs are so organized.  They have members within the police, the military, the 
academia, the banks.  They have the technical ability to locate you just by checking your credit 
card online and looking where you spent your money.” CGRS/RHRC Interview, with Rosy 
Quintanilla, Gerente de Proyectos de Apoyo a la Sociedad Civil [Manager of Civil Society 
Support Projects], Save the Children, in San. Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 15, 2019) (on file with author). 
 42 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 6.  “Studies estimate that 
one in five micro- and small businesses fall prey to extortion, while the private sector as a 
whole pays the equivalent of 3 per cent of the country’s GDP by way of extortion.”  Id.  In-
country sources have noted that even “[b]usinesses and companies of high prestige are extorted 
and they pay the extortion” citing the example of Pullmantur, an international cruise company 
that operates through Latin America, and pays extortion for its landline trips in Central 
America.  CGRS/RHRC Interview, with Celia Medrano, Directora de Programación Regional 
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 As a result of corruption and a weak justice system, levels of impunity 
for crimes committed by the gangs remain high, and only a fraction of the 
homicides,43 femicides,44 and crimes of sexual violence are investigated, 
prosecuted, and result in a conviction.45  Widespread violence committed 
without an effective law enforcement response46 has had a deleterious socio-
economic impact – both on the individual and national level.  Children going 
to school47 or adults going to work cannot safely cross gang lines, resulting 
in worse educational and income levels than for similar individuals not living 
under gang control.48  When surveyed, some individuals who have fled El 
 
[Director of Regional Programming], Cristosal at 7, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 16, 2019) (on 
file with author). 
 43 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 71.  The inability to protect witnesses to 
crimes also contributes to impunity, where many prosecutions rely more on witness testimony 
than on scientific evidence such as “toxicology, pathology, and forensic studies.”  
CGRS/RHRC Interview, with Kenia Elizabeth Melgar de Palacios, Directora Ejecutiva de la 
Unidad Técnica [Executive Director of the Technical Unit] and Flor Parada, Jefa de la Unidad 
de Género [Head of the Gender Unit], Unidad Técnica Ejecutiva del Sector de Justicia (UTE) 
[Technical Executive Unit of the Judicial Sector] at 3, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2019) (on file 
with author).  The budget for El Salvador’s witness protection program “is the same as it was 
in 2006,” even though with the rise in crime, there is increased demand.  Id. 
 44 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 79.  
 45 Instituto De Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana (IDHUCA) 
University of Central America Human Rights Institute], Informe De Derechos Humanos 2019 
[Human Rights Report 2019], UNIVERSIDAD CENTROAMERICANA JOSÉ SIMEÓN CAÑAS 
[CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOSÉ SIMEÓN CAÑAS], 7 (2019), 
https://www.uca.edu.sv/idhuca/wp-content/uploads/INFORME-DE-DERECHOS-
HUMANOS-2019-VF-Completo.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6AJ-US5K] [hereinafter IDHUCA]. 
 46 For a more detailed discussion of factors leading to impunity, see infra text 
accompanying notes 421-425.  There is inadequate performance and corruption by the main 
justice system actors – from the police to the prosecutors to the judges.  CGRS/RHRC 
Interview with Sidney Blanco Reyes, Juez de Instrucción [Instruction Judge], Law Professor, 
Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas [José Simeón Cañas Central American 
University], in San. Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 17, 2019) (on file with author).  The United Nations 
Development Program commissioned Judge Reyes and a colleague to carry out an 
investigation of causes for impunity in 2007.   Their report concluded that the level of impunity 
for homicides was as high as 96.6%.  In 2019 Judge Reyes was of the opinion that: “Impunity 
has not changed much since the study, and the conclusion of this research about impunity is 
still perfectly valid and relevant today.”  Id. at 2.   
 47 See, e.g., Families on the Run, Why Families Flee From Northern Central America?, 
UNHCR (2019), https://familiesontherun.org/ [https://perma.cc/838L-7H33]; A Young Life 
Deeply Saddened by Violence in El Salvador, SAVE THE CHILDREN, 
https://www.savethechildren.org/us/charity-stories/children-impacted-violence-el-salvador 
[https://perma.cc/9T6S-KNA5](last visited Mar. 15, 2021);  CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 
2, at 12. 
 48 See Nikita Melnikov, Carlos Schmidt-Padilla & María Micaela Sviatschi, Gangs, 
Labor, Mobility, and Development 13 (NBER, Working Paper No. w27832, 2020), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477097 [https://perma.cc/YZ35-39B7]; The Wrong Side of the 
Tracks: A New Study Suggests That Street Gangs Inflict Broad Economic Harm, 434 THE 
ECONOMIST 77 (Jan. 11, 2020), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/01/11/a-
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Salvador have stated that they left because of economic reasons, in search of 
work.  But upon further questioning, it is clear that extortion demands – often 
in increasing amounts – made their basic survival impossible,49 contributing 
to the exodus.50  On the national level, El Salvador’s “security challenges and 
ineffective justice system” are among the reasons for low levels of foreign 
investment.51 
 Violence and the threat of violence by the gangs have led to high levels 
of internal displacement, with recent studies showing that of the nearly 
454,000 internally displaced Salvadorans, the majority were forced to move 
due to gang violence,52 although significant displacement also results from 
actions by the armed forces and the police,53 and climate change.54   In-
country sources have described the near impossibility of safe internal 




 49 The human rights organization Cristosal has conducted in-depth interviews to 
determine the reasons individuals leave El Salvador.  An initial reason given is often related 
to the need for work, but on further exploration, the connection to gang extortion and 
intimidation often emerges.  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Celia Medrano, Cristosal, supra 
note 42, at 8 (describing a typical explanation for flight: “I lost my family’s mechanics 
workshop, where I had worked.  I was extorted. I was threatened. I had to abandon it, and I 
could not find work after and for that reason I migrated.”).  In another case recounted by Celia 
Medrano, a young man who was an employee of a government agency lived in an area 
controlled by one gang but worked in the area controlled by the opposing gang.  Id. at 17.  The 
gang members in the area where he lived told him they would only allow him to move between 
zones if he would transport drugs for them.  Id.  He did not want to do so, so he requested that 
his superiors reassign him so that he would not have to move between zones controlled by 
opposing gangs. Id.  When his request was refused, he was forced to give up his job.  Id.  
 50 See The Wrong Side of the Tracks, supra 48. 
 51 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 10. 
 52 El Salvador, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTER, https://www.internal-
displacement.org/countries/el-salvador [https://perma.cc/C8WA-R9LA] [hereinafter 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTER] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). 
 53 See, e.g., CGRS/RHRC Interview with Karen Sánchez Reyes, Coordinadora del 
Programa ACNUR y Desplazamiento Forzado [Coordinator of the Program with UNHCR and 
Forced Displacement], Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana 
José Simeón Cañas [Human Rights Institute, José Simeón Cañas Central American 
University], in San. Sal., El Sal.  (Oct. 18, 2019) (on file with author).  CGRS/RHRC Interview 
with Laura Regina Andrade Cruz, Coordinadora de Estudios de Opinión [Opinion Studies 
Coordinator], Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, Universidad Centroamericana José 
Simeón Cañas [University Institution of Public Opinion, José Simeón Cañas Central American 
University] at 3, in San. Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 18, 2019) (on file with author). 
 54 See infra Section I.D.  
 55 El Salvador is such a small country, and the gangs have “elaborate structures of 
surveillance” enabling them to find their victims “anywhere” they might go, making internal 
relocation impossible.  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Karen Sánchez Reyes, supra note 53, at 
3. 
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death, in order to throw the gang members off their trail.56  Communities are 
often reluctant to accept individuals whose displacement is due to gang 
 
The perception that internal relocation is not possible is widely shared; a source from the 
prosecutor’s office recounted the following: 
A short while ago there was a woman who came to our office. She had 
been a victim in San Salvador, and her case was being prosecuted in the 
courts.  She relocated to the eastern part of the country and was killed.  It 
is very complicated; the country is so small.  It is just not feasible.  Gangs 
have networks of local branches.  They are more organized than the mere 
institutions. . . .   Gangs are extremely well organized.  Their modus 
operandi has improved.  Their capacities have been underestimated.  They 
manage a lot of money, have technology in their favor.  
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Marina Haydee Martinez de Ortega, Directora Nacional de la 
Mujer, Ninez, Adolescencia, Población LGBTI y otros Grupos en Condición de 
Vulnerabilidad [National Director of the Office for Women, Children, Adolescents, the 
LGBTI Population, and Other Groups in Conditions of Vulnerability], Fiscalía General da 
la Republica [Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic] and Erick Alvarez Cornejo, 
Jefe Departamento de Comunicación Interna [Head of the Internal Communications 
Department] at 7, in San. Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with author).   Ms. Ortega 
went on to say that El Salvador’s witness protection services was onerous and inadequate.  
Although witnesses receive protection during the trial, they live in circumstances similar to 
being in “jail,” and protection is terminated immediately after a verdict is reached.  Id. 
The national identity card carried by Salvadorans includes their address; this also causes 
problems when an individual attempts to relocate:  
[T]he first thing they [the gangs] do is ask for their DUI [Document Único 
de Identidad - identity document] and if the person comes from territory 
under the control of an opposing gang, they won’t be permitted to enter, 
and if they came from a zone under the control of the same gang, the gang 
[would] communicate with its members in the other zone to see if the 
person had any issues with the gang. . . or if they are on good terms with 
the person.  Only then can the person move into or enter the zone.    
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Flor de Maria Belloso, Coordinadora Nacional [National 
Coordinator], American Friends Service Committee at 4-5, in San. Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 17, 2019) 
(on file with author). 
 56 Ms. Sánchez Reyes described the case of a feigned death as follows:  
There was a case where a person was driving, and the gangs shot him in 
the arm, and it went through his shoulder.  The gang members thought he 
died, [and they left him there].  He did not die.  He called his family and 
they took him in for medical treatment.  The hospital told the gangs he 
died.  His family took him in a car with polarized windows to a place to 
hide, where he couldn’t even turn on the lights [because they didn’t want 
anyone to know a person was inside].  They didn’t even tell his young 
daughter that he was alive; his family told her he was dead.  The gangs 
will think he is dead or left the country.  Being confined has a 
psychological effect.  Also, there has to be a management of information 
that is given [meaning that the few people that know about the person must 
be wary of revealing information to others].   
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Karen Sánchez Reyes, supra note 53, at 8-9. 
The strategy of attempting to evade the gangs by remaining hidden in one’s home has become 
so normalized that the term “confinandos”– whose literal meaning is “confined” is used to 
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threats, fearing that the gangs will pursue them to the new location, causing 
problems for the relocation community.57  In January 2020, as a result of civil 
society advocacy and a favorable ruling from El Salvador’s Supreme Court,58 
the Legislative Assembly enacted a law59 that recognizes the phenomenon of 
forcible displacement, and provides for a range of governmental responses 
and assistance.60  The government has failed to issue regulations to 
implement and enforce the law, and there has been a decrease in available 
funds for the forcibly displaced since the law was enacted.61   
 With limited exception, since 1999, the government’s response has been 
a Mano Dura (Iron Fist) policy of harsh laws, which has had the unintended 
consequences of strengthening the gangs.62  The government has also 
 
describe these individuals. These persons “cannot leave their house; they cannot work or go 
to school.” CGRS/RHRC Interview with Karen Sánchez Reyes, supra note 53, at 3. When 
NGOs attempt to assist these individuals, by transporting them out of their homes to a 
temporary shelter, they need to use cars with polarized windows, and use great care as to the 
timing for the evacuation.  Id. at 4. 
 57 CGRS/RHRC Interview with Celia Medrano, Cristosal, supra note 42, at 14.  
 58 See Sala de lo Constitucional de la CSJ [Constitutional Chamber of the CSJ], 411-
2017, July 13, 2018, (El Sal), https://d2jhuj1whasmze.cloudfront.net/docs/Amp.%20411-
2017%20Sentencia%20desplazamiento_7MZT.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V5W-MXFC].  The 
Court ruled that the Salvadoran government was violating the constitutional rights of citizens 
by failing to protect and assist those who were forcibly displaced due to violence.  It gave the 
government six months to prepare legislation aimed at protecting and assisting victims of 
internal displacement.  Id. at 46-47.   
 59 Ley Especial para la Atención y Protección Integral de Personas en Condición de 
Desplazamiento Forzado Interno [Special Law for the Comprehensive Care and Protection of 
Persons in Conditions of Forced Internal Displacement], Decree 539, D.O. No. 15, Vol. 426. 
Jan. 23, 2020, (El Sal.), 
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/98F1C211-B62A-446B-
89CB-948EC765E49D.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVV3-2QQN]. 
 60 The law defines internally displaced persons (art. 3), requires the creation of a national 
registry, (art 29.), states that humanitarian services including access to emergency health 
services, education and temporary shelters be provided (art. 10), and directs the Ministry of 
Justice and Security to budget for the law’s implementation (art. 31). Id. 
 61 EFE, Piden a Gobierno de El Salvador Complementar Ley Para Atener a Desplazados, 
DIARIO LIBRE (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/internacional/piden-a-
gobierno-de-el-salvador-complementar-ley-para-atener-a-desplazados-MK23929207 
[https://perma.cc/7TFT-6QJV] (reporting on the lack of regulation to implement and enforce 
the law, and noting the decrease in available funds to address the situation of forced 
displacement since the law was enacted).  Melissa Pacheco, CRISTOSAL Reprocha que 
Gobierno no Formule Reglamento de Ley Para Atender Víctimas De Desplazamiento 
Forzado, LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (Jan. 22, 2021), 
https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/CRISTOSAL-reprocha-que-Gobierno-no-
formule-reglamento-de-ley-20210121-0139.html [https://perma.cc/N2CE-7X8A] (reporting  
the lack of regulation available to implement and enforce the law and the lack of public funds 
assigned to address the forced displacement situation). 
 62 See Musalo, supra note 1, at 27-28; Briscoe & Keseberg, supra note 39, at 117. 
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increasingly involved the military in public security.63  The use of the 
military, along with limited accountability for rights violations, has led to a 
rise in abuses by state security forces,64 including the “formation of death 
squads, sometimes involving active officers, which have reportedly been 
responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings of gang members as well as 
civilians.”65  The use of lethal force by security forces contributed to ten 
percent of the killings in 2017, which was fifteen times higher than in 2011.66  
The high level of homicides, therefore, is related to the security forces, as 
well as the gangs.    
 One notable departure from Mano Dura was in 2012 when the FMLN 
government of Mauricio Funes helped negotiate a truce between the leaders 
of the MS-13 and the two factions of Barrio 18.67  The gangs committed to a 
ceasefire in exchange for the transfer of their leaders out of maximum 
security facilities, and for “creating economic opportunities and social 
projects in marginalized communities.”68  The homicide rate appeared to 
plummet from 2012-2014; however, subsequently, clandestine graves were 
discovered leading some to infer that the gang members had not stopped their 
killing, but had simply hidden the evidence of their deeds.69  
 The following two charts illustrate the trajectory of homicides (2000-
2020) and femicides (2003-2019) per 100,000 population in El Salvador.  For 
homicides, the highest reported number is 103, and the lowest is an estimated 
18-20 homicides per 100,000 for calendar year 2020.  For femicides, the 
highest is 19.1 and the lowest is 6.48.  To put these numbers in context, there 
is one homicide per 100,000 within the European Union, two in Canada, and 
five in the United States.70  The decline in homicide and femicide rates  
between 2012-2014  shown on the following charts corresponds with the 
negotiated gang truce.  
 
 
 63 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 7. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 7-8. 
 67 Id. at 8. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Carlos Carcach & Evelyne Artola, Disappeared Persons and Homicide in El 
Salvador, 5 CRIME SCI. 13 (2016), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40163-016-
0061-x [https://perma.cc/S5QZ-QMJA] (noting that the number of disappeared rose by almost 
the same rate as the decline in homicides). 
 70 U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics Database, 
Intentional Homicide (Per 100,000 People), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 [https://perma.cc/8SXU-37PP] 
[hereinafter Intentional Homicide Statistics] (showing homicides per 100,000 for the 
European Union in 2015, Canada in 2018, and the United States in 2018). 
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Figure 1. Homicide Rate per 100,000 from 2000 to 202071 
 
Figure 2. Violent Killings of Women per 100,000 from 2003 to 201972 
 
 71 The numbers for 2000-2019 are from IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 5.  The estimated 
number for 2020 is from Roberto Valencia, Opinion: El Año en el que El Salvador Se Volvió 
Menos Homicida que México [Opinion: The year El Salvador Became Less Homicidal than 
Mexico], WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2020, 10:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/es/post-
opinion/2020/09/06/el-ano-en-el-que-el-salvador-se-volvio-menos-homicida-que-mexico/ 
[https://perma.cc/C842-KBQU]. 
 72  The numbers for 2003-2015 are from Musalo, supra note 1, at 39.  The number for 
2016 is from the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics Database, 
Intentional Homicides, Female (per 100,000 female)—El Salvador, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.FE.P5?locations=SV 
[https://perma.cc/J9L5-W7W9] [hereinafter Intentional Homicide Statistics, Female]. The 
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 As you can see from the charts, most recently, there has been an even 
more dramatic drop in killings under Nayib Bukele, with the lowest numbers 
recorded in the last two decades, at 18-20 homicides per 100,000 and 6.48 
violent killings of women per 100,000.  Bukele has claimed that the drop was 
due to the implementation of his new public security plan, Plan de Control 
Territorial (PCT) [Territorial Control Plan].73  The Territorial Plan was 
launched in twenty-two priority municipalities with high levels of violence, 
but the drop in homicides does not correspond to the areas where the Plan 
was deployed,74 bringing Bukele’s assertion into doubt.75     
 Other factors better explain the drop.  In November 2020, El Faro, “one 
of Latin America’s most trusted news sites”76 which has won numerous 
awards for its investigative journalism, reported that Bukele’s administration 
began negotiating with MS-13 in June 2019, shortly after his inauguration.77  
Just as the 2012 FMLN-negotiated gang truce led to a steep decline in 
homicide numbers, it is assumed that the same is occurring now.  During the 
current negotiations, MS-13 issued an order to all gang members “to ask 
permission to the leaders in order to commit a murder,”78 a similar mandate 
that the gang had imposed during the 2012 gang truce, allowing it to control 
the level of homicides.  The gang leaders have a “keen understanding that 
homicides, public opinion polls and foreign direct investment are intimately 
linked”79 and having the ability to elevate or depress killings puts them in a 
powerful bargaining position.      
 There are some who believe that killings have not really gone down, but 
that MS-13 is simply hiding the bodies as gangs were believed to have done 
during the 2012-2014 truce, when homicide numbers dropped but 
disappearances rose.80  Disappearances have been high in both 2018, with 
 
 73 Discussed in more detail infra Section I.C.i.  
 74 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 20.  
 75 “If the drop in homicides was the result of the implementation of the Territorial Control 
Plan, it would be natural to suppose that these 22 priority municipalities would display better 
results in security indicators than those not included in the Plan.”  Id. 
 76 Sarah E. Maslin, A Light in the Underworld, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (Nov. 
21, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/el_faro_el_salvador.php 
[https://perma.cc/Z9QN-KU9U]. 
 77 Carlos Martínez, et al., Bukele Has Been Negotiating with MS-13 for a Reduction in 




 78 Id.  
 79 Steven Dudley, 3 Dirty Secrets Revealed by the El Salvador Gang ‘Negotiations,’ 
INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/secrets-el-
salvador-gang-negotiations/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=46929f5f-4fab-4067-8d8c-
3905cc738901 [https://perma.cc/8PEV-VM8E]. 
 80 See Carcach & Artola, supra note 69. 
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3,514, which exceeded the number of homicides registered that year,81  and 
2019, with 3,202.82  Israel Ticas, an internationally renowned Salvadoran 
forensic investigator,83 is one person who shares the belief that bodies are 
being hidden.84  Afraid that “there [would] no longer be investments in the 
country” because of the level of violence, the government and gangs made a 
“deal” and its solution was to “hide everything, zero cadavers, zero 
everything.”85  The bodies are not left in plain sight, but are interred in 
clandestine graves, and the missing person is listed as a “disappearance” 
rather than a homicide.   
 Reinforcing Ticas’ cynical perspective that the government is 
manipulating data is the fact that shortly after taking office, the Bukele 
administration announced that it would no longer count as homicides those 
individuals found in clandestine graves.86 It also adopted a policy of 
excluding from official homicide numbers deaths resulting from security 
force operations.  These operations have become more deadly since 2018,87 
and killings by security forces have constituted an increasing percentage of 
 
 81 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 37. 
 82 The 2019 number translates to a rate of 48 per 100,000.  Anything over 10 
disappearances per 100,000 is considered of “epidemic” proportion.  IDHUCA, supra note 45, 
at 15.  In the past couple of years there have been more disappearances than during the 12 
years of El Salvador’s civil war.  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Sidney Blanco Reyes, supra 
note 46, at 8.  
 83 See Ali Rae & Elizabeth Melimopoulos, Digging up the Dead in El Salvador to Find 
the Truth, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 24, 2018),  
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/24/digging-up-the-dead-in-el-salvador-to-find-the-
truth [https://perma.cc/U7EU-57WH].  Israel Ticas and his work was the focus of a chapter in 
ÓSCAR MARTÍNEZ, A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE: LIVING AND DYING IN CENTRAL AMERICA 95-107 
(2016). 
 84 CGRS/RHRC Interview with Israel Ticas, Criminólogo [Criminologist], Fiscalía 
General de la Republica (FGR) [Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic] at 8, in San 
Sa., El Sal. (Oct. 18, 2019) (on file with author).  
 85 Id. at 3. See also CGRS/RHRC Interview with Karen Sánchez Reyes, supra note 53 
(commenting that: “Actual levels of violence are currently not reflected in the official data.  
There has been a decrease in homicides, but an increase in disappeared which can explain [the 
decrease in homicides].”).  
 86 Parker Asmann, El Salvador to Omit Key Data From Official Homicide Tally, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Jul. 18, 2019) https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/el-salvador-omit-key-data-
homicides/ [https://perma.cc/8X2E-KTW2] (reporting that the homicides registered in the 
country will no longer include victims of alleged confrontations between security forces and 
suspected gang members, nor those found dead and buried in graves).  Redacción Nacional, 
Gobierno Suma 262 Homicidios Entre Junio y Julio [Government Adds 262 Homicides 
between June and July], DIARIO EL MUNDO (Jul. 15, 2019), 
https://diario.elmundo.sv/gobierno-suma-262-homicidios-entre-junio-y-julio/ 
[https://perma.cc/8AL6-MF9D].     
 87 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 11-12. 
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the overall annual homicides. 88  These changes in calculating the homicide 
rate are a “clear attempt to paint a rosy picture.”89  As human rights experts 
have pointed out, even if one were to accept the accuracy of the numbers 
showing an historic decrease in homicides, there is doubt they would persist 
at such a low level because there is no indication that they have been 
accompanied by the “structural changes” needed to effectuate real 
transformation.90   
 Although societal violence – much of it perpetrated by the gangs – affects 
all Salvadorans, certain populations are particularly vulnerable.  Within that 
category are women and girls, and members of the LGBTQ community.  A 
combination of machismo and extreme homophobia, respectively, puts them 
at a higher risk of violence committed with impunity.  
 
i. Violence against Women 
 
 El Salvador is a particularly dangerous country for women.  In addition 
to the elevated levels of gender-motivated killings,91 physical, sexual, and 
 
 88 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 12-13.  In 2011, they made up less than one percent of the 
total homicides (0.7%), but by 2016 the number had risen to 11.69%.  Id. at 13.  One human 
rights expert noted that security forces have planted weapons on victims in order to claim that 
they died in an armed confrontation when they were actually the victims of an extrajudicial 
killing.  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Celia Medrano, Cristosal, supra note 42, at 2. 
 89 Asmann, supra note 86.  Many governmental and NGO sources shared the view that 
the Bukele administration was manipulating statistics to present a positive, but false perception 
of decreased violence.  “[S]tatistics are being manipulated at all levels.  This is because of our 
need to ask for donations and money [i.e. the assistance of the international community].  We 
want to say how good we are. . . . But how can these things change from one day to the other?”  
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Carmen Elena Molina, supra note 39, at 3. 
 90 “La repression del delito sin cambios estructurales serios en nuestra sociedad desigual, 
injusta y con tasas elevadas de pobreza y vulnerablidad social, aunque disminuyan 
coyunaturalmente, siempre se pueden volver a crecer.”  [The repression of crime without 
serious structural changes in our unequal and unjust society, with high levels of poverty and 
social vulnerability, can always increase again.]  IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 10.  The 
perspective that addressing root causes of crime is the only way to reduce it was repeated by 
many in-country sources:  “There is now more repression, more police, and more prisons, but 
that is not changing the situation.  As long as we do not change the situation of employment 
and education then it [the situation of violence] is not going to change.  CGRS/RHRC 
Interview with Carmen Elena Molina, supra note 39, at 3.   
 91 See Femicide or Feminicide, GENDER EQUAL. OBSERVATORY FOR LATIN AM. & THE 
CARIBBEAN, https://oig.cepal.org/en/indicators/femicide-or-feminicide 
[https://perma.cc/6U3W-AFGT] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); Gobierno de El Salvador: 
Ministerio de Economía, Hechos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres, El Salvador 2018, 
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSO (DIGESTYC), 22 (2018), 
http://aplicaciones.digestyc.gob.sv/observatorio.genero/docs/Hechos_de_Violencia_contra_l
as_Mujeres_2018_VF.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VUL-7R89].  See also CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
supra note 2, at 15.  If you refer back to Figure 2, Violent Killings of Women, you will see 
that the highest rate of killing of women per 100,000 was 18.2 and the lowest was 6.48.  For 
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other forms of gender violence are pervasive, and high levels of impunity for 
violence against women has been a constant.92  The statistics on forms and 
levels of violence paint an incomplete picture in that eighty percent of 
incidents of violence against women go unreported.93  A significant 
percentage of the incidents of sexual assault are committed against girls 
under the age of eighteen.94  Although gang members are often the 
perpetrators,95 violence against women and girls is common and normalized 
 
purposes of comparison, for the most recent year in which data was available, the rate for 
Canada was 0.9.  Intentional Homicide Statistics, Female, supra note 72. 
 92 “Due to ineffective governmental institutions, corruption, and social acceptance, 
impunity reigns in nearly all cases of violence against women.”  Angelika Albaladejo, How 
Violence Affects Women in El Salvador, LATIN AMERICA WORKING GROUP, 
https://www.lawg.org/how-violence-affects-women-in-el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/WM89-
5RPG] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).  The UN reported that “only a quarter of femicide cases 
make it to court and only 7% result in convictions.” U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, 
at 79.  Ima Guirola, a women’s rights activist referred to impunity for violence against women 
as “social impunity,” or the “lack of reaction. . . cover-up, the normalization and justification 
that the very population carries out with respect to abuses of violence perpetrated against 
women of different ages, against children and adolescents, and the blaming and stigmatization 
of the victims.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ima Guirola, Instituto de Estudios de la Mujer 
“Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera” (CEMUJER) [Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera 
Institute for Women’s Studies] at 2, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 13, 2019) (on file with author). 
 93 Informe de Monitoreo del Plan El Salvador Seguro 2016-2017 [Monitoring Report of 
the Safe El Salvador Plan 2016 - 2017], PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL 
DESARROLLO [UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP)], 74 (Jul. 2018), 
https://infosegura.org/2018/09/05/informe-de-monitoreo-del-plan-el-salvador-seguro-2016-
2017/.  There are various reasons that a woman may choose not to report.  As one source noted: 
“Women need to feel safe and protected to be able to report a crime or file a complaint.  There 
are municipalities where the violence is so high that women do not report crimes.”  
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Elisa Garcia, Asesora Técnica [Technical Advisor], Comisión 
de la Mujer e Iguladad de Genero (CMIG) [Commission of Women and Gender Equality], 
Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] at 3, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2019) (on file 
with author).  One source linked the lack of shelters and adequate protective services as reasons 
women do not report:   
We don’t give women the security . . .  to file a report….If a woman arrives 
at the FGR [Fiscalia General de la Republic – Office of the Prosectuor 
General of the Republic] and does not receive an immediate response, 
such as access to a shelter, she will regret that she even came to report to 
the FGR  because it made her situation even worse than if she had not 
reported. 
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Maria Antonieta Josa De Parada, Presidente del Consejo 
Nacional de la Judicatura (2016-2021) [President of the National Council of the Judiciary 
(2016-2021)], Oficina del Presidente, Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura [President’s Office, 
National Council of the Judiciary] at 8, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2019) (on file with author). 
 94 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 7.  “[E]n el primer semestre de 2019 hubo 3.138 hechos 
de violencia sexual contra mujeres, el 67% de las mismas contra menores de edad.” [In the 
first semester of 2019 there were 3,138 incidents of sexual violence against women, 67% of 
which were against minors].  Id. 
 95 The gangs inflict sexual violence and economic harms upon women. 
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within the broader societal context.96  Women who attempt to flee their 
persecutors find it near impossible to internally relocate.97  
 
a. Specialized Laws and Institutions  
 
 Laws and institutions created to address gender violence and inequality, 
have not brought about appreciable change.98  The first law, enacted in 1996, 
 
[I]n addition to this economic harm [extortions], women are also subject 
to violence of a sexual nature, both within the extortion framework and 
beyond, as gangs have come to exploit the threat and use of sexual 
violence as a tool in their struggle for territorial control. 
 
‘Women’s bodies have become a battleground,’ said Miriam Bandes, 
responsible for UN Women’s program in El Salvador, who reminds that 
gangs target women related — either directly as members or more often 
as companions — to rival gangs. 
Tristan Clavel, Extortion and Sexual Violence: Women's Unspoken Suffering, INSIGHT CRIME 
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/extortion-sexual-violence-
womens-unspoken-suffering/ [https://perma.cc/QDV3-GY4G]. 
 96 Albaladejo, supra note 92. 
 97 The relatively small size of the country, and the connection and dependency individuals 
have with their home communities makes internal relocation exceedingly difficult:  
 El Salvador is such a small country compared to the United States or 
Canada for example, that an identity reassignment program [i.e. changed 
name/identity] makes no sense.  In the United States or in Canada, one can 
travel to another state, change his or her appearance, have a new place and 
make a new life.  In El Salvador, this is not really possible because El 
Salvador is a place where people are connected to wherever they are from, 
where you can easily find a person anywhere if you are a bit persistent, if 
you investigate[.] 
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ima Guirola, CEMUJER, supra note 92, at 12. 
 98 One in-country source stated that “[d]espite all of the laws in defense of women’s 
rights, we are going backwards.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Benjamin Bonilla, Director 
Asociación Masculinidades para La Paz y La Igualdad de Género (MasPAZ) [Masculinity 
Association for Peace and Gender Equality], in San Sal., El Sal (Oct. 15, 2019) (on file with 
author).  Bonilla singled out the justice system as “having the highest level of misogyny,” 
citing the criminalization of abortion as an example, See infra text accompanying notes 113-
122 for a discussion of abortion in El Salvador.  This opinion was expressed by other sources 
who commented on actions taken by the Bukele administration which were not favorable to 
women’s rights, including placing the holistic service provision centers, Ciudad Mujer 
(Women’s City) in limbo by transferring them from the office of the First Lady to the Ministry 
of Culture.  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Elisa Margarita Garcia H., Asesora Técnica 
[Technical Advisor], Comisión de la Mujer e Igualdad de Género  de la Asamblea Legislativa 
(CMIG) [Commission of Women and Gender Equality, Legislative Assembly]; Vicenta Mabel 
Reyes, Diputada Suplente [Alternate Deputy] for FMLN, San Miguel Department; Maria 
Imelda Rivas de Auceda, Diputada Suplente [Alternate Deputy] for FMLN, La Libertad 
Department;  and Marielos Marquez, Asistente de Grupo Parliamentario de Mujeres (GPM) 
[Parliamentary Group of Women], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter CGRS/RHRC Interview, Gender Unit Legislative Assembly].  See generally 
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was the Ley contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar (LVI) [Law against 
Intrafamilial Violence],99 aimed at prevention, rather than punishment; it 
attempted to make it easier for a woman to obtain a protective order.  It was 
followed by a 1998 reform to Penal Code Article 200100 which has been the 
subject of controversy,101 but was understood to recognize domestic violence 
as a crime.  The LVI and Penal Code reform were followed by the 2010 Ley 
Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres (LEIV 
or Integral Law) [Special Integral Law for a Life Free of Violence against 
Women],102 and the 2011 Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicación de la 
Discriminación contra las Mujeres (LIE or Law of Equality) [Law of 
Equality, Equity, and Eradication of Discrimination against Women].103   
 
Ciudad Mujer, Ciudad Mujer en El Salvador: Una Experiencia Transformadora [Women’s 
City in El Salvador: A Transformative Experience], COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA 
LATINA Y EL CARIBE (CEPAL) [ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN],  
https://www.cepal.org/12conferenciamujer/noticias/paginas/1/49921/Folleto_Ciudad_Mujer
_-_BID.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GCL-THVZ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (for background on 
Cuidad Mujer).  Other sources referred to actions taken by the Fiscalia General de la República 
[Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic], which had dismantled the Unidades 
Especial de la Mujer [Women’s Special Units], resulting in less attention to crimes of gender 
violence.  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Laura Andrade, Directora, Instituto Universitario de 
Opinión Pública (IUDOP) Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA) [Director, 
University Institute of Public Opinion, José Simeón Cañas Central American University], in 
San Sal. El Sal., (Oct. 18, 2019) (on file with author). 
 99 Ley contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar [Law against Intrafamilial Violence], Decree 902, 
D.O. No. 241, No. 333, Dec. 21, 1996 (El Sal), 
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/6AA65328-414D-4E67-
B3DB-6D6D96009D46.pdf [hereinafter LVI]. 
 100 Código Penal (C.P.) [Penal Code] art. 200, Decree 1030, D.O. 105, Vol. 335, June 10, 
1997 (El Sal.).  Article 3 of the LVI defined intrafamilial violence as acts causing physical, 
psychological, or sexual suffering.  Article 200 of the Penal Code provides that “any family 
member. . . who commits violence in any of the forms mentioned in Art[icle] 3 of the [LVI] 
shall be punished with one to three years of imprisonment.”  Id. 
 101 The controversy centered on the question whether article 200 recognized physical, 
psychological or sexual violence as distinct crimes, or if they constituted crimes only if they 
were recognized as such under other provisions of the Penal Code.  See Musalo, supra note 1, 
at 53-55, nn.334-42.  
 102 Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres [Special 
Integral Law for a Life Free of Violence against Women], Decree 520, D.O. No. 2, Vol 390, 
Nov. 25, 2010 (El Sal.), 
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/A5F14F60-2DC3-
4FEB-AEE6-F9AEA7F498B3.pdf [hereinafter LEIV]. 
 103 Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicación de la Discriminación contra las Mujeres 
[Law of Equality, Equity, and the Eradication of Discrimination against Women], Decree 645, 
D.O. No. 70, Vol. 391, Jan 4, 2011 (El Sal.), 
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/0AC3B5EB-167D-
4A11-A34A-8756FF3E6D01.pdf [hereinafter LEI].  
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 Among the LEIV’s most relevant provisions are those criminalizing 
various forms of violence against women, including feminicides.104  Notably, 
neither domestic violence nor rape are included as crimes in the LEIV.105  To 
improve access to justice for women, who historically faced bias in the justice 
system, the LEIV’s drafters had hoped to include provisions for specialized 
courts in the law, as has been done in other countries, such as Guatemala.106  
For budgetary reasons, they were not included in the LEIV, although limited 
specialized courts were created by decree in 2016.107   
 The LIE, rather than dealing with violence against women, focuses on 
what women rights’ activists see as underlying violence against women – a 
lack of gender equality.  The LIE’s stated purpose is to provide “a legal 
instrument that develops the constitutional principles of equality.”108  It 
addresses equality across societal spheres,109 requiring governmental bodies 
to develop internal norms of non-discrimination.  
 
 104 The LEIV uses the term “feminicide” rather than “femicide.”  In the international 
context, both terms denote a gender-motivated killing of a woman, but “feminicide” adds the 
additional element of government complicity. Whether the killing of a woman is a 
femicide/feminicide is a legal determination, and killings designated as femicides/feminicides 
constitute a subset of the larger category of “violent killings of women.”   See Musalo supra 
note 1, at 6 n.13.     
 105 Id. at 79-80.  The explanation given for excluding these crimes is that their volume is 
so great that the specialized courts would “collapse” should they be within their jurisdiction.  
CGRS/RHRC Interview, Gender Unit Legislative Assembly, supra note 98 (stating that if the 
courts had jurisdiction over cases of domestic violence and rape, they would have collapsed).  
Even without having jurisdiction over these crimes, the specialized courts are “saturated,” 
there are only three courts “and the level of violence is so high” that the courts cannot hear all 
the cases.  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Melida Guevara, Coordinadora del Programa de la 
Justicia del Género [Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program], OXFAM, at 3, in San Sal., 
El Sal. (October 18, 2019) (on file with author). 
 106 Héctor Ruiz, No Justice for Guatemalan Women: An Update Twenty Years After 
Guatemala’s First Violence Against Women Law, 29 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 101, 109-12 
(2018) (discussing Guatemala’s implementation of specialized courts). 
 107 Decreto para la Creación de los Tribunales Especializados para una Vida Libre de 
Violencia y Discriminación para las Mujeres [Decree for the Creation of Specialized Courts 
for a Life Free of Violence and Discrimination against Women], Decree 286, D.O. No. 60, 
Vol. 411, Apr. 4, 2016 (El Sal.) [hereinafter Decree 286].  Ima Guirola, of the women’s rights 
NGO CEMUJER noted that there are efforts to amend the legislative decree creating the 
specialized courts so that they would have jurisdiction over crimes such as domestic violence 
and sexual assault, which are not currently included.  “[A]ll those crimes that are in the penal 
code and that have a clear definition of gender violence [should be included]. . . . Starting with 
rape, sexual assault, statutory rape, sexual harassment. . . and forced prostitution.”  
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ima Guirola, CEMUJER, supra note 92, at 8. 
 108 LIE, supra note 103, part VI. 
 109 Id. at ch. III-VI. 
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 Salvadoran sources report that the persistence of deeply entrenched 
attitudes regarding women’s subordinate role in society persist,110 and there 
has been little change in levels of violence111 and impunity112 for these 
crimes.  
 Paradoxically, the only crime which is zealously investigated and 
prosecuted is that of abortion.  El Salvador is among a very small number of 
countries that prohibit all abortions.113  Prior to 1997, although abortion was 
not legal, there were exceptions in cases of rape, abnormality of the fetus, or 
risk to the life of the mother.114  In 1997 an amendment to El Salvador’s Penal 
Code banned abortion in all circumstances,115 and a 1999 amendment to El 
 
 110 Doris Rivas Galindo, a magistrate on El Salvador’s Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ) 
[Supreme Court of Justice] commented on the force these societal attitudes still have:  
The stereotypes, the patriarchy, the power dynamic, and the social 
inequalities persist.  It is the power structure that has lasted.  Women live 
it at every moment. . . . We need to confront and unlearn these stereotypes, 
but I do not know how much time it will take us to achieve it. 
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Doris Rivas Galindo, Magistrada [Magistrate], Corte Suprema 
de Justicia (CSJ) [Supreme Court of Justice], at 3, in San. Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 18, 2019) (on file 
with author).  Some sources characterized officials in Bukele’s government as particularly 
hostile to women’s rights, “I consider many of this government’s officials to be openly sexist. 
. . . I am not saying that the previous ones have not been sexist . . . but at least they were a little 
ashamed of openly declaring themselves sexist.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview with América 
Joaquina  Romauldo, Cárcomo, Directora Ejecutiva [Executive Director], Las Dignas, at 2, in 
San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 15, 2019) (on file with author).  
 111 Although the violent killings of women have decreased, as noted supra, these numbers 
are not considered reliable.  Statistics indicate that other forms of violence are on the rise.  See 
Gobierno de El Salvador: Ministerio de Economía, Hechos de Violencia Contra las Mujeres, 
El Salvador 2019, DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSO (DIGESTYC), 14-15 (2020), 
http://aplicaciones.digestyc.gob.sv/observatorio.genero/docs/Hechos%20de%20Violencia%2
0Contra%20las%20Mujeres%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV57-3AFT] (showing a 
constant increase in gender-based violence from 2015 to 2019).  Press Release, IRC Data 
Shows an Increase in Reports of Gender-Based Violence Across Latin America, INT’L RESCUE 
COMM. (June 9, 2020), https://www.rescue.org/press-release/irc-data-shows-increase-reports-
gender-based-violence-across-latin-america [https://perma.cc/HLD5-DYXG] (stating that in 
El Salvador, the Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace reported a 70% increase in 
violence against women from March to May 2020 compared to 2019 and that this is likely an 
underestimation). 
 112 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 7.  Experts point to a number of factors that have impeded 
the effective implementation of laws, including societal attitudes.   Carmen Elena Molina, a 
Family Court judge noted the “cultural aspect” to the problem, with police and judges both 
blaming the woman for bringing the abuse upon herself. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Carmen 
Elena Molina, supra note 39, at 5.  
 113 See Alyson Zureick et al., Physicians' Challenges under El Salvador's Criminal 
Abortion Prohibition, 143 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 121 (2018). 
 114 Alyssa Julian, Redefining LGBTQ and Abortion Rights in Latin America: A 
Transnational Toolkit, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 317 (2020).  
 115  Id.   
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Salvador’s Constitution declared that life begins at conception.116  Women 
convicted of the crime of abortion face a penalty of two to eight years; the 
penalty for doctors, nurses and other professionals is six to twelve years.117  
If they are charged with homicide, they can serve a much longer sentence.118  
The likelihood of being prosecuted falls much more heavily on poor women 
who are treated at public health facilities.119  Women have been prosecuted 
and sentenced notwithstanding “credible claims that their pregnancies ended 
due to miscarriage.”120  The criminalization of abortion has led to El Salvador 
having one of the highest female incarceration rates in the world.121  The 
reality that men who rape women most often enjoy impunity, while the 
women suffer the harshest consequences is another example of the profound 







 116 Julian, supra note 114, at 318.   
 117 Id. at 318 n.355.  The criminalization also compromises the ethical obligations of 
Salvadoran medical professionals who are “incentivized to disclose their patients’ confidential 
medical information, in violation of their ethical duties, and public healthcare facilities have 
become sites of criminal investigation.”  Zureick et al., supra note 113, at 121.  
 118 A woman who miscarries can be charged with aggravated homicide and sentenced up 
to thirty years in prison. El Salvador Woman Imprisoned After Miscarriage Released, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 23, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/el-
salvador-woman-imprisoned-after-miscarriage-released/2020/09/23/863226e2-fdea-11ea-
b0e4-350e4e60cc91_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z3NC-X93E] (reprinted from the 
Associated Press). 
 119 CGRS/RHRC Interview with Flor de Maria Belloso, National Coordinator, American 
Friends Service Committee – El Salvador, at 16, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 17, 2019) (on file 
with author) (explaining how private doctors can ensure that intra-uterine fetal deaths are not 
prosecuted as abortions).  
 120 Freedom in the World 2020: El Salvador, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2020 [https://perma.cc/FNJ6-
FUQW] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). 
 121 Keith N. Hylton, Whom Should We Punish, and How? Rational Incentives and 
Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2513, 2562-63 (2018). 
 122  There is a double-standard; the system inverts itself.  We put the 
responsibility on the woman, not on the man.  We need a new way to 
understand this.  He who is the man who impregnated [the accused] 
doesn’t feel responsibility, and we discharge him. . . . [W]e have to take 
steps towards equality. 
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Doris Rivas Galindo, supra note 110, at 6.  Another judge 
commented on the difference between the sentences received by men and women:  “Women 
receive harsher sentences.  When a woman has a baby and the baby dies, or the baby is born 
dead, women are jailed for the maximum sentence.  Men are not punished for this.”  
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Carmen Elena Molina, supra note 39, at 10. 
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ii. Violence against the LGBTQ Community 
 
 El Salvador is “frequently ranked as one of the most homophobic” 
countries in the Americas,123 with long-standing violence and discrimination 
against the LGBTQ community.124  Between 1995 and 2016, more than 500 
members of the LGBTQ community were assassinated.125  Gangs are often 
the perpetrators, but violence is also frequently at the hands of government 
security forces.126  Although a 2010 Salvadoran law prohibits sexual 
orientation discrimination by public employees, NGOs have reported lack of 
enforcement,127 and widespread denial of rights, with difficulty obtaining 
access to education, employment and health care.128  Hatred and bias has 
driven LGBTQ individuals out of their communities, with at least 151 cases 
of forcible displacement from the beginning of 2018 to September 2019.129  
 In 2015 El Salvador amended the Penal Code to impose enhanced 
penalties for aggravated assault and homicide motivated by sexual 
orientation, however “[h]ate crimes against LGBTQ individuals are still 
commonplace and often go unpunished[.]”130  The lack of investigation, 
prosecution and resolution, makes victims reluctant to even file 
 
 123 Carlos Iván Orellana & Ligia María Orellana, Sexual Prejudice and the Relevance of 
Political Culture: Trends and Correlates in El Salvador, 13 PSYCHOL. THOUGHT 37, 37 (2020).  
El Salvador’s Institute of Public Opinion reports that “the majority of the Salvadoran 
population considers homosexuality as not justified and as a perversion, rejects having 
homosexual people as neighbors, and opposes to [sic] the church supporting same-sex 
marriage.”  Id. at 40.  Other surveys of countries in the Americas and the Caribbean show that 
El Salvador ranks lowest for approval of same sex marriage, and highest for disapproval of 
the acceptance of homosexuality.  Id. 
 124 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 14; U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 
52-54; IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 8-9.  Benjamin Bonilla commented on the “pervasive 
culture of homophobia” in Salvadoran society, and noted how frequently “[s]tate actors and 
people wearing the uniform [of police or military soldiers] are the perpetrators of this violence.  
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Benjamin Bonilla, supra note 98. 
 125 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 9.   
The bodies of LGBTI victims of crime tend to show signs of torture, and 
media coverage blames the victim for provoking the crime, misgenders 
the victim (i.e. reporting the victim’s sex and name assigned at birth 
instead of their manifested gender identity), or the media omits that the 
crime was committed in response to the victim’s sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity. 
Orellana & Orellana, supra note 123, at 40. 
 126 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 54.  “The most visible perpetrators of 
anti-LGBTI crimes are gang members, and the police and army forces [citation omitted] but 
the most immediate sources of prejudice and threat for LGBTI people are their own family 
and community[.]” Orellana & Orellana, supra note 123, at 40.  
 127 Julian, supra note 114, at 314. 
 128 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 52-53. 
 129 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 9. 
 130 Julian, supra note 114, at 314. 
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complaints,131 while some who have done so report harassment by the police 
or prosecutors.132  A prevailing “culture of impunity” is widely recognized.  
Reports indicate that the situation has deteriorated further under President 
Bukele.133 
 
C. Contemporary Developments – President Nayib Bukele  
 
 Nayib Bukele won on a platform promising to address crime and 
violence,134 and to tackle impunity and corruption.135  He announced a seven 
stage Territorial Control Plan136 to bring down gang violence, and committed 
 
 131 Julian, supra note 114, at 314, n.325. 
 132 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 53.   
133 El Salvador’s laws and policies are rarely overtly hostile to LGBT 
people… In practice, however, El Salvador’s efforts to protect LGBT 
people’s rights at home have been inadequate, and activists say that since 
President Bukele took office in 2019, initiatives put in place under the 
previous government aimed at promoting LGBT inclusion have been 
downgraded or not implemented. 
Human Rights Watch, “I’m Lucky to Still Be Alive” Violence and Discrimination Against 
LGBT People in El Salvador, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 12 (Jan. 2021), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/202101LGBT_ElSalvador_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8SAR-YQTZ] (emphasis added).  
 134 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 4; Ghitis, supra note 24. 
 135 Roman Gressier, Series of Corruption Allegations Stains El Salvador’s Promise – 
What Political Impact Will It Have?, EL FARO (Sep. 11, 2020), 
https://elfaro.net/en/202009/el_salvador/24796/Series-of-Corruption-Allegations-Stains-El-
Salvador%E2%80%99s-Promise-%E2%80%94-What-Political-Impact-Will-It-Have.htm?st-
full_text=all&tpl=11  [https://perma.cc/2HW7-YJFU].  
Nayib Bukele would likely not have become president of El Salvador in 
June 2019 had it not been for corruption.  Three out of four of the Casa 
Presidencial’s preceding occupants were riddled with charges of 
profiteering, nepotism and the misuse of their public positions.  Francisco 
Flores (1999-2004) died while on trial for embezzlement in 2016; Antonio 
Saca (2004-09) who pled guilty in 2018 to embezzlement and money 
laundering charges, will likely spend at least ten years behind bars; 
Mauricio Funes (2008-14) is dodging embezzlement charges of his own 
as an asylee in Daniel Orgega’s Nicaragua.  
Id.  One of Bukele’s campaign promises was to establish an international commission against 
impunity.  Walter Sibrián, CICIES Será Lanzada antes de Primeros 100 Días de Gobierno, 
Anuncia Bukele [CICIES will be Launched before the First 100 Days in Office, Announces 
Bukele], LAPRENSAGRÁFICA (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/CICIES-sera-lanzada-antes-de-primeros-100-
dias-de-Gobierno-anuncia-Bukele--20190809-0190.html [https://perma.cc/8VC5-SE59]. 
 136 Marcos González Díaz, Bukele y la Violencia en El Salvador: Cuánto Ha Influido en 
la Reducción de Homicidios el Plan de Seguridad por el que el Mandatario Militarizó el 
Congreso [Bukele and the Violence in El Salvador: How Much Has the Security Plan 
Influenced the Reduction of Homicides for which the President Militarized Congress], BBC 
NEWS: MUNDO EN MÉXICO Y CENTROAMÉRICA (Feb. 18, 2020), 
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to appointing an anti-corruption czar as well as to establishing an 
international commission,137 similar to the successful efforts of La Comisión 




 137 Gressier, supra note 135. 
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against Impunity in Guatemala]138 to investigate and prosecute corruption.  
He also promised to attract economic investment.139  
 
 138 CICIG was created in 2007 in response to advocacy by Guatemalan civil society 
organizations who feared that government complicity with organized crime networks would 
imperil Guatemala’s consolidation of democracy following the 1996 peace agreement.  
International and Civil Society Organizations Celebrate the Accomplishments of the CICIG, 
WOLA: ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.wola.org/2019/08/international-and-civil-society-organizations-celebrate-
accomplishments-cicig/ [https://perma.cc/GR7N-RBXL].  It had the backing of the United 
Nations, and functioned as an independent investigative body, working alongside Guatemalan 
prosecutors within the country’s legal system. CICIG’s objective was to strengthen the 
country’s justice system, and it was considered to be extremely successful.  Id.  As reported 
by the International Crisis Group: 
The CICIG made impressive progress, playing a central role in numerous 
high-profile prosecutions and in reducing violence across the country.  
Among other things, the CICIG piloted reforms creating a witness 
protection program, tighter gun controls and rules for court-ordered 
wiretaps.  It spurred the establishment of high-risk crime courts to protect 
the safety of individuals involved in the prosecution of especially grave 
crimes, and a special prosecutor’s office against impunity (FECI in 
Spanish) within the Attorney General’s office.  It also trained dozens of 
prosecutors and police officers in scientific criminal investigation 
techniques. . . .  
 
Hundreds of investigations hatched or supported by CICIG have 
successfully broken up rackets involving prominent officials, business 
leaders, drug traffickers, extortionists and street gangs.  Its work helped 
oust a dozen corrupt judges, and led to the removal of 1,700 police 
officials accused of corruption and incompetence.  According to the 
CICIG, unsolved murder cases fell from 95 per cent in 2009 to 72 percent 
in 2012. 
 
As the Crisis Group has previously reported, these achievements saved 
lives.  In the first seven years of the commission’s operations, while the 
country’s neighbours [sic] and regional peers experienced a 1 per cent 
annual rise in homicide rates on average, Guatemala saw an average 5 per 
cent decline, according to World Bank’s figures.  Overall, Crisis Group 
estimates that the CICIG has contributed to a net reduction of more than 
4,500 homicides between 2007 and 2017.   
Tiziano Breda, Curtain Falls on Guatemala’s International Commission against Impunity, 
INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Sep. 3, 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-
caribbean/central-america/guatemala/curtain-falls-guatemalas-international-commission-
against-impunity [https://perma.cc/MP36-YLL4].  CICIG was not afraid to go after those in 
power.  It investigated high level individuals in both the political and business sectors, which 
led to a concerted effort to shutter it.  The U.S. had been a strong supporter of CICIG, but that 
changed with the election of Trump, and in January 2019, then Guatemalan president Jimmy 
Morales – who was being investigated by CIGIG for illegal campaign contributions – refused 
to renew its mandate, effectively shutting it down.  WOLA, supra note 138. 
 139 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 4. 
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 As discussed above, whether homicides have actually declined is still 
open to dispute, and if they have, it appears to be the result of negotiations 
with MS-13 rather than the launch of Bukele’s Territorial Control Plan.  To 
date, Bukele has failed to make good on his promise to appoint an anti-
corruption czar and establish a commission similar to CICIG; and he and his 
administration have been mired in multiple claims of corruption and self-
dealing.  Many of his actions, which demonstrate lack of respect for rule of 
law, and his growing authoritarianism has caused alarm internationally, with 
threats to curtail funding to the country should such anti-democratic trends 
continue.  Finally, although the impact of COVID-19 must be factored in, 
there is little indication of new economic investment or poverty reduction.140  
The following provides a brief analysis of the Bukele administration’s actions 
in these key areas. 
 
i. Public Security 
 
a. Safe El Salvador Plan 
 
 The public security plan in place when Bukele came to office was the 
Plan El Salvador Seguro (PESS or The Plan) [Safe El Salvador Plan].  A 
wide range of civil society organizations were involved in its  
development.141  PESS had ambitious objectives of developing a strategy 
against violence, guaranteeing access to justice, protecting victims,142  and 
addressing root causes.143  It identified the need to strengthen governmental 
institutions as well as to rehabilitate and re-integrate offenders into society.144  
The Plan involved all State agencies and institutions in its execution,145 and 
provided for the publication of an annual report monitoring its successes and 
 
 140 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 10; see also The World Bank in El Salvador, 
Overview, THE WORLD BANK (last updated Oct. 9, 2020), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/elsalvador/overview [https://perma.cc/BK8S-P2VX] 
(stating El Salvador had registered a moderate poverty reduction in 2019). 
 141 Municipal mayors from more than 100 municipalities, representatives of the municipal 
councils, grassroots social organizations, government institutions, and representatives of 
private industries all participated in the elaboration of the Plan Seguro.  National Legislative 
Bodies & National Authorities, El Salvador: Plan El Salvador Seguro, CONSEJO NACIONAL DE 
SEGURIDAD CIUDADANA Y CONVIVENCIA [NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CITIZEN SECURITY AND 
COEXISTENCE], 11 (Jan. 2017), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b6d941c4.html [hereinafter 
Plan Seguro]. 
 142 Id. at 8. 
 143 Root causes include poverty, lack of education and job opportunities, the impact of 
organized crime, impunity and weakness in the justice system and gender inequality.  Id. at 
19. 
 144 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 57-58. 
 145 Plan Seguro, supra note 141, at 8. 
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challenges.146  The cost of the Plan, which was approximately $200 million 
per year, was financed by the international community and an earmarked tax 
approved in November 2015.147  
 In its conception, PESS provided a holistic approach of reducing violence 
by addressing root causes, investing in communities, and strengthening 
institutions, in contrast to prior initiatives that relied only on 
counterproductive harsh law enforcement measures.  However one of the 
main criticisms leveled against it was that although it recognized the need to 
address root causes, and thereby prevent violence, it invested far more money 
on prosecution and punishment than prevention.148  The Plan had 
contemplated allocating around seventy-five percent of its budget for 
prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration, and just about twenty-five 
percent for prosecution, but the reality was that more than fifty percent was 
spent on prosecution.149   
 High levels of poverty in El Salvador also made implementation 
difficult;150 poverty rates increased between 2014 and 2015, and the country’s 
poor economic performance and worsening fiscal conditions made it difficult 
to create jobs for young men,151 a critical component of addressing root 
causes.  Corruption and the self-interest of politicians posed other barriers – 
local officials held up the Plan’s implementation for election advantages,152 
 
 146 See Consejo de Seguridad Presenta Primer Informe de Monitoreo del Plan El 
Salvador Seguro [Security Council Presents First Monitoring Report of the Safe El Salvador 
Plan], PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO (UNDP) [UNITED NATIONS 




 147 El Salvador’s Politics of Perpetual Violence, INT’L CRISIS GROUP, No. 64 (2017), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/64-el-
salvadors-politics-perpetual-violence [https://perma.cc/9HNS-UAQ4] [hereinafter INT’L 
CRISIS GROUP, Politics of Perpetual Violence]. 
 148 Rafael Castellanos, Sobre la Continuidad del PESS y el CNSCC [On the Continuity of 
the PESS and the CNSCC], LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.laprensagrafica.com/opinion/Sobre-la-continuidad-del-PESS-y-el-CNSCC-
20190409-0543.html [https://perma.cc/K35H-E98G]. 
 149 Id.  
 150 One government official commented how the absence of basic amenities impeded the 
implementation of PESS: “‘I arrived in a prioritised [sic] community [priority community for 
PESS due to high levels of violence] where I went to give a talk on peacebuilding, and I 
realised [sic] how far from reality we were when people told me they didn’t even have drinking 
water.’”  INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Politics of Perpetual Violence, supra note 147 (quoting Crisis 
Group interview in San Miguel and San Salvador, June-Sept. 2017). 
 151 Id.  
 152 Concejos Plurales Bloquean Prevención de la Violencia [Plural Councils Blocks 
Violence Prevention] LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (Aug. 25, 2017), 
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while gang members have been accused of channeling funds for their own 
purposes.153  Although PESS had achieved only limited success in bringing 
down violence, it was viewed positively overall.154  
 
b. Territorial Control Plan  
 
 Shortly after taking office, Bukele terminated PESS, and initiated what 
he announced would be the first phase of a seven phase Territorial Control 
Plan to address the country’s high levels of violence.155  His plan was 
developed without any civil society consultation, or transparency, and its 
scope and nature remain unclear.  As one observer noted, Bukele launched 
the Territorial Control Plan with a PowerPoint presentation of “a few 
pages,”156 and to date has only described the first three of seven phases.157   
 Phase 1, named “Preparation,” involved deploying increased military and 
police presence on public transportation, and to seventeen municipalities with 
the highest gang presence; it also included declaring a state of emergency in 
the country’s prisons.158  The tightening of security measures in the prisons 
and their impact on inmates’ health in a time of COVID-19 raised concerns, 
which were heightened after a photograph was widely circulated which 




 153 See Gabriel García, FGR Investiga si Pandillas Recibieron Dinero de GOES [Attorney 
General’s Office (FGR) Investigates if Gangs Received Money from the Government of El 
Salvador (GOES)], LA PRENSA GRÁFICA (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/FGR-investiga-si-pandillas-recibieron-dinero-
de-GOES-20171119-0040.html [https://perma.cc/QTJ8-8WVB]. 
 154 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 60.  In August 2019 Salvadoran NGO 
stakeholders submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Committee as part of the Universal 
Periodic Review process.  They stated that PESS was “a positive step” but that it lacked 
sufficient funds.  In 2018 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions also spoke 
favorably of the Plan but also noted the lack of necessary resources “to truly implement the 
Plan as intended.”  Id. at 58-59.  
 155 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 9. 
 156 Mario Beltrán, Un Plan de Seguridad Confidencial y Desconocido [An Unknown and 
Confidential Security Plan], GATOENCERRADO (June 2, 2020), 
https://gatoencerrado.news/2020/06/05/un-plan-de-seguridad-confidencial-y-desconocido/ 
[https://perma.cc/684N-65YS]. 
 157 The secrecy around the remaining four phases of the seven-phase plan have led some 
experts to speculate that they do not actually exist.  Id. 
 158 Paola Nagovitch, Explainer: Nayib Bukele’s Territorial Control Plan, AS/COA (Feb. 
13, 2020), https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-nayib-bukeles-territorial-control-plan 
[https://perma.cc/FUU3-MKF8].  Numerous Salvadoran experts criticized the effect increased 
police operations, often repressive and violating citizens’ rights, were having on communities.  
See, e.g., CGRS/RHRC Interview with Laura Regina Andrade Cruz, IUDOP, supra note 98, 
at 2. 
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mostly without masks.  We now know that Bukele’s government was 
negotiating with MS-13, using a lifting of these security measures as a 
bargaining chip.  
 Phase 2, dubbed “Opportunity,” is focused on crime prevention and 
entails creating educational and employment opportunities for youth, 
beginning in the seventeen high crime municipalities where Phase 1 was 
initiated.159  In these respects, Phases 1 and 2 of the Territorial Plan share 
some superficial similarity with PESS, but absent civil society input.   
 Phase 3, “Modernization,” was intended to strengthen the police and 
military with “new resources and technology, including helicopters, 
surveillance equipment, night vision tools, drones and modern guns.”160  It 
expanded the number of high crime municipalities to twenty-two – up from 
the original seventeen.  The increased reliance on the military in the 
Modernization phase has raised concerns evoking comparisons with failed 
Mano Dura plans of the past.  This expanded role for the military was not 
without a cost; the executive’s proposed budget for the Ministry of Defense 
rose from $145.1 million in 2019 to $220.3 million in 2020.161  This increase 
in funds for the military occurred at the same time as programs for young 
people were cut, putting repression above prevention.162     
 Bukele obtained necessary funding for Phase 2 through a $91 million 
loan from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)163 
which the Legislative Assembly approved.  In order to finance Phase 3, 
Bukele needed the Legislative Assembly to approve an additional CABEI 
loan for $109 million, which it refused to do.164  The legislative impasse, 
along with the emergence of COVID-19, which has commanded government 
attention, have put the brakes on further implementation of the Territorial 
Plan.  As noted above, although Bukele has claimed that the drop in 
homicides is due to the implementation of his Plan, the available statistics do 
not show a correlation between areas where the Plan has been put in place 




 Bukele’s most concrete commitments to tackle corruption were his 
campaign promises that he would appoint an anti-corruption czar and 
establish an international commission against impunity, the Comision 
 
 159 Nagovitch, supra note 158. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Beltrán, supra note 156. 
 162 Id.  
 163 Nagovitch, supra note 158. 
 164 Id. 
EL SALVADOR ROOT CAUSES-04.05.2021.DOCX2- MUSALO HRPLJ V18-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2021  9:30 PM 
Summer 2021  EL SALVADOR: ROOT CAUSES & JUST ASYLUM POL’Y RESPONSES 213 
Internacional Contra la Impunidad en El Salvador (CICIES) [International 
Commission against Impunity in El Salvador] modeled on the very successful 
Comisión Internacional  contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) 
[International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala].165  CICIG 
followed corruption regardless of who it implicated; the widely heralded 
customs fraud case known as La Linea involved, and brought down then 
Guatemalan President Pérez Molina and his associates.166   
 As of December 2020, no anti-corruption czar has been appointed, and it 
appears that Bukele did not intend to adopt the CICIG model for El 
Salvador’s Commission.  He rejected a proposal by the United Nations that 
would have bestowed relative independence and autonomy on the newly 
created commission, which is under the authority of the executive branch.167  
Civil society organizations called on El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly to 
create an independent commission, similar to CICIG,168 and several 
European countries have stated that independence of CICIES is a condition 
for their funding.169  In addition to lacking independence, unlike its 
counterpart in Guatemala, CICIES cannot investigate or be directly involved 
in the prosecution of a case.170  Its access to information has even been 
restrained; in March 2020, Bukele asked CICIES to oversee the distribution 
of COVID-19 emergency funds.  When CICIES requested information from 
the Ministry of Economy about the COVID fund, the Ministry rejected the 
request on the ground the information was classified.171    
 
 165 Breda, supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
 166 CICIG’s willingness to prosecute those in the highest governmental positions brought 
it into disfavor with Guatemalan president Jimmy Morales, who was being investigated by it 
for campaign finance violations.  Although prior U.S. administrations had strongly supported 
CICIG, and there would have been diplomatic pressure to continue its presence in Guatemala, 
the Trump administration tacitly gave the green light to Morales to expel CICIG, which he 
did.  Id. 
 167 Violeta Rivas, Organismos Sociales Proponen a Asamblea una CICIES Independiente 
[Social Organizations Propose an Independent CICIES to the Assembly], ELSALVADOR.COM 
(Jun 11, 2020), https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/organismos-proponen-
asamblea-legislativa-cicies-independiente/723243/2020/ [https://perma.cc/2S2L-X6WP]. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Redacción [Editorial Staff], Bukele Asegura Que CICIES Está Evaluando 5 Casos de 
Corrupción [Bukele Ensures that CICIES is Evaluating 5 Cases of Corruption], DIARIO1.COM 
(Nov. 19, 2019), http://diario1.com/politica/2019/11/bukele-asegura-que-cicies-esta-
evaluando-5-casos-de-corrupcion/ [https://perma.cc/F7YM-XMFS]. 
 170 Rivas, supra note 167. 
 171 Melissa Pacheco, CICIES sin Datos sobre Emisión de Deuda Debido a la falta de 
Protocolo [CICIES without Data on Debt Issuance Due to Lack of Protocol], ELECONOMISTA 
(May 26, 2020), https://www.eleconomista.net/economia/CICIES-sin-datos-sobre-emision-
de-deuda-debido-a-la-falta-de-protocolo-20200526-0006.html [https://perma.cc/TLN6-
PG4R]. 
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 Allegations of corruption in the Bukele administration have been legion.  
Much of it has centered around the government’s expenditures related to the 
pandemic.  As COVID spread globally, El Salvador appealed for 
international assistance, and received “hundreds of millions of dollars” 
including a loan from the International Monetary Fund for 389 million 
dollars.172  This large influx of money “created ample opportunities for 
corruption.”173  Self-dealing has been a constant, with lucrative contracts 
awarded to family members or allies of the administration.  The government 
has fought transparency, deleting previously available public information 
about expenditures,174 and resisting or refusing to cooperate with audits or 
reporting on emergency spending.175  There has been evidence of 
questionable expenditures concerning governmental actions beyond the 
pandemic.176  In September 2020 the director of a Salvadoran watchdog non-
profit stated that “‘[t]he amount of corruption that has come to light in the 
management of public resources over these five months has been 
scandalous.’”177   
 Given the constraints on CICIES, and its relatively low-profile presence 
since it was established in September 2019, there were diminished 
expectations that it could undertake an effective role.178  But towards the end 
 
 172 Robert Looney, Corruption Scandals Stain Bukele’s Image Ahead of Kay Elections in 
El Salvador, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Jan. 6, 2021), 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29328/corruption-scandals-stain-bukele-s-
image-ahead-of-el-salvador-elections [https://perma.cc/X2CK-CR8T]. 
 173 Id. 
 174 When allegations of government mismanagement of coronavirus funds began to 
mount in the fall of 2020, the administration’s response was a brazen move to hide the 
information.  The government website that provides information on all of the “country’s 
contract expenditure suddenly went dark” and when it came back online, “all information 
pertaining to the Bukele presidency had been eliminated[.]”   Héctor Silva Ávalos & Seth 
Robbins, Corruption Cries Mount Over Pandemic Spending in El Salvador, INSIGHT CRIME 
(Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/corruption-cries-mount-over-
pandemic-spending-in-el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/N4LN-74FX].  Many in-country sources 
have commented on the lack of transparency of the Bukele administration, recounting that 
government websites containing information tracking homicides and other forms of violence 
were no longer accessible shortly after Bukele’s assumption of the presidency.  CGRS/RHRC 
Interview with Laura Regina Andrade Cruz, IUDOP, supra note 98 (“[I]n reality there is very 
little information accessible, it is very hard to access it, and the information is fragmented and 
limited.”). 
 175 Gressier, supra note 135. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. (quoting Roberto Rubio Fabián, director of the National Foundation for 
Development (FUNDE)).  
 178 See Abraham Ábrego, To Fight Corruption, El Salvador Needs an Anti-Impunity 
Commission with Teeth, EL FARO (Nov. 20, 2020),  
https://elfaro.net/en/202011/el_salvador/25020/To-Fight-Corruption-El-Salvador-Needs-an-
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of 2020, CICIES alerted the Fiscalia General de la Republica (FGR) 
[Prosecutor General of the Republic] of possible corruption in the 
expenditure of pandemic funds, which resulted in a major investigation into 
wrongdoing.179  Prosecutors conducted more than twenty raids on various 
government offices aimed at gathering evidence on corrupt expenditures.180  
Notably the Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) [National Civilian Police] tried to 
block the entry of the prosecutors, which was alarming given that the police 
generally act as partners to the FGR in investigations.181  Bukele’s reaction 
to the raids was “furious,” calling the prosecutors “scoundrels” and accusing 
them of attacking his “government’s achievements.”182  Some observers see 
this collaboration between CICIES and the FGR as posing the question 
“whether the CICIES can play a more decisive role in the fight against 
corruption, despite its limitations, and whether the FGR can play a similarly 
strong and independent role in the fight against impunity – something that 
has always been demanded of it.”183  Regardless of the answer to that 
question, it appears that Bukele’s claims of clean government have been 
badly damaged.   
 
Anti-Impunity-Commission-with-Teeth.htm?st-full_text=all&tpl=11 
[https://perma.cc/Z9Y6-VWAA].   
 179 Alex Papadovassilakis, With Pandemic Raids, Bukele Government Faces Major 
Investigation in El Salvador, INSIGHT CRIME (Nov. 23, 2020), 
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/pandemic-raids-bukele-investigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/7UKP-VNW8].   
 180 The alleged improprieties include a $225,000 contract for rubber boots granted to an 
auto parts company owned by the Health Minister Franciso Alabí’s aunt, and $20 million 
dollars expended in nine medical supply contracts which included the purchase of masks at 
twice the manufacturer’s price from a company with links to Alejandor Zelaya, the Finance 
Minister.  Id.  The raids involved hundreds of prosecutors and included searches at the Ministry 
of Health, the Treasury, Agriculture and Livestock, the Environment and Natural Resources, 
and the National Administration of Aqueducts and Sewers.  Marcos Alemán, Fiscalía 
Salvadoreña Investiga Compras durante la Pandemia [Salvadoran Proseutor’s Office 
Investigates Purchases during the Pandemic], SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE EN ESPAÑOL (Nov. 
11, 2020), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/en-espanol/noticias/story/2020-11-
11/fiscalia-salvadorena-investiga-compras-durante-la-pandemia [https://perma.cc/ZM47-
XKFU] (reprinted from the Associated Press).   
 181 Bukele Created CICIES, Now it Investigates his Government, EL SALVADOR 
PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 20, 2020), http://www.elsalvadorperspectives.com/2020/11/bukele-
created-cicies-now-it.html [https://perma.cc/S8M5-NGMK].   
 182 Rodolfo Cardenal, La Corrupción Sobresalta Casa Presidencial [Corruption Shocks 
Presidential House], NOTICIAS UCA (Nov. 19, 2020), https://noticias.uca.edu.sv/articulos/la-
corrupcion-sobresalta-casa-presidencial [https://perma.cc/HGQ4-AZ7S].   
 183 Ábrego, supra note 178.  See also Mirella Cáceres, Cinco Oenegés Ven en Cicies 
“Enorme Potencial” tras Indagar Compras por Covid [Five NGOs See “Enormous Potential” 
in Cicies after Investigating Purchases for Covid], ELSALVADOR.COM (Nov. 14, 2020), 
https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/cicies-comision-internacional-contra-la-
impunidad-el-salvador-oeneges-indaga-compras-covid19-pandemia/775863/2020/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y8JN-CNMP].   
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iii. Authoritarianism and Lack of Respect for Rule of Law 
 
 Bukele has carefully cultivated an image of himself as a “millennial 
figure, with his penchant for leather jackets, backward baseball caps and 90s 
hip-hop.”184  His prolific use of Twitter185 and other social media have 
bolstered that image.  But his authoritarian tendencies, his lack of respect for 
rule of law, and his escalating attacks on the free press have evoked an image 
more in line with that of past Latin American dictators, and has raised alarms 
across the international community.  
 One of the earliest shows of his strongman tendencies occurred in 
February 2020 when the Legislative Assembly refused to meet on a Sunday 
to consider whether to authorize him to negotiate a loan to finance his 
Territorial Plan.  Bukele sent uniformed security officers to the 
congressmembers’ homes and ordered them to attend; many still refused, 
denying him a quorum.  Bukele then entered the legislative chamber 
accompanied by the heavily armed military and police, called the 
congressmembers criminals, and sitting in the seat reserved for the president 
of the Legislative Assembly, he declared, “Now I think it’s very clear who 
has control of the situation.”186  Outside the building, Bukele’s followers 
were smashing pinatas designed to be stand-ins for his political opponents.187  
After he and the security forces departed, he ordered the legislators to 
approve the loan within a week.   
 So concerning were his actions that the Constitutional Chamber of El 
Salvador’s Supreme Court ordered Bukele to desist from actions which 
imperil “‘representative government, the pluralist political system, and the 
separation of powers[.]’”188  In a further attempt to bend the members of the 
 
 184 Emily Green & Deborah Bonello, El Salvador’s Hipster President Is Attacking the 
Media, VICE WORLD NEWS (Sept. 21, 2020, 10:41 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/93548y/el-salvadors-hipster-president-is-attacking-the-
media [https://perma.cc/N893-78HT].  
 185 There are aspects of his use of Twitter which reinforce his authoritarian image.  A 
substantial percentage of his tweets are “orders” to do something (“Se le ordena que”) [“You 
are ordered to”] followed by a directive.  Ruiz-Alba et al., supra note 25, at 268.  Academics 
analyzing the content of his tweets have found that almost 40% (39.6%) fit in the category of 
“propaganda.”  Id.  One expert noted, “[t]here is a politic of major disinformation. – all of the 
media channels have images that are edited to maintain [a positive] image of the President, to 
show Bukele as not making mistakes.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Laura Regina Andrade 
Cruz, IUDOP, supra note 98, at 4. 
 186 Ghitis, El Salvador Knew Bukele Was Brash, supra note 28; see also Nóchez, supra 
note 28. 
 187 Ghitis, El Salvador Knew Bukele Was Brash, supra note 28. 
 188 Nagovitch, supra note 158 (quoting the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court 
order). 
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Legislative Assembly to his will, he ordered their salaries withheld until they 
complied.189  On another occasion, when the Legislative Assembly refused 
to extend a COVID-19 related state-of-emergency that Bukele requested, he 
issued an executive decree in contravention of the Assembly, an act 
characterized as an “usurpation of powers[.]”190   
 Bukele’s disregard for separation of powers has extended to the judiciary, 
as well as the legislative branch.  When El Salvador’s Supreme Court ruled 
against some of his draconian COVID-19 measures, which included 
detaining individuals who violated stay-at-home orders in crowded 
quarantine centers, he tweeted: “‘Five people [the judges] aren’t going to 
decide the death of hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans. . . . It doesn’t 
matter how much ink and seals they have.’”191  At the same time as his 
administration attempted to appear concerned about public health, it was well 
aware that its punishment for violating stay-at-home orders – the close 
confinement in quarantine centers – put individuals at increased risk of 
contracting the disease.192  Other aspects of Bukele’s handling of the 
pandemic have been criticized for their wholesale violation of human rights.  
 
 189 October 2, 2020: A New Migrant Caravan, Ongoing Attacks against the Press, and 
the Battle against Impunity, EL FARO ENGLISH (Oct. 2, 2020), https://us19.campaign-
archive.com/?u=a822abdb775cca5db840e11e5&id=02ba0e86c8 [https://perma.cc/S7VU-
NLY7] [hereinafter A New Migrant Caravan]. 
 190 Nóchez, supra note 28. 
 191 Joshua Goodman, US Official Warns El Salvador’s President that Aid at Risk, ABC 
NEWS (Sept. 3, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-official-warns-el-
salvadors-president-aid-risk-72799276 [https://perma.cc/J5HT-R5DM] (reprinted from the 
Associated Press).  On another occasion he issued an order in direct contradiction of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling around the requirement that all entrants to El Salvador had to present 
a negative COVID test.  The Court had ruled that such an exceptional measure required 
legislative approval.  Bukele ignored the ruling, warning that airlines passengers would not be 
permitted to enter without proof of a negative COVID test . Merlin Delcid, Nayib Bukele 
Desafía a la CSJ y Exigirá a Pasajeros Prueba Negative de Covid-19 para Ingresar a El 
Salvador [Nayib Buekele Challenges the CSJ and Will Demand Proof of Negative Covid-19 





 192 Astrid Valencia & Diana Sánchez, Some Things Never Change: Repression and the 
Militarization of Public Security in El Salvador, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 5, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/represion-militarizacion-seguridad-publica-
el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/K2RX-YFTC].  “The Minister of Justice and Public Security 
warned . . . that people who violated the national lockdown would be sent to containment 
centres, ‘far from their families, and where they would also be at risk of contracting the virus.’”  
Id. (emphasis added). 
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Individuals who had to leave their homes and were encountered by security 
forces have been imprisoned, beaten, and shot.193  
 Journalists whose articles question Bukele’s policies, or put him or his 
government in a negative light, have been the particular targets of Bukele’s 
intimidation and harassment.  Bukele retaliated against El Faro after it broke 
the story on his administration’s secret negotiations and truce with MS-13, 
as well as its numerous articles on his administration’s corruption, and 
mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic.194  He has denied El Faro access 
to his press conferences, attacked them on Twitter, been behind false 
accusations of misconduct at the publication, and most recently has subjected 
it to an audit by the Finance Ministry.195  The audit is of particular concern 
as it seeks “minutes from the publication’s board of director meetings, update 
reports El Faro sends its partners about journalistic projects, and the 
identities of its individual donors.”196  El Faro is not the only publication that 
has been in Bukele’s bullseye, and his administration’s ongoing attack on the 
free press led 600 journalists and scholars from around the world to sign a 
letter to the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the 
Interamerican Commission on Human Rights.197      
 Bukele’s disregard for rule of law and democratic processes, have drawn 
international concern and criticism.  The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, along with Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, denounced his actions in fighting COVID-19.198  A group of U.S. 
Congressmembers sent Bukele a letter expressing their “‘deep concern 
regarding your government’s increased hostility toward independent and 
investigative media outlets in El Salvador.’”199  The U.S. State Department 
also communicated its displeasure about encroachments on the independence 
of journalists.200  And in a statement that could have implications for foreign 
assistance, Thomas Kelly, a senior official with the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation,201 a U.S. foreign aid agency that has committed $300 million in 
 
 193 Valencia & Sánchez, supra note 192.  
 194 Joel Simon, In El Salvador, a Beacon of Truth Under Threat, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/el-faro-nayib-bukele-press-freedom.php?  
[https://perma.cc/8SSE-S5FK]. 
 195 Green & Bonello, supra note 184. 
 196 Id. 
 197 A New Migrant Caravan, supra note 189. 
 198 Nóchez, supra note 28. 
 199 Green & Bonello, supra note 184. 
 200 The U.S. State Department letter stated:  “Journalists do critically important jobs in a 
democracy and their independence must be respected[.]”  Id. (quoting Michael Kozak, acting 
assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs). 
 201 The Millennium Challenge Corporation operates independently, but reports to the 
State Department.  To qualify for MCC funding, a country has to meet the criteria on a 
“scorecard” that rates performance in 20 categories, including political rights and civil 
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grants to El Salvador, indicated that funding is contingent on “strict 
adherence to the rule of law and the protection of fundamental freedoms,” 
and could therefore be at risk.202    
 Despite claims of corruption, and  growing  authoritarianism, Bukele 
remains popular with the public, and it is predicted that Nuevas Ideas, his 
political party, will gain seats in the legislative elections scheduled for 
February 2021.203  It would not be  a positive development for El Salvador’s 
democracy if Nuevas Ideas were to  win a  majority, which would further  
Bukele’s “worst instincts[.]”204  As one critic observed, “‘He’s a profoundly 
manipulative leader and is backed by the military.  The development of his 
dictatorship is not something that will happen in the future, it’s an ongoing 
process.’”205   
 
D. Climate Change, Natural Disasters, Corporate Exploitation, and 
Environmental Degradation  
 
 Although the primary cause of forced migration is the violence, 
impunity, and corruption described above, environmental disasters and 
degradation also make survival precarious, contributing to displacement and 
forced migration.206  Climate change has led to more powerful hurricanes, 
with related flooding and landslides,207 and intensified drought conditions.208  
In addition to climate-related disasters, El Salvador has fault lines 
 
liberties.  MCC was established with the purpose of “raising the goal for foreign assistance.”  
Goodman, supra note 191.  
 202 Goodman, supra note 191. 
 203 Looney, supra note 172. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. (quoting Salvadoran economist Antonio Barrera). 
 206 In 2019 there were 454,000 Salvadorans displaced due to conflict and violence, and 
1,900 due to disasters.  The number displaced by disasters rose sharply in 2020, with 13,000 
Salvadorans displaced in the first six months of 2020.  INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING 
CENTER, supra note 52. 
 207 See generally infra note 214. 
 208 See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DRY CORRIDOR 
CENTRAL AMERICA SITUATION REPORT (June 2016), http://www.fao.org/3/br092e/br092e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5DC7-LSEC] [hereinafter FAO] (“Due to irregular rainfall during 2015, 60 
percent of the maize crop was destroyed. The current impact of drought on the economy has 
increased with respect to the 2014 drought to approximately USD 100 million in 2015.”).  See 
also Inter-American Development Bank, Food Security and Emigration: Why People Flee and 
the Impact on Family Members Left Behind in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, WORLD 
FOOD PROGRAMME (2017), https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000019629/download/ 
[https://perma.cc/3GKN-AEMH].  “Communities in the Dry Corridor have seen a notable rise 
in food insecurity over the past two years because of two to four years of droughts or dry spells 
. . . [T]he area has increasingly become the focus of humanitarian interventions, as the 
cumulative impact of these recent dry seasons has led to negative coping strategies among 
those affected.”  Id. at 20.  
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crisscrossing its territory, and has endured the destruction of powerful 
earthquakes.209  The lack of protective environmental laws has allowed 
exploitation by large businesses and multinational corporations which have 
led to pollution, deforestation, and excessive water use, making clean potable 
water a scarce commodity.210  All of these are additional push factors for 
migration. 
 
i. Climate Change and Natural Disasters 
 
a. Flooding and Droughts 
 
 El Salvador is part of the “Central America Dry Corridor,” which 
encompasses the Pacific coastal area from southern Mexico to Panama.211  
The Dry Corridor, which covers fifty-eight percent of the country, is heavily 
impacted by destructive hurricanes and tropical storms which cause flooding, 
landslides, death, and displacement.  Particularly damaging ones included 
Mitch in 1998,212 Ida in 2009,213 and Amanda, Eta, and Iota in 2020.214  
 
 209 See Martínez-Díaz et al., infra note 221. 
 210 See Atkins, infra note 228. 
 211 The Alliance for Climate Protection, How The Climate Crisis is Driving Central 
American Migration, CLIMATE REALITY PROJECT (May 31, 2019, 10:04 AM), 
https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/how-climate-crisis-driving-central-american-
migration [https://perma.cc/M6DK-MJ54]. 
 212 Hurricane Mitch displaced 85,000 people and killed another 240. See William I. Rose, 
Julian J. Bommer & Ciro Sandoval, Natural Hazards and Risk Mitigation in El Salvador: An 
Introduction, 375 GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y AM. 1, 2 (2004), [https://perma.cc/YEE3-T4NE]. 
 213 Hurricane Ida displaced 15,000 people.  THE NANSEN INITIATIVE SECRETARIAT, 
DISASTERS AND CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: EMERGING NEEDS, NEW 
RESPONSES 11 (2013), http://www.nanseninitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/FINAL_Background_Paper_Central_America_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5G3-SUCT].  The storm and its subsequent flooding and mudslides were 
reported to have killed at least 189 people.  Death Toll from El Salvador Flooding, Mudslides 
Rises to 189, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB. (Nov. 14, 2009), 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=347399&CategoryId=23558 
[https://perma.cc/74VM-TREW]. 
 214 Tropical Storm Amanda contributed to at least 30 deaths in El Salvador and caused 
over $200 million in damage.  ROBBIE BERG, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: TROPICAL STORM AMANDA 4 
(2020), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/EP022020_Amanda.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZWS-
Y7JH].  As of November 2020, Hurricane Eta has killed at least one Salvadoran.  El Salvador 
Reports First Death From Tropical Storm Eta, HAITI NEWS (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.haitinews.net/news/266895112/el-salvador-reports-first-death-from-tropical-
storm-eta [https://perma.cc/RG83-A4VM].  Hurricane Iota killed at least one Salvadoran and 
displaced at least 880.  Carlos Mario Marquez, Iota Dissipates Over El Salvador After Leaving 
Wave of Deaths in Central America, THE TICO TIMES (Nov. 18, 2020), 
https://ticotimes.net/2020/11/18/iota-dissipates-over-el-salvador-after-leaving-wave-of-
deaths-in-central-america [https://perma.cc/PJE3-RP82]. 
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Climate change and global warming contribute to the severity and frequency 
of the storms.215   
 The Dry Corridor experiences acute droughts, also related to climate 
change, resulting in the loss of crops and adding to food insecurity.  Over half 
(54%) of El Salvador’s rural population survive through the cultivation and 
sale of grains,216 and are directly affected by the rising temperatures,217 and 
the decrease in precipitation associated with climate change.  The 2014-2015 
drought led to the destruction of sixty percent of the maize crop.  The Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reported that as a result 
almost 200,000 Salvadorans experienced moderate to severe food 
insecurity.218  The drought conditions that began in 2014 were significant 
drivers of migration to the United States.219  These changes in climate, 
occurring in a time of declining international commodity prices, also had a 
negative impact on El Salvador’s coffee export industry, which in turn, 




 Floods and droughts are not the only disasters impacting El Salvador.  
The country sits upon multiple fault lines, making it susceptible to powerful 
 
 215 See Ileana-Sînziana Pușcaș, Central and North America: Migration and Displacement 
in the Context of Disasters and Environmental Change, in 4 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, 
MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: POLICY BRIEF SERIES 1 (2018), 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/policy_brief_series_vol4_issue1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GU42-VQAH].  “[C]limate change is also acknowledged as increasingly 
affecting the region, visibly seen through the heightened frequency and intensity of hydro-
meteorological storms and reduced accumulated precipitation in the Dry Corridor in Central 
America.”  Id. at 2.  El Niño, whose scientific name is El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
is a worldwide weather pattern that results when there is a temperature increase of at least 0.9 
F in the equatorial waters of the eastern Pacific Ocean.  It brings drought to some areas, and 
severe storm and flooding to others, including the Pacific Coast of the Americas.  El Niño, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, RESOURCE LIBRARY—ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY, 
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/el-nino/  [https://perma.cc/XU4P-5GKG].  
 216 WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, supra note 208, at 20. 
 217 FAO, supra note 208. 
 218 Id. 
 219 WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, supra note 208, at 5. 
 220 Between 2013 and 2014, over 140,000 Salvadorans lost their jobs in the coffee 
industry.  Choetsow Tenzin, A Caffeinated Crisis: An Unfiltered Look at the Struggles of the 
Coffee Industry in El Salvador, 41 HARV. INT’L REV. 41, 43 (2020), https://hir.harvard.edu/a-
caffeinated-crisis-an-unfiltered-look-at-the-struggles-of-the-coffee-industry-in-el-salvador/. 
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earthquakes.221  The earliest recorded history is of a 1625 earthquake, which 
devastated the city of El Salvador and surrounding areas.222   
 More recently, there have been four highly destructive earthquakes, 
occurring in 1982 (7.2 magnitude), 1986 (5.7 magnitude), January 2001 (7.6-
7.9 magnitude), and February 2001 (6.6 magnitude).223  These quakes led to 
landslides, caused loss of life, destroyed buildings, and resulted in large-scale 
displacement and an increase in homelessness.  It was estimated that 200,000 
individuals became homeless after the 1986 earthquake, and that tens of 
thousands were left without housing after the January 2001 quake – either 
because they had lost their homes or were frightened to be inside due to 
ongoing aftershocks.224  Beyond these immediate consequences, were those 
that arose from destruction of infrastructure, such as potable water systems, 
heightening the risk of water-borne infectious diseases.225   
 
ii. Corporate Exploitation and Environmental Degradation 
 
 Corporate exploitation and environmental degradation have worsened 
water scarcity by polluting and overusing available water sources.  To date, 
efforts to enact laws regulating the use of water have stalled.  The only – but 
not inconsequential – victory that activists have had around controlling their 
resources and prohibiting environmentally damaging practices has been 
through passage of a landmark ban on metals mining.  
 
a. Corporate Interests and their Impact on El Salvador’s Water 
 
 El Salvador is considered to be the “most water-stressed nation in Central 
America,”226 with aquifers across the country dropping by at least thirteen 
feet, a decline flagged as profoundly concerning by the country’s Minister of 
Environment.227  In the absence of controls, monied interests – multinational 
corporations, agribusiness, developers – have had unlimited access to water, 
 
 221 José J. Martínez-Díaz et al., Triggering of Destructive Earthquakes in El Salvador, 32 
GEOLOGY 65, 66 (2004). 
 222 Earthquakes in El Salvador, SATCAWEB.ORG, http://www.satcaweb.org/el-salvador/ 
[https://perma.cc/65HB-CMYX]. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Heather Gies, Once Lush, El Salvador is Dangerously Close to Running Dry, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC—ENVIRONMENT (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/el-salvador-water-crisis-drought-
climate-change [https://perma.cc/CFG9-UQA4]. 
 227 Id.  
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greatly contributing to the scarcity.228  Rivers and streams have also been 
affected.  Unregulated industrial and agricultural run-off, as well as untreated 
sewage, has led to the contamination of 90% of El Salvador’s surface water, 
leaving one and half million inhabitants without access to potable water.229 
 The operation of the brewing company Industrias La Constancia (ILC) 
provides an example of a corporation using unlimited amounts of water, 
leaving the local Salvadorans with virtually no access.230  ILC, originally a 
Salvadoran company, is situated in Nejapa, atop one of the largest and most 
important aquifers in the region, which provides water not only to the local 
residents, but to forty percent of metropolitan San Salvador.231  In 2005, ILC 
became a subsidiary for Coca Cola and the South African company, 
SABMiller, which is the second largest brewer in the world.232  ILC drew 
enormous water from the aquifer, via two wells, and as a result of its 
operations, the population of Nejapa experienced water scarcity.233  In 2019, 
it was reported that the water level in the aquifer had  “shrunk by 20%” in the 
preceding five years.234      
 ILC also used large amounts of water from the San Antonio River, which 
the Nejapa residents relied upon; its operations contributed to the river’s 
pollution.235  ILC’s proposal in August 2013 to increase its use of the 
aquifer’s water by digging additional wells led to large-scale protests, which 
 
 228 Gies, supra note 226.  See also Ed Atkins, The Corporate Nullification of the Human 
Right to Water: The Case of El Salvador, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Nov. 28, 2014), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/corporate-nullification-of-human-right-to-water-case-of-
el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/J539-D762].  
In many parts of the world, local waterscapes have been dramatically 
transformed through the neoliberal era and its commodification of water. 
The hydrosocial flow of the resource, already dogged by the battles of 
gender, class and other power hierarchies, has become dominated by 
international finance. This is particularly evident in the nation of El 
Salvador. 
Id. 
 229 Sharon Hunter-Smith, Water as a Human Right or Water as a Commodity?, CHICAGO 
RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP NETWORK ON LATIN AM. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://crln.org/el-salvador-
water/ [https://perma.cc/8XPX-59VP]. 
 230 See Atkins, supra note 228. 
 231 Id.  See also Nina Lakhani, Living Without Water: The Crisis Pushing People Out of 
El Salvador, GUARDIAN (Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2019/jul/30/el-salvador-water-crisis-privatization-gangs-corruption 
[https://perma.cc/C4U4-DP88]. 
 232 Atkins, supra note 228. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Lakhani, supra note 231.  
 235 Karla Umanzor, Industries Endanger Water Quality in El Salvador, BORGEN MAG. 
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.borgenmagazine.com/water-quality-in-el-salvador/ 
[https://perma.cc/CG5C-AL57]. 
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were successful in stopping the expansion.236  However, attempts to 
implement a long-term solution through the passage of legislation which 
would ensure access to water for all, and limit the amount that corporations 
can use, have to date been unsuccessful.237  Legislation was drafted by the 
FMLN, but stalled in the Legislative Assembly due to opposition from “a 
majority of conservative, business-aligned lawmakers.”238  Critics of ILC’s 
exploitation of water have noted the high profits of both SABMiller and Coca 
Cola,239 observing that “[while] the water of Nejapa is disappearing, its 
financial benefits are being enjoyed elsewhere.”240 
 Brewing companies such as ILC are not the only ones contributing to El 
Salvador’s water crisis; “priority water usage” has been given to powerful 
business interests “such as industrial plantations, mining corporations, [and] 
luxury housing developments[.]”241  In an area outside San Salvador where 
local residents have difficulty accessing sufficient water, the developer of an 
exclusive housing development advertised “amenities [such] as a car wash, 
pet shower and swimming pool.”242  Compounding El Salvador’s water woes 
is its antiquated water system – so full of leaks that “once in the system, 48% 




 236 See Edgardo Ayala, Water Dispute Pits Communities Against Brewing Giant, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE, NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/08/water-
dispute-pits-communities-against-brewing-giant/ [https://perma.cc/CBZ9-FYHD]. 
 237 See Hunter-Smith, supra note 229.  
 238 Gies, supra note 226. 
 239 “Poor families without piped water pay up to two dollars for a barrel of water every 
day…. Coca Cola pays 0.06 cents of a dollar per cubic meter” the equivalent of six cents for 
eight barrels. Edgardo Ayala, El Salvador: Most Water-Stressed Country in Central America, 
INTER PRESS SERVICE, NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/12/el-
salvador-most-water-stressed-country-in-central-america/ [https://perma.cc/KC4X-3ZLG]. 
 240 Atkins, supra note 228. 
 241 Gies, supra note 226. 
 242 Id. See also CIVICUS & PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, AGAINST ALL ODDS: THE PERILS OF 
FIGHTING FOR NATURAL RESOURCE JUSTICE 19 (2016), https://media.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/files/documents/Against-All-Odds-PWYP-Civicus-
Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WAV-E8Q3].  
In El Salvador, Grupo Roble, a large corporate conglomerate, sued a 
woman activist for defamation. Sonia Sánchez, an inhabitant of El 
Porvenir, a town south of San Salvador, had protested against a building 
project involving the deforestation of a large area. The company insisted 
that she had lied when claiming that logging was severely damaging the 
local environment. It demanded US$25,000 in compensation and a public 
apology. She was eventually acquitted of all charges. 
Id. 
 243 Lakhani, supra note 231. 
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b. A Rare Victory – El Salvador’s Law Banning the Mining of 
Metals 
 
 In March 2017 El Salvador became the first country in the world to ban 
all mining of metals. The law, Ley de Prohibición de la Minería Metálica 
(Law Prohibiting Metal Mining)244 was approved on a vote of sixty-nine in 
favor, none opposed, with fifteen of the Legislative Assembly’s members not 
showing up to vote.  Members of the FMLN and ARENA, as well as GANA, 
all supported the mining ban.245  The law is comprehensive; it prohibits 
“exploration, extraction, exploitation, and processing, on the surface, or 
underground”246  as well as “the use of toxic chemicals, such as cyanide, 
mercury or other substances used in mining.”247  It calls for the closing of any 
existing metal mines, and for environmental remediation of areas damaged 
by the mines so that “conditions of a healthy environment” can be returned 
to the population.248 
 The story of El Salvador’s successful efforts to ban mining is best 
understood in context; the primary threat came from industrial mining of 
gold, which is inherently environmentally harmful.  Cyanide is used to 
separate the gold from the rocks in which it is embedded, and poisonous 
arsenic and sulfides are released which “contaminate soils and water for 
centuries.”249  Salvadorans first had their experience of severe pollution from 
metal mining in the 1970s when an American-based company contaminated 
the San Sebastián River with cyanide, arsenic, and mercury, resulting in 
“numerous cases of cancer and respiratory diseases[.]”250   
 Most mining ceased during El Salvador’s civil war, but once it ended, 
ARENA developed an economic plan which included mining, and pursuant 
 
 244 Decree No. 639, D.O. No. 60, Vol. 415 at 5-7, April 4, 2017 (El Sal.), 
https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/ (clicking do-2017/, then 
04-abril/, then 04-04-2017.pdf). 
 245 See Sandra Cuffe, El Salvador Becomes First Country to Ban Metals Mining, 
MONGABAY (Mar. 30, 2017), https://news.mongabay.com/2017/03/el-salvador-becomes-first-
country-to-ban-metals-mining/ [https://perma.cc/4JP3-22R6]. 
 246 Decree No. 629, supra note 244, at art. 2. (“La prohibición a la mintería metálica 
incluye las actividades de: exploración, extracción, explotación y procesamiento, ya sea, a 
cielo abierto o subterránea.”). 
 247 Id. (“También, se prohíbe el uso de químicos tóxicos como cianuro, mercurio y otros, 
en cualquier proceso de minería metálica.”). 
 248 Id. at art. 6. (“[P]ara devolver a la poplación las condiciones de un ambiente sano.”). 
 249 Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, Historic Wins for Democracy and Rights in El 
Salvador, ETHICS & INT’L AFF. (June 2017), 
https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/historic-wins-democracy-rights-el-
salvador/ [https://perma.cc/YT62-PQK8]. 
 250 Esty Dinur, How El Salvador Won on Mining, PROGRESSIVE (Apr. 1, 2018), 
https://progressive.org/magazine/how-el-salvador-won-on-mining/ [https://perma.cc/K2PJ-
S2XG]. 
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to the plan granted “twenty-eight exploration licenses to ten companies from 
the United States, Canada, and Australia, without consultation with the 
residents.”251  The areas most impacted by the exploration were the 
departments of Chalatenango and Cabañas, “highly organized communities 
where land had been granted to the residents”252 after the war.  The residents 
of Chalatenango used direct action against Au Martinique Silver, a Canadian 
corporation engaged in exploratory activities, and through blockades and 
other actions “forced” the corporation to stop the project.253  The conflict over 
mining in Cabañas did not resolve so quickly, and gave rise to organizing 
which eventually led to the passage of the law against mining.   
 In 2002, Pacific Rim, a Canadian company, purchased the right to 
explore gold in Cabanas; this was separate from the right to undertake mining 
operations.254  The company touted the benefits to the community – including 
in the form of jobs – and initially residents were not opposed.  However, as 
they became more educated about the environmental harms, opposition grew.  
The possibility of toxic contamination was especially alarming given that the 
Rio Lempa, the source of fresh water for over fifty percent of El Salvador’s 
population, runs through Cabañas.255 
 Local organizers in Cabañas gained the interest and support of civil 
society groups across El Salvador.256  By 2005 a National Roundtable on 
Mining (La Mesa Nacional Frente al Minteria Metálica) was formed, and it 
“decided a key part of its work would be to push the national government to 
ban metallic mining.”257  Between 2005 and 2007 there was a confluence of 
factors favorable to the anti-mining advocates.  Cabinet level ministers in the 
national government “became increasingly concerned about the 
environmental and social impacts of mining”258 and the government’s ability 
to regulate multinational corporations.  The Catholic Church, which is a 
powerful actor in El Salvador, came out with strong opposition to gold 
mining activities, and public opinion had turned, with a poll reporting sixty 
percent of the population was against gold mining.259  This was followed by 
the formation of “an unusual” alliance between El Salvador’s Ministry of 
 
 251 Dinur, supra note 250.  
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Robin Broad, Corporate Bias in the World Bank Group’s International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Case Study of a Global Mining Corporation Suing El 
Salvador, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 851, 858 (2015), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1898&context=jil 
[https://perma.cc/Q5RE-HLCZ]. 
 255 Id. at 859. 
 256 Id. at 860.  
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 860-61. 
 259 Id. at 860.  
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Economy and Ministry of the Environment, who decided that a 
comprehensive “environmental review” needed to be conducted before any 
additional mining activities would be permitted, thus essentially imposing a 
mining moratorium.260 
 Pacific Rim, which has bought the right to explore, but not to mine, 
refused to accept the moratorium, and sued El Salvador in the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a World Bank 
arbitration tribunal.  Pacific Rim, unable to carry the cost of the litigation 
independently, financed the suit through a 2013 sale to Canadian mining 
company OceanaGold.261  The ICSID is a “controversial” body because it 
does not require corporations to first go to a country’s domestic court; it 
allows them to go directly to the World Bank tribunal.262  This aspect of 
ISCID was harshly critiqued when it was created because it “confer[s] a 
privilege on the foreign investor”263 exempting him from domestic law 
requirements.  Pacific Rim’s litigation against El Salvador lasted seven years, 
and in what was hailed as a stunning and unlikely outcome, the ISCID ruled 
in favor of El Salvador in October of 2016.  Many have written about the 
factors that resulted in such a surprising decision.264  Noteworthy is the fact 
that the Salvadoran activists were able to build international solidarity outside 
their borders, with a network of “International Allies.”265   
 Shortly after the ICSID ruling against OceanaGold, the Legislative 
Assembly of El Salvador passed the landmark ban on mining, signaling 
success for what had been a decade-long campaign.  In yet another sign of 
the international solidarity that had been forged, a delegation from the 
Philippines spoke to Salvadoran legislators about “environmental disasters” 
they suffered as a result of OceanaGold’s operations in their country,266 
disputing the company’s assertions that it deserved high marks for 
compliance with “standards on health, safety, environment, community and 
sustainability[.]”267 
 Salvadorans look to the improbable odds they overcame in becoming the 
first country to enact a total ban on metals mining, and hope that the strategy 
and support that made it possible can be mobilized in favor of a national water 
 
 260 Broad, supra note 254, at 861.  
 261 Id. at 862 & 865–66. 
 262 See id. at 853–54.  
 263 Id. at 855. 
 264 See id. at 854.  See also Dinur, supra note 250; Sophie Hares, Water Takes Gold as El 
Salvador Bans Metal Mining, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-el-
salvador-mining-water-idUSKBN1762AG [https://perma.cc/33YW-W8SV]. 
 265 The allies included Institute for Policy Studies, Mining Watch Canada, Friends of the 
Earth, and Oxfam.  See Broad & Cavanagh, supra note 249. 
 266 Cuffe, supra note 245. 
 267 Id. 
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law.268  “‘[I]t gives a lot of hope and inspiration for what’s possible 
politically, as you have support from both the left and the right[.]’”269  It 
appears that it may be much more difficult to bring all sides together on a 
water law.  On the mining issue, small and large interests – rural farmers and 
agribusiness – were on the same side, wanting to avoid toxic pollution of 
water.   
 A proposed General Water Law, first introduced in 2006 and then 
updated in 2013, would “define and protect water as a human right, as well 
as ensure universal access for the population and integrate community 
consultation into national decision-making regarding water usage.”270  The 
legislature has yet to pass the bill; however, some legislators insist that “the 
private sector be included in the new regulatory bodies the General Water 
Law was proposing.”271  According to environmental activists, “the reason 
they have not passed the General Water Law is that business leaders have 
close ties to right-wing legislators. These private, for-profit interests want to 
control water resources through privatization, and their representatives in the 
Legislature have been holding up the bill on . . .  their behalf.”272   
 
II. UNITED STATES’ ASYLUM POLICY TOWARDS 
SALVADORANS  
 
 The conditions described above constitute powerful push factors for 
migration.  Although environmental factors would not easily qualify them for 
refugee protection,273 the violence from state and non-state actors that 
 
 268 Hares, supra note 264. 
 269 Id. (quoting water advisor, Paul Hicks, from Catholic Relief Services in Latin 
America). 
 270 See Hunter-Smith, supra note 229. 
 271 Id. 
 272 The Legislative Assembly’s Environmental Debt, VOICES ON THE BORDER (Apr. 9, 
2015), https://voiceselsalvador.wordpress.com/2015/04/09/the-legislative-assemblys-
environmental-debt/ [https://perma.cc/9FWT-Z9P8]. 
 273 Numerous scholars have commented that individuals displaced or otherwise impacted 
by climate change do not easily fit within the international refugee definition, which the U.S. 
has adopted. See, e.g., Angela Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change 
Refugees in International Law, 30 L. & POL’Y 502 (2008); Frank Bierman and Ingrid Boas, 
Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVT’L POL. 60 (2010). An encouraging note is that one of President 
Biden’s refugee-related executive orders calls for a report that discusses “options for 
protection and resettlement of individuals displaced directly or indirectly from climate 
change[.]”  Exec. Order No. 14,013, 86 Fed. Reg. 8839, § 6 (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-02-09/pdf/2021-02804.pdf.  Individuals 
impacted by natural disasters, such as earthquakes or storms, can qualify for Temporary 
Protected Status.  Immigration and Nationality Act, section 244(a)(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. section 
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Salvadorans have faced are viable bases for successful asylum claims.  
However, bias and the resulting procedural and substantive barriers have 
more often than not excluded Salvadoran asylum seekers from the ambit of 
protection.  As described in the following section, their arrival to the U.S., 
where they could request protection, has frequently been thwarted.  They 
have been coerced to abandon their claims, and a legal double-standard has 
been applied to their cases.  The U.S. has also adopted improbable and 
strained interpretations of key elements of the refugee definition, which have 
disproportionately impacted Salvadoran asylum seekers as well as asylum 
seekers from Guatemala and Honduras.  These policies have spanned 
Republican and Democratic administrations, but reached new heights under 
Trump.  This is an opportune time to review these policies and to work 
towards reforming our asylum law system to bring it into greater compliance 
with our international obligations.   
 
A. From the Passage of the 1980 Refugee Act to the End of the 
Obama Administration  
 
 The United States has undertaken international and domestic law 
commitments to protect individuals fleeing persecution.  In 1968 it became a 
party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees274 (1967 
Protocol), by which it assumed all of the substantive obligations in the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention).275  The 
Convention was drafted in the aftermath of World War II, and is the seminal 
international refugee protection instrument. 276  Its key provisions are articles 
1, 33, and 34.  Art. 1 sets forth the definition of a refugee,277 Art. 33 prohibits 
 
1254(a)(b) (1)(2018).  Salvadorans were granted TPS status in 2001, as a result of the 
devastating earthquake in January 2001.   
 274 1967 Protocol, supra note 7. 
 275 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150. [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
 276 Karen Musalo, The Evolution of Refugee and Asylum Law in the United States, in 
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS: INTERDISCIPLINARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 17, 
19 (S. Megan Berthold & Kathryn R. Libal eds., Praeger Press 2019).  
 277  For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply 
to any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
1951 Convention, supra note 275, at art. 1.  In adopting this definition, “one of Congress’ 
primary objectives. . . was to eliminate discrimination on the basis of outmoded geographical 
and ideological considerations.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM 
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their refoulement or return to persecution,278 while Art. 34 encourages State 
parties to provide a durable status to refugees.279  Congress passed the 1980 
Refugee Act to bring United States law into compliance with its international 
obligations, and adopted near verbatim the Protocol’s refugee definition.280      
 The 1980 passage of the Refugee Act coincided with the beginning of 
the Salvadoran civil war, as well as with the execution of genocide as a 
strategy in Guatemala’s internal armed conflict – both of which resulted in 
an increased exodus from the two countries.  In response, the U.S. began to 
adopt exclusionary and biased policies towards these fleeing asylum 
seekers.281  Mexico and key Central American countries were pressured to 
 
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN – FEW DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 8 (Jan. 1987), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/ggd-87-33br.pdf [hereinafter UNIFORM APPLICATION OF 
STANDARDS]. 
 278 “No Contracting State shall expel or return . . . a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 1951 
Convention, supra note 275, at art. 33. 
 279 “The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization 
proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.” Id. at 
art. 34. 
 280 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). 
 281 Salvadorans have not been the only nationality subject to a biased application of the 
refugee definition. Impermissible factors – such as racial bias, or ideological affinities – have 
impacted overarching policy, as well as the individual adjudication of claims.  For example, 
the Reagan administration attempted to prevent Haitian asylum seekers – Black asylum 
seekers – from reaching the United States.  In 1981 it entered into an agreement with then 
Haitian dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier, which permitted the United States Coast Guard to stop 
Haitian vessels at sea and to “return undocumented passengers to Haiti.”  Cheryl Little, United 
States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 269, 295–96 
(1993); KAREN MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE, RICHARD A. BOSWELL & ANNIE DAHER, REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH 106–07 (5th ed. 2018) 
[hereinafter MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY].  Denying that it was violating its 
obligations under the Protocol and the Refugee Act, the Reagan Administration issued an 
Executive Order, proclaiming that “no person who is a refugee will be returned without his 
consent.”  Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109, § 2(c)(3) (Sept. 29, 1981).  The Coast 
Guard was required to screen Haitians to determine if they could qualify as refugees, and if 
so, they were not to be returned to Haiti, but were to be permitted to pursue their claims for 
asylum.  Christina Carole De Matteis, Forced Return of Haitian Migrants under Executive 
Order 12,807: A Violation of Domestic and International Law, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. 
REG. 431, 436–37 (1993).  Between 1981 to 1990, a time during which human rights violations 
and political persecution were pervasive, 21,455 Haitians were interdicted and returned, and 
only six were permitted to come to the U.S. to pursue asylum claims.  Id. at 432–33, 437.  
It was not just fear of floodgates that led to restrictionism, ideological considerations also 
influenced policy and adjudication, in contravention of congressional intent to eliminate such 
factors.  UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS supra note 277, at 8.  Asylum seekers fleeing 
countries the U.S. saw as ideological enemies were approved at far higher rates, than those 
fleeing countries which the U.S. supported.  “A 1982 draft INS internal report [stated] that 
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“slow down the flow of illegal aliens into the United States,”282 as well as to 
apprehend and deport them before they reached the U.S. border.  The number 
of Salvadorans and Guatemalans apprehended in the U.S. decreased, while 
the number of apprehensions and deportations in Mexico went up.283  At this 
point Mexico was not yet a party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol, so 
the U.S. could not justify its actions by arguing that the fleeing asylum 
seekers had the opportunity to request protection in Mexico.284      
 Those who reached the U.S. were subject to policies that had as their 
stated objective the “detention and quick deportation” of asylum seekers.285  
They were targeted with coercive tactics by the then Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) while in detention, intended to pressure them to 
sign a form accepting “voluntary departure” thereby abandoning their right 
to seek asylum.  These INS practices as applied to Salvadorans were 
successfully challenged in Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese,286 with the court 
ordering a range of procedures to assure that Salvadorans were informed of, 
and able to avail themselves of the right to seek asylum.  In issuing its ruling 
in Orantes-Hernandez, the court made extensive findings of fact, including 
that a “substantial number of Salvadorans who flee El Salvador possess a 
well-founded fear of persecution,” and that the persecutors were “primarily 
Salvadoran military and security forces.”287  
 During this same time period, the adjudication of their cases 
demonstrated bias – with denials of ninety-seven percent of Salvadoran 
asylum claims.288  U.S. foreign policy provides an explanation.289  The United 
 
‘different levels of proof are required of different asylum applicants.’”  MUSALO ET AL., 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, supra note 281, at 101.  The report discussed the disparate 
treatment of Salvadoran asylum seekers with seven Polish sailors who had jumped ship; this 
was at a time when Poland was under communist control.  At that time the Department of State 
(DOS), was required to issue an advisory opinion in every asylum case.  While Salvadorans 
needed to have a “classic textbook case” to receive a positive DOS letter, it stood ready to 
approve the “extremely weak” cases of the Polish sailors.  Id.  See infra, notes 289–293 and 
accompanying text.  
 282 Bill Frelick, Running the Gauntlet: The Central American Journey in Mexico, 3 INT’L 
J. REFUGEE L. 208, 211 (1991).  
 283 Id. at 214. 
 284 See JOAN FRIEDLAND & JESUS RODRIGUEZ Y RODRIGUEZ, SEEKING SAFE GROUND: THE 
LEGAL SITUATION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES IN MEXICO 53–55 (Mexico-U.S. L. Inst., 
Univ. of San Diego 1987). 
 285 Frelick, supra note 282, at 210–11. 
 286 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 
919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 287  Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. at 1491–92. 
 288 Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Reparations for Central American Refugees, 96 DENV. L. REV. 
585, 594 (2019). 
 289 As noted supra, note 281, the Department of State was required to submit an advisory 
opinion in every asylum case, which provided a direct route for the interjection of U.S. foreign 
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States had long provided financial assistance to support Salvadoran military 
forces which as noted by the Orantes court, were committing the 
overwhelming majority of human rights violations during that country’s civil 
war.  Loath to admit that it was funding a government engaged in gross 
human rights abuses, the U.S. opted to deny Salvadoran asylum claims.290  
U.S. policy towards Guatemalan asylum seekers – who were fleeing a civil 
war and genocide – and whose government it had also supported291 – was 
similar, with a grant rate of less than one percent in the time period from June 
1983 to September 1986.292     
 Accusations of bias led to a nationwide class action lawsuit, American 
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC).293  The government agreed to settle 
ABC rather than litigate it, seen by many as a tacit admission of bias,294 and 
an attempt to halt discovery which could have revealed the government’s 
machinations to influence outcomes.  A central provision of the settlement 
was the INS’s agreement to re-adjudicate the asylum and withholding claims 
of every Salvadoran and Guatemalan class member who had previously been 
denied relief.295  Claims were to be re-adjudicated under agreed-upon 
procedures to prevent the consideration of improper factors.296  Most notable 
 
policy into asylum adjudication.  Adjudicators did not ignore these advisory opinions; to the 
contrary, there was a high level of consistency between DOS opinions and immigration 
judges’ decision in asylum cases. See Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in 
the Reagan Era, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era 
[https://perma.cc/X2ZU-VSTN]; MATTHEW GIBNEY, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF ASYLUM: 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 157 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
A personal anecdote demonstrates the degree to which judges reflexively followed DOS 
advisory opinions.  In the mid-1980s I was representing two brothers in asylum proceedings 
in San Francisco Immigration Court.  They were both union activists from the Salvadoran port 
city of Acajutla. Their facts were virtually identical, indistinguishable as to particulars.  The 
brothers appeared before immigration judge Brian H. Simpson, who was known as a harsh 
judge, with  a 92.8% asylum denial rate.  Due to some inexplicable quirk, one of the brothers 
received a positive DOS letter, while the other received the usual (in Salvadoran cases) 
negative DOS letter.  With no persuasive reasoning to support the different decisions in these 
pair of cases, Judge Simpson granted the brother with the positive letter, and denied the brother 
with the negative letter.  
 290 Sherman-Stokes, supra note 288, at 592 & 594. 
 291 See Gregory L. Smith, Immune to Truth? Latin American Truth Commissions and U.S. 
Support for Abusive Regimes, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241, 261–64 (2001). 
 292 JAMES SILK, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 8 
(U.S. Comm. for Refugees, 1986).   
 293 760 F. Supp 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 294 See SARA IGNATIUS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRATION 
AND NATURALIZATION PROCESS 19 (National Asylum Study Project, Harvard Law School, 
1993). 
 295 Am. Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. at 799–800. 
 296 Id. at 799.  
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are the settlement agreement’s provisions that “foreign policy and border 
enforcement considerations are not relevant to the determination of . . . a 
well-founded fear,” nor is the fact that an individual is from a country “whose 
government the United States supports or with which it has favorable 
relations[.]”297  In precluding these factors, the settlement agreement was 
directly addressing what had contributed to the restrictive and biased policies 
towards asylum seekers. 
 Successful challenges such as Orantes and ABC were important steps, 
but parallel to these affirmations of the right to seek asylum was the 
development of jurisprudence which increasingly limited protection.  The 
major cases in this limiting trend involved Central Americans – many were 
Salvadorans – and adopted interpretations of the refugee definition out of step 
with international norms and directives.298  There are many examples of this, 
but only two of the most significant which preceded Trump will be addressed 
in this section – the interpretations of the statutory terms “on account of,” and 
“particular social group.”  The Trump administration took restrictive 
interpretations to new depths, with decisions and rules which would virtually 
rule out the possibility of protection for most asylum seekers, with a 
disproportionate impact on Central American claims.299 
 One of the earliest limiting interpretations came in the 1992 Supreme 
Court decision, INS v. Zacarias.300  The refugee definition requires that feared 
harm (persecution) be “on account of” or with a “nexus” to one of the five 
protected grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.  Claiming to rely on plain meaning, 
the Supreme Court adopted a highly formalistic interpretation of “on account 
of,” ruling that it requires proof of the persecutor’s intent.301   
 Elias Zacarias, the Guatemalan asylum seeker in the case, feared harm at 
the hands of the guerrillas for his refusal to join them in their armed conflict 
against the government. He claimed that because his reason for refusing was 
political, and the guerrillas’ goals were political, his impending persecution 
would be “on account of” political opinion.  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
 
 297 Am. Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. at 799. 
 298 See infra, notes  321-341 and accompanying text. 
 299 The Trump administration issued successive sets of regulations impacting procedural 
rights as well as the substantive refugee definition.  The regulation which had the most far-
reaching impact on the substantive definition was titled “Procedures for Asylum and 
Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review” (85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 
(proposed June 15, 2020)), and was referred to by advocates as the “death to asylum 
regulation” because of its expansive attempt to rewrite asylum law in a manner which would 
essentially foreclose protection in the majority of cases.  Litigation led to the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction against the implementation of this set of regulations.  Pangea Legal 
Servs., et al., v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 20-cv-09253-JD (N.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 2021).   
 300 502 U.S. 478 (1992).  
 301 Id. at 482. 
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ruling that “on account of” required proof that the guerrillas were motivated 
to harm him for his political opinion, rather than his refusal to join – no matter 
that his refusal arose from his political opinion, or that the guerrillas were 
political actors.302   
 The Supreme Court’s strained nexus interpretation was not limited to 
political opinion cases – but to all of the statutory grounds.  For example, in 
another case, two Salvadoran Jehovah’s Witness303 brothers, the Cañases, 
who faced imprisonment for their conscientiously motivated refusal to serve 
in the military, could not establish persecution on account of religion.304 
Pursuant to Zacarias, the Salvadoran government’s application of a universal 
conscription law to them, requiring them to violate their religious beliefs of 
pacifism or to be imprisoned, was not religious persecution because there was 
no intent to harm them for their religious beliefs, simply an intent to enforce 
conscription law.305  This analysis runs counter to UNHCR guidance.306     
 Interpretations of “on account of” which do not require proof of intent 
are more in keeping with the humanitarian objectives of the 1980 Refugee 
Act and the Convention.307  As the UNHCR pointed out in an amicus brief in 
the Zacarias case,308 proof of intent is appropriate when criminal liability is 
 
 302 Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483. 
 303 A central tenet of the Jehovah’s Witness faith is to not bear arms.  THE NATIONAL 
INTERRELIGIOUS SERVICE BOARD FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, WORDS OF CONSCIENCE: 
RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 38 (7th ed. 1970). 
 304 Cañas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F. 2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992).  Although the Cañas case 
involved the traditional religiously grounded objection to military service required by a State, 
young men who do not want to join gangs should be seen as conscientious objectors also.  This 
perspective is shared by human rights experts in El Salvador:  
Take a seventeen-year-old-boy – he did not want to participate in the gang 
and that is why they threatened him and his family.  We have argued that 
this is conscientious: the young man, for reasons of convictions this person 
does not want to belong to a criminal structure. That is conscientious 
objection for us. 
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Celia Medrano, Cristosal, supra note 42, at 10.    
 305 Cañas-Segovia, 970 F. 2d at 603. 
 306 See Karen Musalo, Conscientious Objection as a Basis for Refugee Status: Protection 
for the Fundamental Right of Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, 26 REF. SUR. 
Q. 69 (2007). 
 307 The overarching humanitarian objective of a treaty is to be taken into consideration in 
interpreting it.  Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: “A 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (emphasis added). 
 308 Brief for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 16, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (“Refugee status 
examiners are not called upon to decide the criminal guilt or liability of the persecutor” but to 
give protection to victims of persecution, an objective undermined by the intent standard).  
EL SALVADOR ROOT CAUSES-04.05.2021.DOCX2- MUSALO HRPLJ V18-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2021  9:30 PM 
Summer 2021  EL SALVADOR: ROOT CAUSES & JUST ASYLUM POL’Y RESPONSES 235 
being determined, but not when the purpose is protection to victims of 
persecution.  The protective objectives of the Refugee Convention could be 
better served by the application of either a “but for” (but for their religion, 
they would not be persecuted) or an “effects” analysis (a law punishing the 
Cañas brothers had the effect of punishing them for their religion).309 
 Since the proof of intent requirement was imposed in 1992, it has been 
heightened to make it even more difficult to establish.  Persecutors may have 
more than one motive in targeting an individual, and under the REAL ID Act 
of 2005, not only does the asylum seeker need to prove that one of them is a 
protected ground, the individual must establish it was “one central” reason.310  
The impact of Zacarias and its proof of intent requirement cannot be 
overstated – no matter how grievous the harm feared – failure to prove what 
is in the mind of the persecutor will result in denial of protection.311   
 Another jurisprudential area which narrowed, and in many cases 
foreclosed protection was the interpretation of the statutory ground, 
“particular social group.”  Much has been written attempting to divine what 
the drafters of the Refugee Convention intended by its inclusion,312 and in the 
absence of clear legislative intent, how U.S. courts should interpret it.313  The 
 
 309 Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from 
Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1235–39 (1994); Anjum Gupta, Dead Silent: 
Heuristics, Silent Motives, and Asylum, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016).  For a 
critique of various approaches to nexus, and the recommendation of a “contributing cause” 
approach (which would find nexus if a protected ground was a “contributing cause” of the 
persecution), see Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the 
Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2002).  
 310  The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a 
refugee, within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title. To 
establish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of such section, 
the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one 
central reason for persecuting the applicant.  
REAL ID Act, § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009). 
 311 A case of a Salvadoran woman denied asylum which preceded Zacarias, but applied 
the standard which the Supreme Court ultimately adopted, illustrates the indisputable failure 
of protection.  The Salvadoran female asylum seeker had been brutally raped and forced to 
watch members of her family hacked to death by a group that chanted political slogans while 
doing so.  However, her claim failed because the court found her evidence insufficient to 
establish the motivation of the attackers.  Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 
1987).   
 312 See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution 
Due to Membership in A Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 509–10 (1993) 
(discussing the introduction of the “particular social group ground” as an amendment to the 
draft Convention, and noting the absence of a record “discussing the purpose or meaning” of 
the term). 
 313 See Nitzan Sternberg, Do I Need to Pin a Target to My Back?: The Definition of 
“Particular Social Group” in U.S. Asylum Law, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 245 (2011); Fatma 
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Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed that question in the 1985 
decision, Matter of Acosta,314 ruling that it would be guided by the 
interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, Latin for “of the same kind or 
class.”315  The other four protected grounds are characteristics of a person 
that are immutable and cannot be changed,316 or so fundamental to a person 
such that they should not be required to change.317  Applying ejusdem 
generis, the BIA held that a “particular social group” was a group of persons 
defined by characteristics they could not change or should not have to change 
to avoid persecution.318  The BIA provided examples such as “sex, color or 
kinship ties,319 or a shared past experience such as former military leadership 
or land ownership.”320  
 The approach of Acosta was applied without modification until 1999 
when the BIA issued Matter of R-A-,321 the decision in a case of a Guatemalan 
woman fleeing domestic violence.  For the first time, the “immutable or 
fundamental” standard was described as only a threshold, insufficient to find 
a particular social group legally cognizable.322  In addition, it had to be shown 
that the members of a group perceived themselves as a group, as did the 
 
Marouf, Becoming Unconventional: Constricting the ‘Particular Social Group’ Ground for 
Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487 (2019). 
 314 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (BIA 1985).  
 315 Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A canon of 
construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word 
or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed”). 
 316 Race and nationality are immutable; race is not susceptible to change, and the same is 
true of nationality if we understand it to mean the country of one’s birth. 
 317 Religion and political opinion are fundamental; one should not have to change one’s 
political opinion or religion to avoid persecution. 
 318 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34. 
 319 Id. at 233. 
 320 Id.  
 321 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999). 
 322 Id.  at 918.  
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society.323  This requirement later became known as “social visibility”324 and 
was subsequently renamed “social distinction.”325  Because many of the 
claims involving gender-based violence,  including from  Guatemala and El 
Salvador, could not be successfully argued on the grounds of race, religion, 
nationality, or political opinion, the particular social group ground is 
especially important, and anything that heightens the standard makes it more 
difficult for women to prevail.  The application of the new social group 
standard resulted in the reversal of a grant of protection to Rody Alvarado, 
the asylum seeker in R-A-.326   
 Subsequent BIA decisions continued to limit the use of the particular 
social group ground – having a notable impact on cases of Central Americans 
 
 323 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918-19 (BIA 1999). Matter of R-A- had a long and 
complicated procedural history.  Attorney General Janet Reno vacated it in it in January 2001, 
remanding it to the BIA with instructions to stay a decision until regulations the Department 
of Justice had proposed were issued as final.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001).  In 
February 2003 Attorney General John Ashcroft certified R-A- to himself, and then ended up 
sending it back to the BIA with the same order as Janet Reno had – to stay the case until 
regulations issued.  In September 2008 Attorney General Michael Mukasey became the third 
A.G. to certify R-A-; he lifted the stay and remanded the case to the BIA for a decision.  Matter 
of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).  Ultimately the case was remanded to an 
immigration judge, who granted in a summary decision on December 10, 2009.  For additional 
background on Matter of R-A-, see MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, supra note 
281 at 811–13, and Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: 
Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s 
Claims, 29 REF. SURV. Q. (Special Issue) 46, 58–60 (2010). 
 324 In re C-A- was the first decision in which the BIA explicitly stated that social visibility 
was required.  23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), aff’d, Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 446 
F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1115 
(2007).  It justified this approach by incorrectly stating that its addition of “social visibility” 
to Acosta’s immutable/fundamental approach was in conformance with Guidelines issued in 
2002 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  In Re C-A-, 23 I. & 
N. at 956 (citing UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a 
Particular Social Group” within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 
2002), https://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular 
Social Group]).  Contrary to the BIA’s assertion, the UNHCR Guidelines did not add an 
additional requirement, but instead provided alternative approaches to establishing social 
group membership; the “protected characteristic” approach tracked Acosta, while the “social 
perception” approach recognized groups which did not meet Acosta’s requirements, but were 
“recognized as a group” in society. UNHCR, Guidelines on Particular Social Group, supra 
note 324,  ¶¶ 6–9. 
 325 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).   
 326 As described supra note 323, Ms. Alvarado was ultimately granted relief, but after 
years of controversy which included the direct intervention of three successive Attorneys 
General. 
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fleeing gang violence.327  In 2008, in two cases328 involving youth fleeing 
gangs, the BIA imposed not only social distinction, but the additional 
requirement of “particularity,” which it explained as requiring a showing that 
the group is “sufficiently distinct” to be recognized “in the society in 
question, as a discrete class of persons.”329  Applying those criteria, it denied 
both claims. Some circuit court decisions had questioned whether the 
departure from Acosta was reasonable and entitled to deference.330  In 2014 
the BIA issued two decisions331 pertaining to fear-of-gang claims; both of 
them attempting to make the case that the BIA’s addition of social distinction 
and particularity were reasonable and entitled to deference.     
 Just as the jurisprudence requiring proof of persecutor’s intent to 
establish nexus runs counter to the humanitarian objectives of the Refugee 
Convention and 1980 Refugee Act,332 so does the interpretation of “particular 
social group.”  UNHCR Guidelines recommend the recognition of social 
groups that meet the immutable/fundamental criteria of Acosta, without 
more.  In addition, they recognize groups that are not defined by immutable 
or fundamental characteristics, but that are nonetheless perceived by society 
to be a group.333  The U.S. approach has a severe limiting impact on 
protection, while UNHCR’s approach expands it.      
 
 327 Many asylum claims from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras involve gender 
violence and fear of gangs.  See, e.g., UNHCR, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS 
OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO (2015), 
https://www.unhcr.org/56fc31864.html [https://perma.cc/Q5HC-84ZX].  
The women from the NTCA reported multiple reasons for flight. Many 
women spoke of severe instances of violence due to maras or other 
criminal armed groups, including assaults, extortion, and disappearances 
or murder of family members. Likewise, many women described brutal 
domestic violence. Many emphasized that being women compounded the 
difficulties they faced; this was especially true for transgender women. 
Id. at 15; Press Release, Death Threats and Gang Violence Forcing More Families to Flee 
Northern Central America, UNHCR Press Release (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/news/press/2020/12/5fdb14ff4/death-threats-gang-violence-forcing-families-flee-
northern-central-america.html [https://perma.cc/8D2N-ADZZ] (“Death threats, gang 
recruitment, extortion and other forms of targeted violence are driving more families in 
northern Central America to flee their homes and seek safety in other countries, a new UNHCR 
and UNICEF survey reveals today.”). 
 328 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008). 
 329 Id. at 584. 
 330 See Gatimi et al. v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009), Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 
589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 331 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227; Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208. 
 332 See supra, notes 307-309 and accompanying text. 
 333 See UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE 
STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 95 (reissued Feb. 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
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 The interpretation of these key terms of the refugee definition did not 
occur in a vacuum.  It occurred in the context of claims from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras – beginning with INS v. Zacarias334 (Guatemala), 
Cañas-Segovia335 (El Salvador), continuing with Matter of R-A-336 
(Guatemala), Matter of S-E-G- 337 (El Salvador), and Matter of M-E-V-G-338 
(Honduras).  Furthermore, the restrictive interpretations took place against 
the backdrop of multiple procedural barriers which clearly were intended to 
thwart the claims of these Central American asylum seekers.339  We should 
see the trend towards restrictive interpretation in that light, rather than as an 
exercise in principled decision-making – especially since so many of the 
interpretations were driven by judges of the BIA – a body without judicial 






 334 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
 335 970 F. 2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992).   
 336 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999). 
 337 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008). 
 338 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014). 
 339 See supra, notes 281-297.  
 340 Appointments to the Board of Immigration Appeals have historically had enforcement 
backgrounds.  This changed for a short period of time during Bill Clinton’s presidency.  In 
response to a growing caseload, the Clinton administration expanded the size of the Board, 
and among its new appointees were individuals with academic or non-profit backgrounds.  
This was a short-lived change. During the administration of George W. Bush, Attorney 
General Ashcroft reduced the Board’s membership, using the reduction as a means to remove 
most of those with non-enforcement backgrounds, who had shown more independence in their 
decision-making, and had “disagreed. . . ideologically” with Ashcroft.  See Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 352-53 (2007).   
 341 The Trump administration increased the size of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
from seventeen to twenty-three, and the judges that it added had denial rates in asylum cases 
which were the highest in the country.  Felipe de la Hoz, The Shadow Court Cementing 
Trump's Immigration Policy, THE NATION (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/trump-immigration-bia/ [https://perma.cc/QF5Q-
PNWC].  Two of the six judges, Keith Hunsucker and William Cassidy, denied every case 
they heard in 2019, while others denied at rates high above the national average.  Brian 
Johnson, Immigration Judges Asylum Grants & Denials in FY 2018-2019, AMOACHI & 
JOHNSON, PLLC (Dec. 24, 2019), https://amjolaw.com/2019/12/24/immigration-judges-
asylum-grants-denials-in-fy-2018-2019/ [https://perma.cc/N5FK-RMRL]. 
The denial rates of the newly appointed BIA judges in 2019, rounded to the closest whole 
number were: Stuart Couch, 95%, Earle Wilson 97.4%, Stephanie Gorman 96%, and Judge 
Goodwin, 97%.  Id.   Paul Wickham Schmidt, a former chair of the BIA from 1995-2001, 
criticized the decision to pack the BIA with denying judges, stating that, “It’s not a court 
anymore.  It’s an enforcement mechanism.” De la Hoz, supra note 341. 
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B. Asylum Policy under the Trump Administration  
 
 Any criticism one might have of the  policies described in the preceding  
section pales in comparison to those implemented by the Trump 
administration.  Numerous articles have detailed the unrelenting roll-out of 
policies, which taken cumulatively, were an attempt to put an end to the 
ability to seek asylum at the U.S. southern border.342  Each successive policy 
was more extreme.   
 There was “metering,” by which asylum seekers who showed up at land 
ports of entry were falsely told that Customs and Border Protection had 
limited capacity to process them; they were directed to wait on the Mexico 
side of the border.343  Next, breast-feeding infants, toddlers, and young 
children were taken away from their parents as part of the now-notorious 
Family Separation policy, which separated 2,800 children, more than 1,000 
under the age of 10.344  A court ordered an end to the policy, and the return 
 
 342 See, e.g., Nicole Narea, The Demise of America’s Asylum System Under Trump, 
Explained, VOX (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/11/5/20947938/asylum-system-
trump-demise-mexico-el-salvador-honduras-guatemala-immigration-court-border-ice-
cbp  [https://perma.cc/L39E-NSJC];  Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, Interlocking Set of 
Trump Administration Policies at the U.S.-Mexico Border Bars Virtually All from Asylum, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/interlocking-set-policies-us-mexico-border-bars-
virtually-all-asylum [https://perma.cc/6JS3-5DES]; A Timeline of the Trump Administration’s 
Efforts to End Asylum, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER (last updated June 2020), 
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/no-content-type/2020-06/06-
01-2020-asylumtimeline-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N4T-FZTP]; Ian Gordon, Asylum Is 
Dead. The Myth of American Decency Died With It., MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/10/donald-trump-asylum-stephen-miller-
guatemala-central-america/ [https://perma.cc/22LG-DMV2];  Mneesha Gellman, The Trump 
Administration Keeps Making It Harder to Claim Asylum. Here’s How — And Why, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/15/trump-
administration-keeps-making-it-harder-claim-asylum-heres-how-why/ 
[https://perma.cc/363U-N93N]. 
 343 Savitri Arvey & Steph Leutert, Thousands of Asylum-Seekers Left Waiting at the US-
Mexico Border, THE WORLD (June 17, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-
17/thousands-asylum-seekers-left-waiting-us-mexico-border [https://perma.cc/8839-XCCN]. 
 344 Kids in Need of Defense (KIND), Family Separation: Two Years Later, the Crisis 
Continues, KIND 3 (2020), https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Family-
Separation-Report-2020-FINAL-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CTD-LD9A].  Details regarding the 
policy can be found in a House Judiciary Committee Report released in Oct. 2020.  MAJORITY 
STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP OF THE H.R. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S FAMILY SEPARATION POLICY: 
TRAUMA, DESTRUCTION, AND CHAOS (Oct. 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/the_trump_administration_family_separation_polic
y_trauma_destruction_and_chaos.pdf?utm_campaign=4526-519 [hereinafter H.R., THE 
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FAMILY SEPARATION POLICY]. 
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of children to their parents.345  However, the government launched this 
program without the intent to reunify families, and therefore had not 
maintained records which would facilitate unification.346  As of October 
2020, the families of 545 children could not  be located despite the efforts of 
a non-profit contracted to find the parents of the separated children.347 
 Family separation was followed by regulations that mandated the denial 
of asylum to anyone who entered the United States between ports of entry.348  
This was in violation of the plain language of the 1980 Refugee Act,349 and 
was enjoined by the courts.350  Next, came the “Migrant Protection Protocol,” 
(MPP) implemented in January 2019.351  It forced asylum seekers to await 
their hearings in Mexico, in border towns with high levels of violence, limited 
humanitarian amenities, and very little access to attorneys to represent them 
in their U.S. immigration proceedings.352  As of May 13, 2020, it was reported 
 
 345 H.R., THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FAMILY SEPARATION POLICY, supra note 344, at 
17. 
 346 Id. at 10. 
 347 Caitlin Dickerson, Parents of 545 Children Separated at the Border Cannot Be Found, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/us/migrant-children-
separated.html [https://perma.cc/8GLU-SJL4]. 
 348 See Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; 
Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018); see also Proclamation 
No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 15, 2018).   
 349 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2009) (providing the right to apply for asylum to all persons in 
the U.S. or who arrive to the U.S. “whether or not at a designated port of arrival”). 
 350 The rule was challenged in E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838 
(N.D. Cal. 2018). Judge Tigar, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, 
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the policy.  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and then the Supreme Court, denied the government’s requests for stays of the 
preliminary injunction pending appeal.  In February 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the grant of a nationwide preliminary injunction.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. 
Trump, 950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 351 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant 
Protection Protocols (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-
protocols-policy-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8D6-ZELY].  
 352 Karen Musalo & Brianna Krong, 48,000 Asylum Seekers Have Been Put in Harm's 
Way by the Trump Administration, MS. MAGAZINE (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://msmagazine.com/2019/10/03/the-trump-administration-has-placed-48000-asylum-
seekers-in-harms-way-the-courts-must-step-in-now/ [https://perma.cc/QG8A-VYZK].   
Human Rights First has issued a number of reports on the implementation of MPP. See Human 
Rights First, Delivered to Danger: Illegal Remain in Mexico Policy Imperils Asylum Seekers’ 
Lives and Denies Due Process, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/delivered-danger-illegal-remain-mexico-policy-
imperils-asylum-seekers-lives-and-denies-due [https://perma.cc/5FHK-CPHH]; Human 
Rights First, Orders from Above: Massive Human Rights Abuses Under Trump Administration 
Return to Mexico Policy, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/orders-above-massive-human-rights-abuses-
under-trump-administration-return-mexico-policy [https://perma.cc/C9G3-3P2E]; Human 
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that there had been more than 1,114 publicly reported cases of murder, rape, 
torture, kidnapping, and other violent assaults against asylum seekers forced 
back into Mexico under MPP.353  There were multiple legal challenges to the 
program,354 with one of them, Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, reaching the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Argument in Innovation Law Lab was canceled as a result 
of the Biden administration’s suspension of its application to arriving asylum 
seekers.355  
 The Trump administration also attempted to end special obligations to 
child migrants which had been secured by way of a settlement agreement in 
Flores v. Reno,356 a class action lawsuit brought to challenge the inhumane 
detention conditions for Central American children in the 1980s.  The  
settlement agreement set standards for the care and custody of children, 
providing that they be released without unnecessary delay, held in the “least 
restrictive” settings possible, and that any facilities housing them be licensed 
by state child protection authorities.357  The Trump administration attempted 
to upend the settlement agreement by way of proposed regulations which 
contravened its key requirements, and would have allowed indefinite 
detention of children.358  Litigation ensued and U.S. District Court Judge 
Dolly Gee ordered the regulations permanently enjoined;359 the government 
appealed her order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which mostly 
upheld Judge Gee’s earlier decision.360 
 
Rights First, Human Rights Fiasco: The Trump Administration’s Dangerous Asylum Returns 
Continue, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Dec. 2019), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-rights-fiasco-trump-administration-s-
dangerous-asylum-returns-continue [https://perma.cc/864F-SMBU]; Human Rights First, A 
Year of Horrors: The Trump Administration’s Illegal Returns of Asylum Seekers to Danger in 
Mexico, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 2020), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/year-
horrors-trump-administration-s-illegal-returns-asylum-seekers-danger-mexico 
[https://perma.cc/P224-298B]. 
 353 Human Rights First, Pandemic as Pretext: Trump Administration Exploits COVID-
19, Expels Asylum Seekers and Children to Escalating Danger, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 1 (May 
2020), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/PandemicAsPretextFINAL.pdf. 
 354 E.g., Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2020); Nora v. Wolf, No. 
CV 20-0993 (ABJ), 2020 WL 3469670 (D.D.C. June 25, 2020); Immigrant Defenders Law 
Center et al. v. Chad Wolf et al., No. CV-09893 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020). 
 355  Press Release, DHS Statement on the Suspension of New Enrollments in the Migrant 
Protection Protocols Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 20, 2021), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/01/20/dhs-statement-suspension-new-enrollments-migrant-
protection-protocols-program [https://perma.cc/D56V-U5N5] [hereinafter DHS Statement]. 
 356 Flores v. Reno, Case No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997).  
 357 Flores v. Reno, Case No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) at 7, (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997). 
 358 Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and Unaccompanied 
Alien Children, 84 Fed. Reg. 44392-01 (proposed Aug. 23, 2019).  
 359 Flores v. Barr, 407 F. Supp. 3d 909 (C.D. Cal. 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-56326 
(9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2020). 
 360 Flores v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2020) 
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 In March 2020361 the Trump administration, under the pretext of 
protecting public health during the COVID-19 pandemic, issued interim 
regulations that shut down the border to asylum seekers.  The regulations 
provide for the expulsion of all non-citizens, who arrive by land, and do not 
have valid travel document. The regulations were issued under the authority 
of public health provision 42 U.S.C. 265, which had never been used to close 
the border, but simply to quarantine for a reasonable amount of time ,persons 
or goods where there a risk of infectious disease.362  It later was revealed that 
the border closure was not motivated by public health concerns;  high level 
CDC personnel opposed the measure, but were pressured by the White House 
to impose it.363    
 In addition to these unprecedented procedural barriers to asylum, the 
Trump administration attempted to rewrite the refugee definition, and to 
override forty years of precedent interpreting the 1980 Refugee Act.  It did 
this through regulations,364 as well as decisions by his successive Attorneys 
General, who have authority to “certify” BIA decisions to themselves, and to 
reverse or vacate them.365  Trump’s Attorneys General have aggressively 
used the certification authority, issuing more than fifteen decisions as of July 
2020; in comparison, President Obama’s Attorneys General issued four in an 
eight year period, President George W. Bush’s sixteen in an eight year period, 
and President Clinton’s three in an eight year period.366   
 A number of the Attorneys General decisions were clear attempts to roll 
back jurisprudence relevant to Central American asylum cases, particularly 
 
 361 See supra note 3 (discussing the CDC order shutting down the border in March 2020). 
 362 Id. 
 363 Pence Ordered Borders Closed, supra note 3.  
 364 The most extensive attempt to rewrite all of asylum law was through the regulation 
entitled Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal: Credible Fear and Reasonable 
Fear.  85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 (proposed June 15, 2020) (also known as the “monster rule”).  See 
supra note 299 for a discussion.  Other regulations have imposed additional bars to asylum 
including: an expansion of criminal bars (see 85 Fed. Reg. 67,202 (Oct. 21, 2020) (currently 
enjoined)); an expansion of the national security risk bar to exclude from protection those who 
simply passed through countries with high levels of COVID-19 infections (see 85 Fed. Reg. 
41,201 (July 9, 2020)); and, a new bar for individuals who did not apply for and receive a 
denial of  asylum in countries of transit (see 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (July 16, 2019) (discussed 
infra note 370)). 
 365 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h). 
 366 See Comprehensive List of A-G- Certified Opinions in Trump Administration to Date, 
LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2020/11/comprehensive-list-of-ag-certified-
opinions-in-trump-administration-to-date.html [https://perma.cc/E6WG-87B3]; see also 
Sarah Pierce & Jessica Bolter, Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S. Immigration System: 
A Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 60-63 (July 
2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPI_US-
Immigration-Trump-Presidency-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F2C-M4KN]. 
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those based on gender violence and fear of gangs.367  The decisions also 
restricted claims based on family membership,368 which come up frequently 
in gender or gang cases with girls often being targeted because of what other 
family members may have done to invoke the ire of the gang. 369   
 Among the many policies, regulations, and decisions rolled out by the 
Trump administration, there may be no two measures as willfully blind to 
conditions in the region as the Transit Ban370 and the Asylum Cooperative 
Agreements (ACAs).371  The Transit Ban barred asylum for  all individuals 
who transited a third country en-route to the U.S. unless they applied for and 
were denied protection in the countries through which they passed.372  This 
bar is based on the fiction that the countries of transit – El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico—are safe havens, in which individuals 
fleeing persecution could apply for and obtain meaningful protection.  The 
Asylum Cooperative Agreements take this a step further.  They allow the 
United States to send asylum seekers from any country in the world to 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador to seek protection – even if these 
individuals never transited the three countries.  The U.S. used the threat of 
tariffs,373 as well as cutting off foreign aid to pressure the three countries to 
agree to the ACAs.374   
 
 367 Matter of A-B- (A-B- I), 27 I&N Dec. 316 (AG 2018); Matter of A-B- (A-B- II), 28 
I&N Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021).  For an excellent discussion of the impact of the first A-B- 
decision, see Kate Jastram & Sayoni Maitra, Matter of A-B- One Year Later: Winning Back 
Gender-Based Asylum through Litigation and Legislation, 18 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 48 
(2020). 
 368 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019). 
 369 It has been well-documented that when gang members have been thwarted in inflicting 
harm on their chosen victim, they target that individual’s entire family: 
[T]he way the gangs operate is that if they can’t find the son [who they 
are looking for] they will harm the family. . . . [I]f a family of eight lives 
in a dangerous zone, and one leaves [due to a gang threat], then the gangs 
go after the seven that stayed.  In this case all of them are at risk. 
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Karen Sánchez Reyes, supra note 53, at 8. 
 370 Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (July 16, 2019). 
 371 Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative Agreements Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,994 (Nov. 19, 2019).   
 372 In June 2020, the D.C. Circuit issued a vacatur of the Transit Ban rule. See Capital 
Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal. v. Trump, 471 F.Supp.3d 25 (D.D.C. 2020), appeals docketed, 
No. 20-5271 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 2020) and No. 20-5273 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 2020). 
 373 John Wagner et al., Trump Threatens Guatemala After it Backs Away from ‘Safe Third 




 374 Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, United States Resumes 
Targeted U.S. Foreign Assistance for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Oct. 16, 2019), 
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 The Asylum Cooperative Agreements were entered into pursuant to the 
“safe third country” provision in U.S. law, which allows the U.S. to refuse to 
consider the claim of an asylum seeker if she could be sent to a third country 
to request protection.375  The statute requires that the U.S. have an agreement 
with the third country,   that it be safe for the asylum seeker, and that he or 
she would have “access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim 
for asylum or equivalent protection[.]”376  The safe third country provision 
has existed in U.S. law for almost twenty-five years, and the only country 
with which the U.S. has had such an agreement is Canada, which enjoys a 
high standard of protection of human rights,377 and has a robust and well-




 375 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2009).  
 376 The country of removal must be one in which the person’s “life or freedom would not 
be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group 
or political opinion, and where the individual would have access to a full and fair procedure 
for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection[.]”  Id. 
 377 Freedom in the World 2020: Canada, FREEDOM HOUSE (last visited Mar. 2021), 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/canada/freedom-world/2020 [https://perma.cc/GM94-
MNNV] (“Canada has a strong history of respect for political rights and civil liberties. . . .”). 
 378 It is notable that U.S. refugee advocates have never questioned the safety of Canada 
under this agreement, while Canadian human rights and refugee organizations have brought 
litigation on two separate occasions, arguing that the U.S. is not a safe country for asylum 
seekers.  A Canadian federal court ruled for the plaintiffs in the first case, but that decision 
was overturned on appeal.  Canadian Council for Refugees v. R., [2009] 3 F.C.R. 136 (Can.).  
A second challenge was brought in 2017.  In explaining the basis of the challenge, Claire 
Roque, the president of the Canadian Council for Refugees noted, 
how refugees are treated heartlessly in the U.S. under President [Donald] 
Trump: children separated from their parents, long-term detention in 
horrific conditions, criminal prosecution of people just for crossing the 
border to seek safety, new policies closing the door on women fleeing 
gender based violence.  The conclusion is clear: The U.S. cannot be 
considered a safe country for refugees. 
Beth Persky & Federica Dell’Orto Hadar, Recent Developments in Safe Third Country 
Agreements Feasibility and Approach: US-Guatemala, US-Canada, and EU, 
67 FED. LAW. 16, 17 (2020), 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.barjournals/fedlwr0067&i=18 
[https://perma.cc/L9DA-D3EX].  The Federal Court of Canada held that provisions of 
Canadian law enacting the Safe Third Country Agreement were unconstitutional under Section 
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The court held that U.S. detention policies 
violated the Charter’s guarantee of “the right to life, liberty or security of the person,” and 
created a risk of refoulement.  Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada (Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship), [2019] F.C. 418 (Can.).  The Court suspended its decision for six 
months.  The Canadian government appealed, and as of December 2020, the appeals court has 
not rendered a decision. 
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 It was particularly cynical for the U.S. to enter into these agreements, as 
it was undoubtedly aware of the dire conditions in all three countries.379  As 
detailed in Part I of this article, El Salvador is not a safe country;380  
Salvadoran government officials acknowledge their inability to protect their 
own citizenry, much less to extend that protection to asylum seekers from 
 
 379 Levels of violence and instability in all three countries has been well-documented, and 
there can be no doubt the architects of these policies in the Trump administration were quite 
aware of them.  See, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 5 (“El Salvador has been dealing 
with escalating homicides and generalized crime committed by gangs, drug traffickers, and 
other criminal groups for more than two decades.”); Human Rights First, Is Honduras Safe for 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers—Fact Sheet, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (May 1, 2020), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/IsHondurasSafeforRefugeesandAsylumS
eekersFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5HY-NAHM]. 
Many Hondurans are fleeing violence and seeking refuge in other 
countries because their government fails to protect them. According to the 
UNHCR, 24,000 Hondurans fled their country to seek asylum in the 
United States in 2018. More than 76,000 asylum applications by 
Hondurans are currently pending adjudication worldwide. There were an 
estimated 191,000 persons displaced within Honduras due to violence, 
national and transnational gang activity, and human trafficking, according 
to the U.S. State Department. According to the Congressional Research 
Service, Honduras “remains one of the most violent countries in the 
world.” In 2019, the number of murders rose in Honduras making its 
homicide rate the highest in Central America. Despite restrictions imposed 
by the government due to COVID-19, the murder rate remains high in 
2020. In 2019, two Nicaraguan refugees were among those murdered in 
Honduras; other Nicaraguan asylum seekers have reportedly been tracked 
by persecutors and killed in Honduras. 
Id. at 2.  See also Human Rights First, Is Guatemala Safe for Refugees and Asylum Seekers?—
Fact Sheet, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (June 2019), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/GUATEMALA_SAFE_THIRD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9UKM-RKNN] [hereinafter Human Rights First, Is Guatemala Safe?]. 
The Congressional Research Service reports that Guatemala has some of 
the highest levels of violence, inequality, and poverty in the region. 
Guatemala “remains among the most dangerous countries in the world” 
according to the State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council 
with an “alarmingly high murder rate.” Guatemala has the third highest 
femicide rate in the world. 
Id. at 2.  
 380 In determining whether a country is safe for purposes of safe third country agreements, 
UNHCR has advised an assessment of, among other factors, the country’s “respect for human 
rights and the rule of law, its record of not producing refugees[.]”  UNHCR Position Relating 
to the Resolution on Safe Countries of Origin, UNHCR, 1 (1992), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3fa7c4f04.html [https://perma.cc/8S3V-GW79] (“Countries 
where there is more than an insignificant risk of persecution or other threats to life and freedom 
should not be considered ‘safe.’”). 
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other countries,381 and representatives of NGOs have expressed the same.382  
Some have stated  the additional concern that El Salvador’s commitment to 
take in asylum seekers, when it is unable to respond to the needs of its own 
nationals, could lead to scapegoating and xenophobia.383  
 El Salvador also lacks the required full and fair procedure for 
determining claims to protection, which should exist not only in law, but in 
“actual practice.”384  Although the country has ratified the relevant 
international treaties,385 joined regional agreements and initiatives,386 enacted 
 
 381 When asked if El Salvador could protect asylum seekers from other countries, Marina 
Haydee Martinez de Ortega responded:   
My God!  What will we be able to do if we cannot even protect our own 
victims and witnesses?  Women are beaten and we cannot protect them.  
It is very contradictory.  There are no shelters.  Look at the witness 
protection program and programs for victims – we have so few resources.  
And people are leaving to save their lives.  We cannot guarantee it [safety].  
And people are leaving to save their lives.  
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Marina Haydee Martinez de Ortega, supra note 55, at 8. 
 382 “We cannot even guarantee the rights of our citizens.  Really, we do not have the 
conditions to where people can live with dignity, much less protect the rights of those who 
seek asylum.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Karen Sánchez Reyes, supra note 53, at 9. 
 383 Ima Guirola, a women’s rights expert, pointed to the anti-immigrant attitudes which 
surged in Colombia as a result of the large number of Venezuelan immigrants, and observed 
the need to “ensure that the human rights of migrants and foreigners [sent to El Salvador] are 
not violated.”  She expressed the hope that treatment accorded to migrants would be consistent 
with the guidance of UNHCR, the International Organization of Migration, Amnesty 
International, and other human rights organizations “involved in the protection of the rights of 
migrant populations.”  CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ima Guirola, CEMUJER, supra note 92, 
at 14.    
 384 Guidance Note on Bilateral and/or Multilateral Transfer Arrangements of Asylum 
Seekers, UNHCR 1-2 (2013), https://www.refworld.org/docid/51af82794.html 
[https://perma.cc/JV3U-AK8Q]. 
 385 El Salvador became a party to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol in 1983 
(States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol, UNHCR (as of Sept. 2019), 
https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf [https://perma.cc/44SS-
XCKY]); to the Convention Against Torture in 1996 (Signatories to the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION (as of Mar. 2021), 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/NM79-7UDA]); and to the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Stateless Persons in 2015 (Signatories to Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (as of March 2021), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/U6KP-MVMT]).   
 386 El Salvador is an original signatory of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
(Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, UNHCR 4 (Nov. 22, 1984), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-
international-protection.html [https://perma.cc/AZF8-9Y7Z]) and it adopted the Brazil 
Declaration and Plan of Action, “agreeing to work together to maintain the highest standards 
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laws and regulations providing for the protection of refugees, and established 
refugee determination procedures,387 its system is so underdeveloped and 
under-resourced that it is unable to process more than a trickle of asylum 
seekers.388  El Salvador’s refugee determination body, the Comisión para la 
 
of protection at the international and regional level[.]”  A Framework for Cooperation and 
Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protection of Refugees, Displaced and 
Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, BRAZIL DECLARATION AND PLAN OF 
ACTION (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2014/9865.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9F83-MDE5].  It is also a member of the Marco Integral Regional Para la 
Protección y Soluciones (MIRPS) (Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions 
Framework), a government led initiative, assisted by the UN and OAS, for regional 
cooperation to respond to protection needs. About the MIRPS, GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES 
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://globalcompactrefugees.org/mirps-en/about-mirps 
[https://perma.cc/D73X-HVKK].     
 387 Law and policy pertaining to asylum seekers are set forth in the Ley Especial de 
Migración y Extranjeria (LEME) [Migration Law] (Decree 286, April 2, 2019 (El Sal.), 
https://goldservice.com.sv/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/LEY-ESPECIAL-DE-
MIGRACI%C3%93N-Y-DE-EXTRANJER%C3%8DA.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTY4-
P8M6]) and its regulations (Reglamento de la Ley Especial de Migración y Extranjeria 
[Regulations for the Migration Law], Decree 35, D.O. No. 75, Vol. 423, April 25, 2019 (El 
Sal.), https://www.transparencia.gob.sv/institutions/dgme/documents/311490/download 
[https://perma.cc/DS2D-84ZV]).  It is also included in the Ley para la Determinación de la 
Condición de Personas Refugiadas [Law for the Determination of the Status of Refugees or 
Refugee Law] (Decree 918, D.O. No. 148, Vol. 365, Aug. 14, 2002 (El Sal.), 
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/171117_072947707_arc
hivo_documento_legislativo.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VTA-BQQD]) and its regulations 
(Reglamento de la Ley para la Determinación de la Condición de Personas Refugiadas 
[Regulations for the Law for the Determination of the Status of Refugees or Refugee Law], 
Decree 79, D.O. No. 165, Vol. 368, Sept. 7, 2005 (El Sal.),  
https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2005/3792.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD87-
CCRG]).  The Refugee Law establishes refugee determination procedures, creating a new 
body, the Comisión para la Determinación de la Condición de Personas Refugiadas (CODER) 
[Commission for the Determination of Refugee Status].  Decree 918, supra note 387, at art. 5.  
Individuals who present at the Salvadoran border, or who are within the country, are permitted 
to apply for refugee status if they meet an initial screening standard of demonstrating that their 
request is not “manifestly unfounded, clearly fraudulent or does not meet the criteria for 
refugee status[.]”  Decree 79, supra note 387, at art. 15.  The screenings are carried out by a 
Sub-Commission of CODER, and are to take place within 72 hours.  Id.  Asylum seekers may 
be detained during the screening procedure.  Centro Atención Integral para el Migrante 
(CAIM), GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT (2015),  
https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/el-salvador/detention-
centres/1879/centro-atencion-integral-para-el-migrante-caim [https://perma.cc/MXQ5-
QF8F].  Once screened in, the individual’s claim for protection is submitted to and decided by 
CODER, which must reach a unanimous decision.  Decree 918, supra note 387, at art. 27–28.  
Appeals from denials do not go to a different body, but must be made to CODER.  Id. at art. 
32.  There is only one dedicated immigration detention facility in the entire country, the Centro 
de Atención Integral para el Migrante (CAIM) [Center for Integral Attention to Migrants].  
See GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, supra note 387.  
 388 Solicitud de Acceso a la Información Pública [Request for Access to Public 
Information] SAI-230-2019, DATOS ESTADÍSTICOS DE LA CODER [CODER STATISTICAL 
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Determinación de la Condición de Personas Refugiadas (CODER) 
[Commission for the Determination of Refugee Status], is composed of a 
total of nine persons.  In the five-year period between September 2014 and 
September 2019, El Salvador reported a total of 99 claims for asylum,389 with 
85 pending claims as of December 2019.  After El Salvador signed the ACA, 
it was reported that the U.S. hoped to send 2,000 asylum seekers in its first 
year of implementation,390 a wildly unrealistic number in light of the 
country’s lack of capacity.  
 
C. Moving Forward from the Status Quo 
 
 The Biden administration has begun the process of rolling back some of 
the Trump policies described above, and has committed to reviewing others.  
It ended prospective application of the Migrant Protection Protocols,391 and 
stated that it would “consider a phased strategy” for allowing the entry of 
those stranded in Mexico.392  It condemned family separation and set up a 
task force to reunify families.393  It terminated the Asylum Cooperative 
Agreements, first ending it with Guatemala,394 which was the only one which 
had been in full implementation, and then announcing an end with all three 
countries.395  Among the policies that it has committed to review are the Title 
42 border closure,396 the Transit Ban,397 and “rules, regulations, precedential 
decisions, and internal guidelines governing the adjudication of asylum 
 




[https://perma.cc/EEJ2-S8F2] [hereinafter CODER STATISTICAL DATA, SAI-230-2019]. 
 389 CODER STATISTICAL DATA, SAI-230-2019, supra note 388.  
 390 Hamed Aleaziz, Trump Officials are Finalizing Plans for Sending Asylum-Seekers to 
El Salvador, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/el-salvador-us-asylum-seekers-plan 
[https://perma.cc/Z2TF-S7AG]. 
 391 DHS Statement, supra note 355. 
 392 See E.O. Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework, supra note 10, at § 4 
(a)(ii)(B). 
 393 See Exec. Order No. 14,011, 86 F.R. 8237 (Feb. 2, 2021), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/05/2021-02562/establishment-of-
interagency-task-force-on-the-reunification-of-families. 
 394 Melissa Angell, U.S. Exits Trump Admin.’s Guatemala Asylum Agreement, LAW 360 
(Feb. 5, 2021). 
 395 Sabrina Rodriguez, Biden Administration Takes Steps to Dismantle Trump-Era 
Asylum Agreements, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2021), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/06/biden-dismantle-trump-era-asylum-agreements-
466565 [https://perma.cc/WXV9-58X4]. 
 396 E.O., Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework, supra note 10, at § 4(a)(ii)(A). 
 397 See id. at § 4(a)(ii)(C). 
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claims and determinations of refugee status to evaluate whether the United 
States provides protection for those fleeing domestic or gang violence in a 
manner consistent with international standards.”   
 A complete reversal of Trump era policies would be a welcome and 
necessary first step.  But in light of restrictive measures which have been put 
in place over the decades, more than a return to the 2016 status quo is in 
order.  This is the time to reexamine procedural barriers to protection, and to 
revisit the key interpretations of the refugee definition which stray from 
international norms, and which have resulted in the denial of protection to 
Salvadorans and other bona fide asylum seekers.  The focus in this section 
has been on the interpretation of “nexus” and “particular social group” but 
there are many other substantive interpretations and procedural rules which 
are inconsistent with the spirt and letter of the Refugee Protocol.  Scholars 
and advocates have laid out priority areas for reform,398 and will be urging 
the Biden administration to include our refugee protection system in its 
overarching plan to “build back better.”399   
 
III. ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF MIGRATION 
 
 The first section of this article details the conditions in El Salvador which 
are major drivers of migration, while the second section critiques policies 
which have often resulted in the denial of protection.  A fair and rational 
approach needs to tackle both – providing asylum consistent with 
international norms while addressing the root causes of migration.  A number 
of recent publications400 have discussed policies that would begin to 
ameliorate the conditions which lead to forced migration.  This last section 
 
 398 See, e.g. Human Rights First, Walking the Talk: 2021 Blueprints for a Human Rights-
Centered U.S. Foreign Policy, 26-49 (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaigns/2021-policy-blueprints. Center for Gender & 
Refugee Studies, Asylum Priorities for the Next Presidential Term (Nov. 2020), 
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/CGRS%20Asylum%20Priorities%20-
%20Next%20Term_Nov.%202020.pdf 
 399 The Biden administration’s “Build Back Better” agenda does not explicitly include 
re-envisioning and strengthening the U.S. refugee and asylum protection framework. Build 
Back Better, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/build-back-better/.  
 400 See, e.g., Latin America Working Group Education Fund et al., Serve Your People, A 
Roadmap for Transforming Relations between the United States & the Northern Countries of 
Central America, LATIN AMERICAN WORKING GROUP 6-7 (Jul. 2020), 
https://www.lawg.org/wp-content/uploads/LAWG-Central-America-
recommendationsFIN2.pdf [https://perma.cc/854Q-8JVL] [hereinafter Serve Your People]; 
Nicholas Copeland, A New Deal for Central America: In Central America, Addressing the 
Root Causes of Mass Migration Requires Reversal of Destructive U.S. Foreign Policies in 
Favor of Redistributive, Ecologically Sustainable Development, 52 NACLA REP. ON THE AM. 
67 (2020). 
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will provide a brief overview of these policies.  International assistance, 
including that of the U.S., could be conditioned to encourage and fund the 
initiatives described below.401  
 
A. Investing in Prevention, Strengthening Rule of Law, and 
Reducing Impunity  
 
i. Violence Prevention 
 
 Gangs are a major source of violence.  Many young people join gangs to 
“escape difficult family circumstances, degrading treatment and limited 
educational and job prospects.”402  Effective prevention measures must 
address this reality.  The creation of “well-trained, well-resourced, and 
accountable child protection systems,”403 the funding of early childhood 
development, and a much greater investment in education is a necessary first 
step.404  El Salvador’s spending on education is currently the lowest in 
Central America.405  Education should “denormalize” gender violence and 
include “healthy masculinity programming” to counter the existing deeply 
entrenched machismo and homophobia,406  and include “effective job 
training and employment programs. . . and ensure that job training programs 
connect to the workforce[.]”407   
 Providing education and employment opportunity is a necessary factor 
in dissuading youth from joining gangs, but it needs to be accompanied by 
other reforms, such as the cessation of security policies which have resulted 
in indiscriminate violence against, and mass detention of, youth as suspected 
 
 401 The United States cut funding to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras under Trump.  
Milton Castillo & Daina Beth Solomon, U.S. Aid Helped Guatemalan Farmers Stay Rooted 
to their Lands, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-
aid/u-s-aid-helped-guatemalan-farmers-stay-rooted-to-their-lands-idUSKCN1RH0B4 
[https://perma.cc/HD2H-VR6V].  While “U.S. assistance expanded under former President 
Barack Obama,” under whose administration “funds appropriated for Central America hit a 
high of $754 million,” aid under President Donald Trump “steadily decreased” from $700 
million in his first year to $627 million in 2018. Id.  For El Salvador in particular, funding 
dropped from $46.3 million in 2018 to $45.7 million in 2019.  Chantal Da Silva, How Much 
Aid Does U.S. Give to Central America? Trump Says He’s Cutting Funding to El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras Over Migrant Caravan, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.newsweek.com/how-much-aid-does-us-give-central-america-trump-says-hes-
cutting-funding-el-1180732 [https://perma.cc/UZK9-HSMJ]. 
 402 Int’l Crisis Group, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 30.   
 403 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 6. 
 404 Id. at 7. 
 405 Int’l Crisis Group, Politics of Perpetual Violence, supra note 147, at 24. 
 406 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 8. 
 407 Id. at 6.   
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gang members.408  This has led to a lack of trust in law enforcement, and 
undermined public security.409  It has also had the consequence of El Salvador 
holding the unenviable record of the “second highest per capita prison 
population rate in the world,”410 second only to the U.S. 
    El Salvador should also turn away from a purely punitive policy towards 
gang offenders, and engage in sustained means of rehabilitation and 
reinsertion into society.  Prisons are not only overcrowded, but the conditions 
are dehumanizing, with gang members imprisoned in “sealed cells with no 
access to sunlight, for long periods of time.”411  During periods when the 
government has declared a state of emergency, conditions in the prisons 
worsened, with families unable to visit and bring necessities such as medicine 
or funds for the purchase of food, resulting in cases of severe malnutrition.412  
And although experts have identified rehabilitation of gang members as “an 
essential step toward a lasting reduction in violence, little has been achieved 
in this regard.”413  Legislative proposals to mandate rehabilitation have been 
“bogged down” in the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly since 2010.414  
 Beyond these targeted measures is the imperative to address the social 
inequality and marginalization that persists in El Salvador, leaving so many 
in poverty415 with limited to no pathways forward.416  El Salvador’s fiscal 
policies have contributed to these inequalities.  Taxing and spending is a 
means to redistribute wealth, and at sixteen percent, El Salvador has one of 
the lowest tax rates in Latin America.417  The U.S. and other foreign donors 
could encourage fiscal reforms that would begin to lessen inequality, by 
increasing the tax rate, closing loopholes to tax evasion, and using monies to 
 
 408 Int’l Crisis Group, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 7.  Tough law enforcement 
policies “together with the weakness of security forces’ internal accountability mechanisms, 
created a permissive environment for an increase in police and military abuses.”  Id. 
 409 Id. at 8.  “El Salvador’s police and army ranked among the least trusted security bodies 
in Latin America in 2018.”  Id. 
 410 Id. 
 411 Id. at 31.  
 412 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 19. 
 413 Int’l Crisis Group, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 30. 
 414 Id. at 31, n.187. 
 415 Although poverty dropped under successive FMLN Administrations, it is still high.  It 
dropped from 50.1% in 2009, to 44.5% in 2014, to 26.3% in 2018; and, extreme poverty 
dropped from 17.1% to 11.7% to 5.7%.  U.N. Economic Commission for Latin American and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), El Salvador: National Socio-Demographic Profile, CEPALSTAT: 
DATABASES AND STATISTICAL PUBLICATIONS (last visited March 2021), 
https://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/Perfil_Nacional_Social.html?pais=SLV&idioma=engl
ish [https://perma.cc/URU2-KBJ3]. 
 416 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 12.  “El Salvador has had the highest percentage 
of youth aged 15-24 who are not employed, in school, or in vocational training (28.4%) in 
Central America.”  Id. 
 417 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 12. 
EL SALVADOR ROOT CAUSES-04.05.2021.DOCX2- MUSALO HRPLJ V18-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2021  9:30 PM 
Summer 2021  EL SALVADOR: ROOT CAUSES & JUST ASYLUM POL’Y RESPONSES 253 
“strengthen domestic markets, create jobs, and improve food security,” 
instead of spending it to provide tax incentives for multinational 
corporations.418   
 The U.S. could engage in concrete measures to reduce poverty and 
inequality by redesigning trade agreements to support labor rights, the 
environment, and small-scale farmers,419 and ensuring that all projects funded 
by the U.S. “comply with human rights, core labor and environmental 
standards” and are developed in partnership with the affected 
communities.420 
 
ii. Strengthening the Rule of Law and Reducing Impunity 
 
 Impunity and pervasive corruption are long-standing problems in El 
Salvador.  A 2007 study commissioned by the United Nations Development 
Fund (UNDP) reported a 97% impunity rate.421  A subsequent investigation 
in 2015 reported a 98.7% impunity rate in homicide cases.422  A more recent 
analysis issued in 2018 by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for 
Internally Displaced Persons noted the failure to carry out investigations for 
“even the most serious crimes, including homicides,”423 reporting that the 
overall criminal conviction rate in El Salvador was less than 5%.  There is 
“near total impunity for sexual crimes,”424 as well as for abuses committed 
by state security forces.425  Deep-seated deficiencies, including incompetency 
and corruption,  have been identified across the key institutions responsible 
for effective law enforcement – the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary.   
 
a. The National Civil Police 
 
 The Peace Accords which brought an end to El Salvador’s civil conflict 
created the National Civil Police (PNC) to replace security forces which had 
 
 418 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 13. 
 419 See id. at 10-12. 
 420 Id. at 12. 
 421 Musalo, supra note 1, at 66-67. 
 422 U.K. HOME OFFICE, COUNTRY POLICY AND INFORMATION NOTE, EL SALVADOR: FEAR 
OF GANGS 79 (Jan. 2021), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/951926/El_Salvador_-_CPIN_-_Fear_of_gangs_.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HNP-SXTE] 
[hereinafter U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2021] (finding that only 1.3% of all homicides cases 
resulted in convictions). 
 423 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2021, supra note 422, at 79. 
 424 Id. at 82. 
 425 See World Report 2021: El Salvador Events of 2020, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/el-salvador#194231 
[https://perma.cc/W4CU-EH8V]. 
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carried out massive human rights violations during the war.426  The PNC was 
constituted of twenty percent former police, twenty percent FMLN, and sixty 
percent civilian recruits,427 and was “[o]riginally designed in the peace accord 
to have a community-oriented role[.]” 428  Ninety percent of the officers come 
from “humble social backgrounds” and their salaries are relatively low, 
resulting in many of them living in areas under the control of gangs, which 
puts them at risk.429  At the same time, the PNC has been involved in an 
increasing number of human rights violations, with credible allegations of  
extrajudicial executions, extortion and sexual abuse of minors,”430 among 
other crimes.  In order to conceal their misdeeds, the PNC have lied and 
destroyed or rearranged evidence at the scene of the crime.  The problem of 
abuses has been exacerbated by the incorporation of the military in security 
operations.  The high levels of violence at the hands of the police and military 
have led some Salvadorans to state that they fear the authorities as much as 
the gangs.431 
 The situation of violence and corruption by the PNC is compounded by 
lack of competency and professionalism.  The Salvadoran Constitution432 
assigns to the PNC the role of collaborating in the investigation of crime.  The 
lack of proper coordination between the PNC and the FGR has been a long-
standing deficiency,433 worsened by the PNC’s faulty or inadequate 
collection and preservation of evidence at the crime scene, its lack of interest 
in improving and modernizing techniques for crime investigation, and failure 
to identify and interview witnesses.434  Most recently, the PNC not only failed 
to coordinate with the FGR, but it blocked the entry into government offices 
of prosecutors carrying out raids related to allegations of corruption in the 
expenditure of pandemic funds.435  This was a monumental act of obstruction, 
leading the FGR to express its lack of confidence in the PNC, and to call for, 
 
 426 See Charles T. Call, Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule 
of Law in El Salvador, 35 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 827, 831-34 (2003). 
 427 Id. at 833. 
 428 Int’l Crisis Group, Politics of Perpetual Violence, supra note 147, at 6. 
 429 Id. at 5-6. 
 430 Id. at 6. 
 431 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2021, supra note 422, at 80. 
 432 See El Salvador’s Constitution of 1983 with Amendments through 2014, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT (July 15, 2016), 
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/els127410E.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8BU-XKZP] 
[hereinafter El Salvador Constitution, Eng.]. 
 433 CGRS/RHRC Interview with Sidney Blanco Reyes, supra note 46. 
 434 Id. (listing these as issues which existed when he completed his United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) report, and which still persist today). 
 435 EL SALVADOR PERSPECTIVES, supra note 181. 
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among other things, the creation of a new body to replace the PNC in the 
collaborative role of a partner in crime investigation.436   
  There is need for a major overhaul of the approach to public security.  
Removing the military from its current law enforcement function, and 
reforming the police are critically necessary first steps.  The Salvadoran 
Constitution requires that the PNC act “in accordance with the law and with 
strict respect for Human Rights,”437 – training should reflect that mandate.  
Putting in place procedures to identify, investigate, and act promptly in all 
cases of officer misconduct438 would ensure that commitments to respect 
human rights are not toothless.439  Police involvement in the rape and killing 
of women and members of the LGBTQ community underscores the urgency 
for human rights training to counter normalized violence against these 
populations.  The international community, including the U.S., should 
support and encourage such training.  NGOs have cautioned against U.S. 
direct involvement in training, observing  that it was not “well-placed” to do 
so, given the “controversy over policing in the United States today.”440  And, 
a September 2018 report by the Government Accountability Office found that 
U.S. police training in El Salvador had not succeeded in establishing 
“consistent human rights-related objectives in its police professionalization 
programs.”441  A more fruitful approach would be to involve Salvadoran and 
international NGOS in training, including on how to develop a community 
policing approach,442 and to incorporate Salvadoran civil society 





 436 Gabriela Cáceres & Roxana Lazo, Así Sería la Nueva Policía Fiscal Que Raúl Melara 
Pide a la Asamblea [This Would be the New Prosecutor’s Police that Raul Melera Requests 




 437 El Salvador Constitution, Eng., supra note 432, at 41, art. 159. 
 438 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 9. 
 439 Very few violations by police officers are prosecuted and end in a conviction. 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) et al., Gaps in Human Rights Protections in El 
Salvador, 1 CENT. AM. MONITOR 1, 9-11 (Sept. 2019), https://www.wola.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/Derechos-Humanos-SV-ENG-4.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL46-
QKE5] (showing, for example, that in 2017-2018, of the 1,590 human rights complaints 
handled by the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights, about 70% of these complaints 
were against PNC officers, and demonstrating that very few human rights violations were 
prosecuted, and even fewer ended up in a conviction). 
 440 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 9. 
 441 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 27.  
 442 Int’l Crisis Group, Mirage or Miracle?, supra note 35, at 31-32. 
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b. The Prosecutor General of the Republic  
 
 The Fiscalia General de la Republica (FGR) [Prosecutor General of the 
Republic] is responsible for directing criminal investigations, and initiating 
prosecution of those accused of crimes.443  The head of the FGR, the 
Prosecutor General, is appointed by majority vote of the Legislative 
Assembly.  This has tended to politicize the institution, resulting in the 
protection of corrupt incumbents, and the prosecution of political enemies.444   
 The FGR has been criticized for lack of competency, disregard for human 
rights, and malfeasance.445  Failure to effectively carry out investigations has 
led to exceedingly high levels of impunity.  The majority of homicides “are 
not investigated, nor go to trial, and of those that do go to trial, only a minority 
reach a verdict.”446  At the same time, there is pressure on prosecutors to meet 
a certain monthly quota of accusations and arrests, in order to give the 
appearance of being effective.447  The presumption of innocence is frequently 
ignored, with massive sweeps and arrests of suspected gang members, and 
lengthy pre-trial detention.448  Affirmative misconduct has also been alleged, 
implicating prosecutors in acting in concert with the police in destroying or 
tampering with evidence at the scene of a crime.449  
 Training is an essential first step in addressing deficiencies of the FGR; 
the improvement of investigative abilities, especially in complex cases is 
 
 443 El Salvador Constitution, Eng., supra note 432, at 50, art. 193. 
 444 See Sonja Wolf, Subverting Democracy: Elite Rule and the Limits to Political 
Participation in Post-War El Salvador, 41 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 429 (2009). 
 445 A recent editorial discussing meaningful reform of the FGR began by listing its 
deficiencies: 
El nombramiento politico de su titular, las deficiencias en la investigacion, 
las relativamente pocas condenas que se consiguen en los tribunales, la 
impunidad, el centralismo autoritario, la mala relacion con la PNC en 
casos importantes, y, a la vez, la tendencia a aceptar sin critica la 
information policial sobre delitos sin mayor repercussion social son 
algunas de las multiples deficiencias de la institucion. [The political 
appointment of its head official, the deficiencies in  investigations, the 
relatively few convictions that are obtained in the courts, impunity, 
authoritarianism, the poor relationship with the PNC in important cases, 
and, at the same time, the tendency to uncritically accept police 
information on crimes without any significant social repercussion are 
some of the multiple deficiencies of the institution.] 
Editorial UCA, Una Propuesta Disparatada [A Wild Proposal], NOTICIAS UCA (Nov. 30, 
2020) https://noticias.uca.edu.sv/editoriales/una-propuesta-disparatada 
[https://perma.cc/4WMQ-5JLL]. 
 446 U.K. COUNTRY NOTE, 2020, supra note 2, at 71.   
 447 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 39. 
 448 Id. at 38.   
 449 Id. at 39. 
EL SALVADOR ROOT CAUSES-04.05.2021.DOCX2- MUSALO HRPLJ V18-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2021  9:30 PM 
Summer 2021  EL SALVADOR: ROOT CAUSES & JUST ASYLUM POL’Y RESPONSES 257 
“indispensable.”450  There is also the necessity of incorporating international 
human rights standards into the FGR’s operations.451  Performance standards 
related to professional competency and ethics should be put in place as a 
means of evaluation and oversight, and support by the U.S. and other donors 
should impose clear benchmarks for continued funding.  An additional 
positive reform to the FGR would be adopting an appointment process for 
the Fiscal General that is transparent, involves civil society, and is based on 
qualifications, not political connections.452   
 As mentioned in Section I.C.2, the recent collaboration of CICIES with 
the FGR in investigating allegations of financial impropriety against various 
high-level government officials is an encouraging sign.  The CICIG 
experience in Guatemala demonstrates the measurable contribution to 
strengthening rule of law that such a body can have.  International 
endorsement and support for an independent CICIES, expressed through 
diplomacy as well as funding, would be a positive development in El 
Salvador, and align with the calls of civil society. 
 
c. The Judiciary 
 
 When El Salvador’s civil war came to an end, a Truth Commission was 
created to investigate human rights violations committed during the conflict.  
The inadequate state of El Salvador’s judiciary at the time is illustrated by 
the Truth Commission’s decision not to send any cases to the domestic courts 
for prosecution, finding that “El Salvador has no system for the 
administration of justice which meets the minimum requirements for 
objectivity and impartiality so that justice can be rendered reliably.”453  
Judicial reforms implemented since have led to some improvement, but a 
more recent assessment noted that, notwithstanding substantial foreign 
assistance, El Salvador still did not have the “kind of judiciar[y] usually 
associated with a liberal democracy.”454  Partisan influence, corruption, and 
lack of competency are rife within the judicial system.  
 The selection process of judges contributes to undue influence of 
political parties, and opportunities for corruption.455  The Legislative 
Assembly appoints Supreme Court magistrates, who in turn select the judges 
for all the lower courts, choosing from a list generated by the Consejo 
Nacional de la Judicatura (CNJ) [National Judicial Council], which is also 
 
 450 Editorial UCA, supra note 445.  
 451 Id.  
 452 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 36-37. 
 453 RACHEL E. BOWEN, THE ACHILLES HEEL OF DEMOCRACY: JUDICIAL AUTONOMY AND 
THE RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL AMERICA 137 (2017). 
 454 Id. at 3. 
 455 Id. at 141. 
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appointed by the legislature.  The CNJ includes appellate court judges, 
representatives from the Public Ministry, public and private law schools, and 
members of the legal profession.456  This selection process, with the heavy 
involvement of the legislature and other influential actors, “opens up multiple 
avenues for corruption beyond simple partisan influence.”457  The payment 
of bribes is common,458 and “[p]owerful individuals can evade justice by 
exerting pressure on the judiciary.”459  Misconduct is so prevalent that in the 
eight month period from January to August 2019, El Salvador’s Supreme 
Court, which has the authority to discipline judges, “heard cases against 110 
judges accused of various irregularities, including collusion with criminal 
groups.”460  The quality and knowledge level of many judges has also been 
considered to be inadequate, with the system lacking ongoing evaluations to 
ensure that judges understand new legislative developments, as well as 
interpretations underlying rationales of significant national and international 
jurisprudence.461 
 Another impediment to the effective functioning of the courts is the 
manner in which judges and their staff are assigned throughout the country.462  
Instead of distributing them on the basis of case volume, they are assigned 
according to “administrative divisions” with the result that judges working in 
areas with high levels of violence “process up to ten times more cases than 
colleagues in quieter municipalities[.]”463  The saturation of cases has 
contributed to delays in prosecutions, which have resulted in long periods of 
pretrial detention.464  The crushing number of cases in some courts have also 
led to the “dehumanization” of judicial personnel who do not see the person 
being prosecuted “as an innocent person as the Constitution guarantees,” but 
as someone who is presumed to be guilty.465     
 Recommendations for addressing problems in the judiciary are not 
dissimilar to those made above in relation to the FGR.  The selection process 
should be non-partisan and based on qualifications rather than political 
connections.  There should be ongoing training, as well as a means to evaluate 
judges as to knowledge, competency, and ethics.  The process of acting on 
complaints against judges should be depoliticized, perhaps taking it out of 
the hands of the Supreme Court, and assigning it to a neutral commission.  
 
 456 BOWEN, supra note 453, at 214. 
 457 Id.  
 458 See Int’l Crisis Group, Politics of Perpetual Violence, supra note 147, at 7. 
 459 FREEDOM HOUSE, El Salvador, supra note 120. 
 460 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 8. 
 461 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 40. 
 462 See Int’l Crisis Group, Politics of Perpetual Violence, supra note 147, at 5. 
 463 Id.  
 464 IDHUCA, supra note 45, at 39. 
 465 Id. at 40. 
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As was noted in relation to international assistance to the FGR, aid should be 
conditioned on measurable benchmarks. 
 There are a number of non-governmental organizations – many within El 
Salvador – which have long dedicated themselves to analyzing these issues.  
Their investigations and recommendations provide an invaluable resource for 
policymakers crafting U.S. initiatives addressing violence prevention, 
impunity and strengthening of rule of law.  The measures mentioned in this 
section are just a condensed overview of recommendations which have been 
developed in much more depth by these organizations.  
 
B. Addressing the Impact of Climate Change 
 
 Climate change and water scarcity are significant factors in forced 
migration.  Increasingly frequent and severe tropical storms, which kill 
people and destroy homes, have impacted the agricultural sector, with 
devastating impact on small farmers.  Crop failures exacerbate food 
insecurity and make it even more difficult for rural farmers to support 
themselves.  Government failure to properly regulate the water supply has 
allowed private interests to restrict public access to water through overuse 
and pollution.  Although addressing global climate change is a larger 
challenge, which is beyond the scope of this article, the U.S. and international 
donors could direct funding towards adaptation and mitigation measures, and 
could encourage El Salvador to adopt policies consistent with these goals.   
 
i. Enacting a Water Law   
  
 Among the most pressing matters facing Salvadorans is lack of access to 
potable water.466  By passing the General Water Law, thereby “protect[ing] 
water as human right” and integrating community concerns into water policy, 
El Salvador would regain power over its own waters, laying the groundwork 
for better water protections and broader access for more Salvadorans.467  
Absent passage of sweeping water legislation, the status quo of “priority 
water usage” for “industrial plantations, mining corporations, luxury housing 
developments, and bottling companies,” as well as the resulting “gap in 
[potable water] access,” is likely to persist.468  “Water management must not 
be left to the market but include the participation of civil society 
organizations and communities.”469 
 
 
 466 See Hunter-Smith, supra note 229.  
 467 Id. 
 468 Gies, supra note 226. 
 469 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 15. 
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ii. Upgrading El Salvador’s Water System 
 
 Compounding El Salvador’s water scarcity problem is the degraded 
condition of its water system, which allows for extensive leakage and loss of 
water.  Continued investment in improved piping could increase access to 
water.  A prior U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact,470 
from 2007-2012, included a water and sanitation component, whose 
objective was to “enhance access to water systems and to improve sanitation 
services to the poorest inhabitants in the Northern Zone of El Salvador.”471  
Through this project new pipelines were installed or existing pipes were 
upgraded in more than 7,500 homes.472  This increased the percentage of 
Salvadorans that had access to water and the quality of the water sanitation.473 
Projects such as these need to be scaled in light of the challenges; as of 2016, 
more than 600,000 Salvadorans remained without access to any drinking 
water, and over a million had access to only poor water service.474   
 
iii. Constructing Irrigated Greenhouses 
 
 Small scale farmers whose survival depends on the success of their crops 
can be devastated by drought or storms that result in meager or no harvests.  
The construction of irrigated greenhouses has been a successful measure in 
mitigating the impact of climate change.  The greenhouses can be constructed 
at a relatively low-cost, using wood, netting, plastic, and coconut fiber.475   
 
 470 MCC compacts are “large, 5-year grants for countries that pass MCC’s eligibility 
criteria” that “complement other U.S. and international development programs.” Millennium 
Challenge Corp., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, https://oig.usaid.gov/MCC?page=7 
[https://perma.cc/7SRA-JKBM]. 
 471 Measuring Results of the El Salvador Water and Sanitation Sub-Activity, MILLENNIUM 
CHALLENGE CORP. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/summary-measuring-
results-of-the-el-salvador-water-and-sanitation-sub-activ [https://perma.cc/X8KE-8QX2] 
[hereinafter Measuring Results]. 
 472 Marissa Taylor, 10 Facts About Sanitation in El Salvador, BORGEN PROJECT (Apr. 8, 
2020), https://borgenproject.org/10-facts-about-sanitation-in-el-salvador/ 
[https://perma.cc/KT8X-KYQX].   
 473  Measuring Results, supra note 471. 
 474 Observaciones Preliminares del Relator Especial sobre el Derecho Humano al Agua 
Potable y al Saneamiento al Concluir su Misión Oficial a El Salvador del 11-18 de Mayo de 
2016 [Preliminary Observations of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe 
Drinking Water and Sanitation at the Conclusion of his Official Mission to El Salvador on 
May 11-18, 2016], UNITED NATIONS: OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19974&LangID
=E [https://perma.cc/EE52-ZR7D]. 
 475 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) et al., The 
International Symposium on Agricultural Innovation for Family Farmers: 20 Success Stories 
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The building of irrigated greenhouses “has drastically reduced crop losses 
and improved farmers’ incomes.”476  The green houses allow for high quality 
vegetable production “year round . . . with fewer inputs, pesticides and 
fertilizers,” even in the face of  drought and storms.477  In an area where 
farmers came together to build greenhouses for common use, they later 
“upscaled their activities and markets by creating a cooperative.”478   
 
iv. Diversifying Crops and Switching to Drought Resistant 
Crops 
 
 Diversifying crops, including switching to drought resistance crops 
increases resilience in the face of climate change.  For example, in 2018, the 
World Food Program (WFP) assisted farmers who grew only grains to 
incorporate the growing of vegetables into their planting.479  These farmers 
could select from among a variety of “heat and water-stress resistant crop 
varieties.”480  This benefited the families by increasing their “dietary 
diversity,” and generating “additional incomes” for them.481  
 Selection of crops that can better survive unpredictable weather 
conditions is an integral adaptation strategy.  Increased and ongoing 
development assistance in this area would “help [both] small and medium 
producers increase food security.”482  The selection of appropriate crops can 
also contribute to the health of the environment by preventing soil erosion.483  
A switch to the use of heirloom seeds in lieu of imported seeds can also result 




of Agricultural Innovation from the Innovation Fair, FAO 14 (2018), 
http://www.fao.org/3/CA2588EN/ca2588en.pdf#page=12 [https://perma.cc/6YEV-VHQS]. 





 477 FAO, The International Symposium, supra note 475, at 14. 
 478 Id. 
 479 El Salvador Annual Country Report 2018: Country Strategic Plan 2017-2021, WORLD 
FOOD PROGRAMME 11 (2018), https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-
0000104305/download/ [https://perma.cc/52BR-M67J] [hereinafter WFP, El Salvador 2018]. 
 480 Id.  
 481 Id. 
 482 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 16. 
 483 Id. 
 484 Id. 
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v. Adopting Policies to Conserve Water and Reduce Pollution 
in Coffee Production 
  
 Existing practices in the coffee industry result in the  waste and pollution 
of  water.  “Wet mills,” are a key step in the process of transforming a coffee 
“cherry” into the coffee bean.485  Traditional wet mills use large quantities of 
water and discard the untreated wastewater and coffee pulp after use, 
dumping them into waterways.486  Such wet mills use over seventy-five liters 
of water per kilogram of parchment coffee (untreated coffee beans), which 
contributes to the strain on El Salvador’s clean water supply.487  By contrast, 
ecological mills that use gravity instead of water use less than one liter of 
water to process the same amount.488   
 There are examples of positive experiences with the use of ecological 
mills in Nicaragua. During the 2016-2017 harvest, Catholic Relief Services’ 
Blue Harvest Project replaced six traditional wet mills in Nicaragua with 
improved ecological wet mills, allowing farmers to process 1,760 quintales489 
of green coffee while saving 1.1 million liters of water.490  El Salvador is 
expected to export over 451,000 sixty-kilogram bags of coffee for the 
marketing year 2019-2020, which, while low by historic standards, is still a 
large drain on the country’s already strained water supply.491  Supporting 
investment in more efficient ecological wet mills could save the country 
millions of liters to be redirected for “drinking water or other productive 
purposes such as irrigating crops.”492 
 
 
 485 Kraig Kraft, Wet Mills and Water Use, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES: COFFEELANDS 
(Oct. 5, 2016), https://coffeelands.crs.org/2016/10/wet-mills-and-water-use/ 
[https://perma.cc/2MY8-VGET]. 
 486 Kraig Kraft, Coffee Wet Mill Makeovers on the Cheap!!, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES: 
COFFEELANDS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://coffeelands.crs.org/2018/01/coffee-wet-mill-
makeovers-on-the-cheap/ [https://perma.cc/5D4W-GDFP].    
 487 SPECIALTY COFFEE ASS’N AM., WHITE PAPER: A BLUEPRINT FOR WATER SECURITY IN 
THE COFFEELANDS 6 (2016), http://www.scaa.org/PDF/scaa-wp-water-security.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FZ8U-CLHU]. 
 488 Kraig Kraft, Saving Water with New Ecological Wet Mill Designs, CATHOLIC RELIEF 
SERVICES: COFFEELANDS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://coffeelands.crs.org/2018/03/saving-water-
with-new-ecological-wet-mill-designs/ [https://perma.cc/GJU3-PAJV]. 
 489 Id.   
 490 Id. 
 491 MIGUEL HERRERA, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., ES2020-0010, EL 




 492 Kraft, Saving Water, supra note 488. 
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vi. Investing in Environmentally Beneficial Measures and 
Supporting Disaster Risk Strategies 
 
 There are strategies that protect the environment, and help subsistence 
farmers build resilience through adaptation.493  The World Food Program has 
trained farmers in “sustainable soil and water conservation practices, 
agroforestry and reforestation,” and the use of organic fertilizers and 
renewable energy sources for irrigation systems.494  WFP also worked with 
small farmers to plant fruit and forest trees, an important contribution in a 
country with high levels of deforestation and soil erosion.495    
 Preparing for and responding to natural and climate change disasters is 
another key strategy towards mitigation of the impacts of climate change; it 
not only save lives, but helps communities rebuild post-disaster.496  The U.N. 
Food and Agricultural Organization implemented a “resilience programme” 
in El Salvador’s Dry Corridor “to strengthen the disaster risk management 
capacities of the national and local authorities[.]”497  U.S. and international 
assistance to support such planning, especially if it is carried out with the 
involvement of civil society organizations, can ameliorate the worst impacts 
of disasters such as drought and storms.498     
 All of the above measures can help reduce the impact of climate change 
and contribute to the well-being of Salvadorans facing storms, droughts, and 




 The legal and moral obligations of the United States in response to forced 
migration should be twofold: the protection of migrants fleeing for their lives, 
and the commitment to address root causes for flight.  The imperative to do 
so is more pronounced in light of the U.S.’s role in contributing to the current 
situation in El Salvador – whether by supporting the brutal military during El 
Salvador’s civil war, deporting gang members back to a country ill-equipped 
to deal with them, or encouraging neoliberal economic policies that deepened 
inequality.   
 This article details the conditions which compel Salvadorans to flee.  In 
doing so, it provides a context for evaluating our asylum policies, as well as 
 
 493 See WFP, El Salvador 2018, supra note 479. 
 494 Id. at 15.  
 495 Id.   
 496 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 16. 
 497 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2015-2016 El Niño: Early 
Action and Response for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, FAO 22 (working draft, 
Aug. 2016), http://www.fao.org/3/i6049e/i6049e.pdf. 
 498 Serve Your People, supra note 400, at 16. 
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envisioning root cause strategies.  The transition from the Trump to Biden 
administration provides a unique opportunity to reform our asylum system to 
bring it into greater compliance with international standards and the 
humanitarian objectives of the Refugee Protocol.  It is also an opportune time 
to reset relations between the two countries, so as to ensure that our 
engagement ameliorates rather than worsens the conditions that result in 
forced migration.   
 Over the four years of Trump’s presidency, we heard quite a bit of 
rhetoric about building walls, and witnessed significant resources allocated 
to their actual construction.499  It should not have to be said, but real solutions 
do not consist in the building of walls.  People desperate to save their lives 
will not be deterred by walls, although the building of walls will make their 
journey more dangerous and lead to greater death and suffering. 
 The priest and human rights activist Peter Hinde expressed this sentiment 
quite eloquently, cautioning that it is a false belief that “something so frail 
and ephemeral as a wall can ever be an effective shield against the tide of 
history [i.e. the forced migration of desperate people].” 500  But it is not only 
that walls are ineffective; building walls to keep out those who are struggling 
to survive is a betrayal of U.S. commitment to human rights and the 
protection of refugees.  It is also a profound moral failure: “‘If we don’t 
develop a different attitude. . . we’re going to be like people in a lifeboat, 
beating on those who are trying to climb in.’”501   
 
 499 It was reported that under Trump, $15 billion was allocated for building 453 miles of 
border wall. Jane Tim, Fact check: Mexico never paid for it.  But what about Trump’s other 
border wall promises?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2021), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/fact-check-mexico-never-paid-it-what-
about-trump-s-n1253983.  
 500 Lustgarten, supra note 476. 
 501 Id. (quoting Rev. Peter Hinde).  
